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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(4), Appellant states as 
follows: The Court of Appeals of Utah has appellate jurisdiction 
over cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court. Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 78-2-2(3) (j) as this case 
presents an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals did not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), Appellant states the 
issues presented for review, the standard for review, and 
demonstrates that each issue was preserved below. 
With respect to Appellee Hales and Warner Construction, 
Inc., hereinafter *Appellee H & W", the issue presented for 
review is: 
1. In Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322, 327(Utah 
1999), the Supreme Court held that a principle employer is 
subject to liability for injuries arising out of an 
independent contractor's work if the employer is "actively 
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of 
performance of the contracted for work." The issue presented 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by this appeal is whether "active participation'' exists when 
the principal employer becomes actively involved in or exerts 
control over the performance and manner of the work of the 
contractor, or sub-contractor, or whether active participation 
exists only when the employer exerts control over the method 
and choice to engage in the specific act that results in the 
injury. 
Citation to record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and 
arguing same in their Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Hales & Warner 
Construction, Inc.'s and Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment of the Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints (alternatively referred to as "CPB"), See Record, 
hereinafter referred to as "R," at 884. 
Standard of Review: The record of this case must be viewed 
in a light favorable to Appellants. Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992); 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App. 
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1992) . This Court must examine a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, with "no deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions." Jones, 834 P.2d at 558. This 
is true whether the issue presented on summary judgment is one 
of law or equity. See Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
797 (Utah App. 1992) (applying summary judgment standard on 
review of an injunction); Vergote v. K Mart Corp., 158 Mich. 
App. 96, 404 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. App. 1987) (applying suiranary 
judgment standard on claim for specific performance). When 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court reviews the 
record, including all inferences arising therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Hill, 827 
P.2d at 242. As a matter of law, this case's entire record, 
including any inferences that might arise from the facts in 
favor of Appellant's argument, must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to Appellants. See Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l 
Bank, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 81, 849 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1993). 
With respect to the Appellee CPB the issues presented for 
review are: 
2. Whether a principle employer is subject to liability for 
injuries arising out of an independent contractor's work under 
the "retained-control doctrine" by virtue of the existence of 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a contract in which the principle employer retained sufficient 
control over the manner or method of the work, without respect 
to whether such contractual rights were in fact exercised. 
Citation to record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court: Appellants preserved this in the same manner as 
they preserved Issue No. 1 above,(by raising and arguing same in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions for Summary 
Judgment), See R. 884. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this second 
issue is the same as stated above for Issue No. 1. 
3 . Whether the relationship of principle employer and independent 
contractor can exist when the principle employer possesses the 
right to accept or reject any subcontractor or employee 
selected by the purported independent contractor. 
Citation to record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court: Appellants preserved this in the same manner as 
they preserved Issue No. 1 above,(by raising and arguing same in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions for Summary 
Judgment), See R. 884. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this second 
issue is the same as stated above for Issue No. 1. 
6 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (7), Appellant states as 
follows: 
i. Nature of the Case: The Appellant brought a 
wrongful death action on behalf of its decedent Jason Smith, 
against the Appellee H & W and Appellee CPB. Jason Smith died on 
a construction site. Appellee H & W was the general contractor 
of the construction project, and Appellee CPB was the owner of 
land as well as the building that Appellees constructed. 
2. Course of Proceedings: The Appellant filed its 
complaint. The Appellees each filed Answers. Immediately after 
discovery commenced, the Appellees each filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed a request pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(f) to postpone consideration of the Motions, as well 
as substantive responses. The court granted the Rule 56(f) 
requests and discovery proceeded. At the conclusion of discovery 
the Appellees renewed their Motions for Summary Judgment and 
those motions were heard and decided by the Hon. Claudia Laycock 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
3. Disposition below and previously: The district court 
granted Appellee's respective motions for summary judgment and 
this appeal followed. The Appellees each filed Motions for 
7 
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Summary Disposition in this Court, and each respective motion 
was denied by this Court. 
IV, STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7), Appellant states as 
follows: The Appellee CPB entered into a contract for the 
construction of a house of worship known as the Highland 4 and 
20 Project. Deposition of Dean Schick, hereinafter "Schick 
Depo," at page 9, excerpts attached as Exhibit 1 to the 
Addendum; Contract documents attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 
2 ("Agreement"), and Exhibit 3 ("Conditions of the Contract"). 
There was an invitation to bid on the project and subsequently a 
bid opening. CPB chose Appellee H & W as general contractor for 
the project. Hales and Warner entered into a contract with the 
Appellee CPB for the construction of the Highland 4 and 20 
Project. The Appellee CPB retained the right to approve or 
reject any subcontractor of employee engaged by Appellee H & W 
to complete the work or any part of the work. Conditions of the 
Contract, attached as Exhibit 3, at Paragraph 5.1(B) through 
(C), page 5 of 12, and Paragraph 6.1(A), page 6 of 12. Appellee 
H & W commenced work on the project. 
The Appellee H & W submitted a list of subcontractors that 
it intended to use to perform the majority of the work required 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by the project and the Appellee CPB, along with Paul Evans, the 
architect whom the Appellee CPB hired to assist it, reviewed the 
list and approved of each subcontractor. Schick Depo at pages 
30,31-32, attached as Exhibit 1; Deposition of Paul Evans, 
hereinafter "Evans Depo," at pages 33-34, 80, excerpts attached 
as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum. 
The subcontractor chosen for the framing of the Highland 4 
and 20 project was Third Party Defendant Brent Reynolds 
Construction, Inc., hereinafter UBRC." BRC hired Egbert 
Construction to perform the actual framing, but supplied the 
materials necessary for the framing. See deposition of Brent 
Reynolds, hereinafter xxReynolds Depo," at page 8, excerpts 
attached as Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. Defendant BRC, in the 
course of the framing project, sent its own employees to assist 
in the framing. Reynolds Depo at page 10, attached as Exhibit 4. 
The Egbert Construction foreman, Ken Egbert, took direction and 
instruction from Brent Reynolds, President of Brent Reynolds 
Construction, Inc. Reynolds Depo at pages 25-27, attached as 
Exhibit 4. Brent Reynolds testified that H & W Superintendent 
Maurice Egbert continually interfered with the framing process 
from beginning to end, and in the event that there was a dispute 
with regard to framing methods or details, Brent Reynolds 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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instructed Ken Egbert to do it the Hales & Warner way. Reynolds 
Depo at pages 25-27 and 33, attached as Exhibit 4. 
Appellants' decedent, Jason Smith, among others, became 
employed by Ken Egbert to frame the Highland 4 and 20 Project. 
Appellee CPB knew that Egbert Construction was the primary 
framer on the Highland 4 and 20 Project and did not object or 
disapprove of the use of Egbert construction. On August 13, 
1999, while framing a wall, Jason Smith was killed when a wall 
fell upon him and crushed his skull. 
The Appellee H & W was actively involved in the framing 
process, asserted control over the framing process, and asserted 
control over the manner of performance of the contracted for 
work. The following facts in the record demonstrate this active 
participation and control: 
a. Brent Reynolds, President of Third Party Defendant Brent 
Reynolds Construction, Inc., stated as follows to Clifford 
Hales, President of Appellee Hales & Warner: 
From the very beginning, your superintendent, [Maurice 
Egbert], interfered with the framing process, telling [the 
framers] that they couldn't do it [the] way they were used to 
framing and caused the framers many problems, costing extra 
time and material. This interference continued through out the 
framing of the building... 
See Letter from Defendant BRC to Appellee H & W, Attached as 
Exhibit 5 to the Addendum. 
10 
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b. Brent Reynolds testified about at least three different 
specific instances where H & W manifested control over the 
work of Egbert Construction's employees. Reynolds Depo at 
pages 46-47, attached as Exhibit 4. 
c. Brent Reynolds stated that Maurice Egbert, the superintendent 
of the project for Appellee H & W Construction, Inc., wouldn't 
let his men frame walls the way they wanted to frame them. 
Reynolds Depo, at page 25, attached as Exhibit 4; 
d. Brent Reynolds stated that he, or Ken Egbert,(a framer more 
particularly identified below, with little or no relationship 
to Maurice Egbert),told Appellee H & W that it was not 
effective to frame the building the way that Appellee H & W 
wanted to frame it, but Appellee H & W made Brent Reynolds 
Construction, Inc.,and Egbert, frame the building "the Hales & 
Warner way." Reynolds Depo at pp 25-26, attached as Exhibit 4; 
e. Brent Reynolds said that Appellee H & W would not let him 
and/or Ken Egbert frame the building in the manner they wanted 
to frame the building. See Reynolds Depo at 25, attached as 
Exhibit 4, (emphasis supplied); 
f. Appellee H & W began interfering with the framing process on 
the day that the framing began. See Reynolds Depo at page 29, 
attached as Exhibit 4; 
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g. Brent Reynolds could not recall whether there was a single 
aspect of the framing process with which Appellee H & W did 
not interfere. See Reynolds Depo at page 28, attached as 
Exhibit 4,(emphasis supplied); 
h. The Appellee H & W's superintendent, Maurice Egbert, stated 
that he ufound problems'' with the framing, including the 
heights of walls, and that he made the framers tear one wall 
apart and rebuild it the way Appellee H & W wanted it built. 
See Deposition of Joel Warner, hereinafter "Warner Depo," at 
pages 49-50, excerpts attached as Exhibit 6 to the Addendum; 
Deposition of Maurice Egbert, hereinafter vxEgbert Depo," at 
page 56, excerpts attached as Exhibit 7 to the Addendum. 
i. H & W Superintendent Maurice Egbert testified how he became 
especially watchful of the framers' work and directly ordered 
much correction for the work of all of the framing employees. 
Egbert Depo at pages 56-57, 65-66, 69, 70-71, 72-74, 76-77, 
79, attached as Exhibit 7. Maurice Egbert says that several 
times he would find error in the framers' work, and order them 
to redo the job the way the way H & W wanted. Id., at 70-71. 
j. During Egbert Construction's first day on the job site, H & 
W's Joel Warner questioned Ken Egbert at length about his work 
experience, framing ability, his crew and all other aspects of 
12 
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his ability to do the framing job. Warner Depo at pages 39-42, 
attached as Exhibit 6. 
k. H & W's superintendent (Maurice Egbert) learned that the 
framers had no experience framing churches, and this is why 
the framers got behind schedule. Maurice Egbert Depo at page 
56, attached as Exhibit 7. 
1. Maurice admits talking to Ken Egbert about framing and 
learning that Egbert Construction was an inexperienced 
company, and he therefore watched the framers very closely. 
Maurice Egbert Depo at 76-77, attached as Exhibit 7. Maurice 
Egbert also told Joel Warner about the framers inexperience 
and errors, and Joel Warner then told Maurice to closely watch 
the framers and to check their work. Id. at 79. 
m. Joel Warner alleged that the Appellee CPB, through its 
architect, Paul Evans, instructed Appellee H & W to tell the 
framers to build the wall to a specified height. See Warner 
Depo at 46, attached as Exhibit 6. 
n. The architect, Paul Evans, testified that he never observed 
any walls that needed to be torn down and did not give any 
instruction to destroy any walls. Evans Depo at page 48, 
attached as Exhibit 8. 
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o. The architect, Paul Evans, admits receiving information about 
interference by H & W into the framing process. Evans Depo at 
pages 69-70, attached as Exhibit 8. Evans read H & W's daily 
reports and was aware of H & W's interference into the framing 
process, which he reported to CPB. Evans Depo at pages 63-72, 
attached as Exhibit 8. 
p. Dean Schick, an employee of the Appellee CPB, also stated that 
nothing was installed incorrectly on the project. Schick Depo 
at page 24, attached as Exhibit 1. 
q. Michel Lewis was an Egbert Construction employee and fellow 
wall-lifter with Jason Smith. Michael Lewis admits that 
Egbert Construction employees were supposed to wear hard hats, 
but nobody corrected them on their decision to not wear the 
hats. Deposition of Michael Lewis, hereinafter "Lewis Depo," 
at pages 17-18, excerpts attached as Exhibit 19 to the 
Addendum. Jason Smith died partly as a result of not wearing 
a hard hat. Mr. Lewis states that Jason Smith was never 
trained on how to do anything, and was just told to start 
performing dangerous work without any supervision or training. 
Lewis Depo at pages 24-25, attached as Exhibit 19. H & W's 
Maurice Egbert gave daily orders to all the framers. Lewis 
Depo at page 54, attached as Exhibit 19. 
14 
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r. H & W bears responsibility for Jason Smith's death because 
aside from manifesting control over all aspects of the framing 
process that caused the death of Jason Smith, H & W held the 
power to stop workers from working if they were too young or 
inexperienced. Maurice Egbert Depo at pages 73-74, attached as 
Exhibit 7. Jason Smith was too young and inexperienced for the 
job site. Lewis Depo at pages 24-25, attached as Exhibit 19. 
When Jason Smith suffered his injury and death, it was Maurice 
Egbert who called for 911. Lewis Depo at pages 12-13, attached 
as Exhibit 19. 
s,H & W's VP Joel Warner admits that H & W general contractor 
had a duty to keep a safe and clean site. Warner Depo at 
pages 84-85, attached as Exhibit 6. 
t. Appellee H & W told the framers (i) how many men to employ, 
(ii) told the framers the time frame within which they had to 
complete, or substantially complete, the framing, and (iii) 
dictated the experience level of the men hired to actually do 
the framing. This assertion is supported as by the following: 
l.On August 11, 1999, Clifford Hales, President of the 
Appellee H & W, sent a letter to Brent Reynolds which 
stated as follows: 
...You promised to have 12 men on the job. This has not 
happened. If you continue with the same number of framers, 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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you will not meet the 7 week framing schedule. We feel you 
need to immediately increase the number of framers, and 
provide proper supervision so as to meet the 7 week framing 
schedule. Please provide us a written framing schedule 
outlining manpower and target dates such as wall framing, 
roof framing, completion, etc. 
See Letter dated August 11, 1999, attached to the Addendum 
as Exhibit 9; (Also identified as Deposition Exhibit 34). 
2. What Appellee H & W meant by "proper supervision" was that 
they wanted * experienced" men/framers. Warner Depo at page 
79, attached as Exhibit 6 . 
3. On August 25, 1999, Clifford Hales again made the following 
statement in a letter to Brent Reynolds: 
This is a follow up to the letter dated August 11, 1999. 
You still have not had 12 men on the job as promised, and 
the job is getting further behind. Therefore, you are 
hereby notified that you are in breech [sic] of [our 
agreement]. Specifically, you have failed to employ 
sufficient competent help to complete the work in a 
reasonable time...Please...have sufficient men on the job site 
(12 or more men) by August 27, 1999, and continue to have 
sufficient men on each job day thereafter. 
See Letter dated August 25, 1999, attached to the Addendum 
as Exhibit 10;(Also identified as Deposition Exhibit 35). 
4. Appellee H & W also gave oral instructions to Brent Reynolds 
to put 12 or more framers on the job. Warner Depo at page 32, 
attached as Exhibit 6. 
5. Appellee H & W, through Joel Warner, controlled the time 
schedules for the construction project. Warner Depo at pages 
16 
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18-19, attached as Exhibit 6. Thus, Joel Warner controlled the 
time for beginning and completing the framing. 
6. The contract between Appellee H & W and Brent Reynolds 
Construction, Inc., did not provide for a specific number of 
men (framers) to be on site. Warner Depo at 32, attached as 
Exhibit 6. 
Because Appellee H & W actively participated in, and 
controlled the framing work, Appellee H & W is liable to 
Appellants for the injuries arising from the work. Appellee CPB 
is liable to the same extent as Appellee H & W. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (8), Appellants state as 
follows: The district court erred when it granted the Appellee H 
& W's Motion for Summary Judgment because Appellee H & W, the 
principle employer/general contractor, actively involved itself 
in, and asserted control over, the manner of performance of the 
contracted for work of its independent contractor, Brent 
Reynolds Construction, Inc. Appellee H & W is therefore subject 
to liability for the damages suffered by Plaintiff, which are 
injuries arising out of the independent contractor's, Brent 
Reynolds Construction, Inc.'s, work. The district court 
erroneously interpreted Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d 
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322 (Utah 1999) in a narrow and restrictive fashion. It imposed 
a standard not required by Utah Law and granted the motions 
because Appellant failed to demonstrate that one or both 
Appellee's were on site assisting, instructing or directing 
Appellants' decedent at the time he was killed. Thompson does 
not impose such onerous requirements. 
The district court erred when it granted the Appellee CPB's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because the Apellee CPB was liable 
under the retained control doctrine as defined in Thompson. 
Appellee H & W did not have an independent contractor 
relationship with respect to Appelle CPB because Appellee CPB 
retained sufficient control over the manner and/or method of the 
work to be performed by Appellee H & W. Because Appellee CPB 
held an employer/employee relationship with Appellee H & W, it 
became liable to the same extent as Appellee H & W. 
Regardless of the retained control doctrine, Appellee H & W 
was an employee of Appellee CPB, and not an independent 
contractor because Appellee CPB had the contractual right to 
accept or reject any subcontractor or employee selected by 
Appellee H & W. Pursuant to Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 
Utah 168, 179, 235 P. 884, 888 (Utah 1925), and Lodge v. 
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977), no 
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independent contractor relationship can exist under these 
circumstances. 
Thus, Appellee H & W is liable to the Appellants because 
they actively participated in the framing process. Appellee CPB 
is vicariously liable to the Appellants by virtue of the acts 
and omissions of its employee Appellee H & W. 
VI. ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9), Appellant states as 
follows: 
1. Appellees H & W and CPB are liable under the retained control 
doctrine because one or both were actively involved in# and 
asserted control over, the manner of the performance of the 
framing. 
The parties agreed below, and in the Motion for Summary 
Disposition Pleadings, that the case of Thompson v. Jess, 1999 
Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), controls the issues presented 
in this appeal. A copy of the Thompson case is attached as 
Exhibit 11 to the Addendum. The issue presented is upon which 
the trial court's decision turned, and which Appellant seeks to 
present on appeal. The issue is whether Appellee H & W (and/or 
Appellee CPB), became liable under the "retained control 
doctrine." Appellees became liable under the retained control 
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doctrine if they actively participated in the contracted for, or 
subcontracted for, work. The work in this case was the framing 
of the Highland 4 and 20 project. Thompson describes the 
"retained control doctrine" and "active participation" standard 
as follows: 
This Court has not had opportunity to determine the 
precedential value of Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408 
(Utah 1914), with respect to the retained control doctrine. 
Several federal courts applying Utah law, however, have been 
called upon to do so. Those courts uniformly have determined 
that under Dayton, a principal employer is not subject to 
liability for injuries arising out of its contractor's work 
unless the employer "actively participates" in the performance 
of the work. For instance, in Simon v. Deery Oil, 699 F. Supp. 
257, 258 (D. Utah 1988), the court cited Dayton for the 
proposition that a principal employer "retaining an 
independent contractor to render services has no duty to warn 
of train employees of the contractor, nor must the principal 
protect the contractor's employees for the contractor's own 
negligence, unless the principal has "actively participated in 
the project." See Also Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 
F.2d 274, 276, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 12266 (10th Cir. 1979), 
cert, denied, 44 U.S. 1080, 62 L.Ed.2d 763, 100 S.Ct. 1031 
(1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 
1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 6685, *8, (addressing Utah law on issue). We 
believe the standard relied upon in these cases is correct, 
and we formally adopt same. Elaboration on the contours of the 
standard is needed, however. 
Thus, by "formally adopting same," the law, as articulated 
in Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, became the law of Utah. The 
district court below did not correctly interpret and apply 
Thompson, Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin. The district court, 
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based on its interpretation of Thompson, granted summary 
judgment based on the following facts: 
Egbert Construction hired and trained Jason Smith, Michael 
Lewis, and Jose Louis. On August 13, 1999, an Egbert 
Construction supervisor instructed Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, 
and Jose Louis to "put up" a wooden framed wall Egbert 
Construction had built. On August 13, 1999, Jason Smith, 
Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis raised the wooden framed wall, 
and were in the process of putting the wall onto bolt studs 
when the wall started to fall and fell on Jason Smith causing 
Jason Smith's death (hereinafter the "Accident")... 
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose 
Louis were not under the direction, supervision, instruction 
or control of (H & W) or the CPB prior to and at the time of 
the Accident. The Court finds that there is no evidence that 
Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were ever under the 
direction, supervision, instruction, or control of (H & W) or 
the CPB. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that [H & W] or the 
CPB instructed Egbert Construction or its employees (or [Brent 
Reynolds Construction] or its employees) to do the work being 
performed at the time of the Accident in a different manner or 
by way of a different method. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that [H & W] or the 
CPB exerted control over the means utilized by Jason Smith, 
Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis, in doing the work Jason Smith, 
Michel Lewis and Jose Louis were performing at the time of the 
Accident or that [H & W] or the CPB interfered with that work. 
The Court finds that the employee of [H & W] on the site at 
the time of the Accident was in the construction trailer and 
had no involvement as the work being performed, and the wall 
being put into place, by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose 
Louis at the time of the Accident. 
The Court also finds that there was no employee or 
representative of the CPB on the site at the time of the 
Accident, and no employee or representative of the CPB had any 
involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith, 
Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at the time of the Accident. 
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The Court finds that the evidence indicates that it was Egbert 
Construction who was controlling the means utilized and the 
manner of performance of the work being performed by Jason 
Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at the time of the 
Accident. 
[H & W] and the CPB did not exert affirmative control over the 
method or operative detail of the work and did not directly 
manage the means and methods of Egbert Construction's work nor 
provide the specific equipment used by Egbert Construction as 
to the work Jason Smith was performing at the time of the 
Accident. 
See Order of Summary Judgment in favor of H & W Construction, 
Inc., and the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, hereinafter 
referred to as "Order of Summary Judgment," attached as 
Exhibit 12 to the Addendum, at page 3-5, (emphasis 
supplied) .See Also Order for Summary Judgment, R. 1043. 
The district court concluded, based on Thompson, that: 
[T]he exertion of control over the means utilized must relate 
to the 'injury causing aspect of the work.'[citing Thompson]. 
[H & W] and the CPB did not exert control over the means 
utilized as to the 'injury causing aspect of the work' of 
Jason Smith..., rather, Egbert Construction controlled the means 
utilized as to the work Jason Smith was performing at the time 
of the Accident. The activities of [H & W] and the CPB to 
which Appellants refer did not relate to, and were not an 
exertion of control over, the work Jason Smith was performing 
at the time of the accident, and did not cause the accident 
and death of Jason Smith. 
Order for Summary Judgment, at page 7, attached as Exhibit 
12,(emphasis supplied). See Also R. 1043. 
Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, do not support the 
district court's conclusion. The district court interpreted 
Thompson in a manner unsupported by the precedent relied upon 
and "formally adopted" as the law of Utah: Simon, Sewell, 
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Texaco, and Erwin. In short, the district court's focus and 
reliance on the acts and omissions that occurred at the time of 
the accident, and limiting the consideration to the exertion of 
control that occurred over the manner of means utilized by Jason 
Smith in the process of lifting a specific wall onto a set of 
particular bolts, was too narrow and unsupported by the holdings 
of Thompson, Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin. 
Appellees are liable under Thompson if they actively 
participated or exerted control over the framing process, even 
if they did not exert control over method or choice to lift the 
particular wall that fell upon and killed Jason Smith (a 
particular and specific element of the framing process) at the 
day and time that the procedure and resulting injury occurred. 
Thompson, and its adopted precedent, Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and 
Erwin, require that, if an entity like H & W wants to avoid 
liability for the harm caused to another by the acts and 
omissions of an independent contractor, such as the framers in 
this case, it must not exert control over, or actively 
participate in, the manner, method or means by which the 
independent contractor performs the work of framing. Thompson, 
and its precedents, do not require that Appellants demonstrate 
that one or both, of the Appellees stood next to Jason Smith and 
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ordered him to pick up the wall and then stood underneath it as 
it fell upon his head. The district court erred when it so 
held. All that Thompson requires is that Appellants demonstrate 
that Appellees were actively involved in the framing process. 
Based on the facts above, Appellant demonstrated this 
participation and the district court did not find otherwise. 
Simon, a copy of which is attached to the Addendum as 
Exhibit 13, provides for liability on behalf of Appelees because 
they participated in the framing project, as detailed above. 
Simon held the employer of an independent contractor was not 
liable unless he "actively participated in the project." Simon, 
699 F. Supp. at 258, citing Dayton, Sewell, and U.S. v. Page, 
350 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965) . Simon made no mention, express 
or implied, that the employer might participate to some extent, 
short of participating in the particular aspect of the work that 
caused the injury, and still avoid liability. In fact, Simon was 
not even limited to a particular type of work, but imposed 
liability as soon as the employer participated in the "project." 
Simon does not support the district court's conclusion that 
liability could only be imposed against Appellees if there was 
active participation in the manner and means by which Jason 
Smith lifted or dropped the wall that fell upon and killed him. 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instead, Appellees sacrificed protection from liability when 
they actively participated in the *framing project." As detailed 
above, Appellee H & W actively participated in the framing 
project and are therefore liable under Simon, and the district 
court erred when it failed to appreciate the meaning and import 
of Simon. 
The Sewell decision, which is attached as Exhibit 14 to the 
Addendum, provides little detail or procedural history, and 
merely holds that the lower court committed harmful error 
because it gave a jury instruction on retained control that 
failed to explain the necessity for active participation by the 
defendant/principal employer. Sewell, 606 F.2d at 276. Sewell is 
most persuasive because of what it did NOT hold. Sewell, 
formally adopted by the Supreme Court as the law of Utah, did 
not require the lower court to explain, in its jury instruction, 
that active participation must be shown with respect to the 
particular aspect of the work from which the injury arose, but 
rather, Sewell held only that active participation was required. 
Like Simon, there was no limitation or requirement that the 
participation at issue relate to the particular injury causing 
aspect of the work. Active participation or control, in any 
respect, was all that was required. Sewell, as well as Simon, 
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was not as restrictive as the district court thought them to be. 
Contrary to the conclusion of the district court, they merely 
require active participation in some aspect of the (framing) 
project. Appellants demonstrated that Appellees were involved in 
the framing of the project, and thus, they are not insulated 
from liability under Thompson. 
Texaco, which is attached as Exhibit 15 to the Addendum, 
was the first case to explain with specificity the degree of the 
participation on behalf of the principal employer that will 
create liability. Texaco held that the principal employer must 
exercise direction or control of the particular work being 
performed. Texaco, 396 F.2d at 240. Texaco suggests that if an 
employer in a construction project exercises direction or 
control over the landscapers, it will not owe any duty to the 
bricklayers, but only to the landscapers. Similarly, Appellees 
exercised direction and control over the framers and thus owe a 
duty to the framers, but not the other independent 
(sub)contractors. The district court did not attempt to 
reconcile its unduly restrictive interpretation of Thompson, 
with the clear holding of Texaco, or Simon and Sewell for that 
matter. Neither Thompson, nor Texaco, supported the district 
court's restrictive conclusion that Appellee H & W might only be 
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liable to Appellants if, and only if, an agent of Appellee was 
standing behind Jason Smith and barking orders and instructions. 
Thompson is not so restrictive, and should not be interpreted so 
restrictively. This Court should not allow the district court's 
order to stand. 
Last, Erwin, attached as Exhibit 16 to the Addendum, held 
that a principal employer is liable to employees of an 
independent contractor, if, and only if, the employer reserved 
the contractual right to direct, control, or superintend the 
independent contractor's work, or in fact directed or controlled 
the time and manner of the work, or the means and methods by 
which the results were accomplished. Erwin, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 
6685 at page 9. Again, as with Simon, Sewell, and Texaco, there 
is no language or dicta in the holding to support the 
restrictive interpretation that the "active participation" must 
relate directly to the aspect of the work that resulted in the 
injury, as concluded by the district court below. 
As noted by the Thompson Court, immediately after adopting 
the cases of Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin as the law of 
Utah, "elaboration of the contours of the standard is needed." 
Thompson, 979 P.2d at 327. The Thompson Court elaborated as 
follows: 
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Under the "active participation" standard, a principal 
employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of 
its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively 
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of 
performance of the contracted work. See Conklin v. Chen, 287 
So.2d 56, 60, 1973 Fla. LEXIS 4019 (Fla. 1973) (holding that 
under "active participation" standard, principal employer must 
directly influence manner in which work is performed; no duty 
arises from vxpassive nonpart icipat ion") . 
This passage provides no support for the restrictive 
interpretation of Thompson rendered by the district court. 
Appellants demonstrated that Appellants were actively involved 
in, and asserted control over, the framing process and framing 
project (the work). The Thompson Court further elaborated the 
"contours" of the active participation standard as follows: 
Such an assertion of control occurs, for example, when the 
principal employer directs that the contracted work be done by 
use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means 
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. See e.g. 
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d 
5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992)(imposing liability where subcontractor's 
employee was injured as a result of the new, less safe method 
of work required by general contractor); Redinger v. Living, 
Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418, 1985 Tex. LEXIS 825, 28 Tex. 
Sup. J. 404 (Tex. 1985) (imposing liability where 
subcontractor was ordered to operate backhoe dangerously close 
to plaintiff). 
Thompson, 979 P.2d. at 327. (emphasis supplied). 
The Thompson Court referred consistently to "the work." In 
the case at bar, "the work" is framing. Thompson does not 
express, or imply, any limit, such as that imposed by the trial 
court, that the participation in "the work," or in the framing, 
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relate to the particular aspect of the framing that ultimately 
caused the plaintiff's damages. Furthermore, the above quote 
ended the Thompson Court's elaboration of the contours of the 
active participation standard. The Thompson Court did go on to 
state that the comments to § 414 of the Second Restatement of 
Torts provided guidance, but did not, as it did with Simon, 
Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, "formally adopt" the comments to § 
414 as the law of Utah. It is from the comments, particularly, 
comment c, that the district court based its erroneous 
conclusion that it was the particular detail of the work, 
(lifting the specific wall onto the particular bolts), that the 
Appellant must prove the Appellee was actively participating, in 
order to survive Appellees' summary judgment motion. The nature 
of the district court's error was two fold. First, the lower 
court misunderstood the Restatement (Second) of Torts §414 
(1965), attached as Exhibit 20 of the Addendum, to be the law of 
Utah. The Thompson Court specifically did not adopt the 
Restatement as the law of Utah, but the district court 
nevertheless assumed the Restatement to be the law. Second, 
ignoring the non-controlling legal nature of the Restatement, 
the district court misinterpreted the meaning of the Restatement 
and its comments-. 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 has never been 
adopted as the law of Utah. Thompson, 1999 UT at P16. Thompson 
specifically declined to formally adopt this persuasive-only 
material. Id. In the other 49 States of the Union, 
Restatements are secondary authority only, and are not the law, 
unless specifically adopted by a State's legislature or Supreme 
Court. See Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Active Erectors & Installers, 
Inc., 969 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1992); Picker Fin. Group L.L.C. 
v. Horizon Bank, 293 B.R. 253, 257, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8716, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 376 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Dee v. 
Marriott Int'l, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16159, 10 (E.D. Pa. 
1999). § 414, like any Restatement, is useful as a research tool 
or study aid, but nothing more until adopted by a State's 
Supreme Court. See Hoffman, supra. The lower court therefore 
erred when it applied comment (c) to § 414 to this case as if it 
was the law of Utah. 
Second, as illustrated in the following passage, comment 
(c) of § 414 of the Restatement, (upon which the district court 
so heavily relied), concerns itself with a general contractor's 
interference with any part of the work of the subcontractor, not 
just the specific task that caused the injury. § 414, attached 
as Exhibit 20, provides: 
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One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who 
retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to 
liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the 
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is 
caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable 
care. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, at 388 (1965). Emphasis 
Added. 
H & W's consistent and extensive exercise of control over 
the framing process constituted control over "any part of the 
work." H & W is therefore liable under § 414. 
Comment (a) of the Restatement 2d imposes liability that 
exceeds the law of Agency: 
If the employer of an independent contractor retains control 
over the operative detail of doing any part of the work, he is 
subject to liability for the negligence of the employees of 
the contractor engaged therein, under the rules of that part 
of the law of Agency which deals with the relation of master 
and servant. The employer may, however, retain a control less 
than that which is necessary to subject him to liability as 
master. He may retain only the power to direct the order in 
which the work shall be done, or to forbid its being done in a 
manner likely to be dangerous to himself or others. Such a 
supervisory control may not subject him to liability under the 
principles of Agency, but he may be liable under the rule 
stated in the Section unless he exercises his supervisory-
control with reasonable care so as to prevent the work which 
he has ordered to be done from causing injury to others. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414, comment a, at 388 (1965). 
The lower court never even considered whether H & W's 
control over the framing process was performed with reasonable 
care as to prevent the causing of injury to others, but instead 
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incorrectly focused on whether H & W actually directed the 
lifting of the wall that killed Jason Smith. See Order for 
Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit 12, (continuous references 
to the "time of the Accident"). 
Comment (b) of the Restatement 2d provides that H & W is 
liable if they (1) superintended the job, (2) knew or should 
have known that its subcontractors were performing their work in 
a manner unreasonably dangerous to others, and (3) injury or 
death results from that dangerous work: 
The rule stated in this Section is usually, though not 
exclusively, applicable when a principal contractor entrusts a 
part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a 
foreman superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the 
principal contractor is subject to liability if he fails to 
prevent the subcontractors from doing even the details of the 
work in a way unreasonably dangerous to others, if he knows 
work is being so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it 
by exercising the power of control which he has retained in 
himself. So too, he is subject to liability if he knows or 
should know that the subcontractors have carelessly done their 
work in such a way as to create a dangerous condition, and 
fails to exercise reasonable care either to remedy it himself 
or by the exercise of his control cause the subcontractor to 
do so. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414, corranent b, at 388 (1965). 
(Emphasis Added) . 
This is clearly what happened in this case. H & W's 
superintendent Maurice Egbert superintended the entire job. The 
H & W Superintendent, Maurice Egbert, knew or should have known 
that inexperienced and young subcontractor employees were being 
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hired to perform extremely, dangerous work. The inexperience of 
these employees resulted in death and injury to Jason Smith. The 
lower court didn't consider these factors and instead, narrowly 
focused only on whether H & W directly ordered young Jason to 
lift the wall that killed him. 
Finally, the *retained control" concept is explained in 
comment (c) to § 414, which provides: 
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the 
employer must have retained as least some degree of control 
over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough 
that he has merely a general right to order the work 
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need 
not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations 
and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved 
for employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is 
controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative 
detail. There must be such a retention of a right of 
supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do 
the work in his own way. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414, comment c, at 388 
(1965), (Emphasis Added). 
Accordingly, if the general contractor entrusts the work to 
the subcontractor, but retains control of the work being done to 
the degree provided for in the Restatement, it owes a duty of 
care for the safety of the subcontractor's employees. Here, H 
& W went far beyond a ''general right" of merely inspecting 
progress, receiving reports or making suggestions. H & W took 
the burden and liability upon itself to directly order specific 
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work tasks on at least three different occasions. At the very 
least, the lower court should have considered whether or not the 
H & W orders to Egbert Construction, on at least three different 
occasions, exceeded the "general right" referred to in the 
Restatement. 
The above several paragraphs illustrate the lower court's 
failure to properly interrupt and apply Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §414 (1965) . However, Appellants note again that its 
argument regarding the misapplication of the Restatement is 
academic because the Restatement has not been adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Legislature, and therefore, 
unlike Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, is not the law of Utah. 
The amount of control and participation of Appellee H & W 
was adequate to create a genuine dispute of material facts such 
that summary judgment was inappropriate. There was a genuine 
issue as to whether the control and participation demonstrated 
amounted to "active" under Thompson, such that a reasonable jury 
could impose liability upon Appellee H & W. In the case at bar, 
Appellee H & W entrusted a part of the work to a subcontractor, 
Brent Reynolds Construction, Inc., (who hired Egbert 
Construction and its employees to perform the work), but through 
its employee, Maurice Egbert, superintended the entire framing 
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job. Appellee H & W interfered in the framing process "from the 
very beginning." See Letter from Brent Reynolds, attached as 
Exhibit 5 to the Addendum; See Also Brent Reynolds Depo at page 
20, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. Appellee H & W would 
not let the framers uframe some of the walls the way they wanted 
to frame them." Reynolds Depo at pages 25-26, attached as 
Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. After Brent Reynolds and/or Ken 
Egbert told Appellee H & W that it was not effective to frame 
the walls the way that Appellee H & W wanted them framed, 
Appellee H & W told Brent Reynolds (and the framers), that the 
framers "could not frame [the walls] in the manner that they 
wanted." Reynolds Depo at page 25, attached as Exhibit 4 to the 
Addendum, (emphasis added). In the event of a dispute regarding 
the framing process or an aspect of framing, and there were such 
disputes, the framers did it the Hales & Warner way. Reynolds 
Depo at page 26, attached as Exhibit 4, (emphasis supplied). In 
fact, Brent Reynolds could not recall whether there was single 
aspect of the framing process with which Appellee H & W did not 
interfere. Reynolds Depo at page 20, attached as Exhibit 4. 
Joel Warner, an executive of Appellee H & W, kept a daily 
log of the activities and happenings on the construction site. 
On August 5, 1999, Joel Warner noted as follows: 
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Ken Egbert (framer) is concerned with the manner in which 
we, [Appellee H & W], want the [building] framed.£rent Reynolds 
with whom our contract is with (framing) told Ken he shouldn't 
do it that way because of extra labor cost. At my, [Joel 
Warner's] request, Ken [Egbert, and] Brady (another framer who 
always does his Church framing this way) met to discuss this 
method of framing. Ken [and] I also went up to a Church with 
the same floor plan directly North of us to see the framing of 
it. Ken is proceeding as we, [Appellee H & W], have requested 
until final decision from Brent Reynolds is given. 
See Log for August 5, 1999, attached as Exhibit 17 to the 
Addendum, (emphasis supplied); also referred to as Deposition 
Exhibit 30. 
Other aspects of participation and control exercised by H & 
W included the following: 
Appellee H & W established the time frame within which the 
work would be completed, and also established the time frame 
for various stages of the framing to be completed, See Warner 
Depo at pages 18-19, attached as Exhibit 6 to Addendum. 
Thus, Appellee H & W determined the pace of the framing as 
well as the date on which the framing would begin and end. 
Deposition of Clifford Hales, hereinafter "Hales Depo," at 
page 28, attached as Exhibit 18 to the Addendum. 
Appellee H & W dictated the number of framers that would be on 
site doing the framing (12 or more men). See Letter dated 
August 11, 1999, attached as Exhibit 9 to the Addendum; See 
Also Letter dated August 25, 1999, attached as Exhibit 10 to 
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the Addendum; See Also Warner Depo at page 32, attached as 
Exhibit 6 to the Addendum; 
iv. Appellee H & W dictated the general qualifications of the 
framers and mandated, or attempted to mandate, that they be 
"experienced./# Warner Depo at page 79, attached as Exhibit 6 
to the Addendum. 
Whether the amount of control exercised or retained is 
sufficient control over the performance of the relevant item of 
subcontracted for work is a question of fact that should 
ordinarily be left to the jury. Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, 
Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992), cited with 
approval by, Thompson, supra1. Because there is some evidence of 
control and participation, the district court erred when it 
granted summary judgment and this honorable Court should reverse 
the ruling of the district court. 
2. Appellee CPB remains liable to Appellant under the ^retained 
control doctrine" because there was a contract in which the 
Appellee CPB, as principle employer, retained sufficient 
control over the manner or method of the work. 
1
 Lewis, in turn, cited the following cases as authority for this principle: Barker v. General Petroleum Corp., 72 Ariz. 
187,195,232 P.2d 390, 395 (1951); Hughes v. Shanafelt, 203 Okla. 80, 218 P.2d 350, 352 (1950); Rabar v. E.I, du-
Ponte de Nemours & Co., 415 A.2d 499, 507-508, (Del. Super. 1980); Weber v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 10 
Ill.App.3d 625, 641, 295 N.E.2d 41,49 (1973); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass 1, 11,483 N.E.2d 793 (1985); 
Powell v. General Tel. Co., 85 Mich.App. 84, 94-95, 270 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1978); Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 
44 Wash.App. 244, 252, 722 P.2d 819, 823 (1986). 
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In Thompson v. Jess, the Supreme Court addressed the 
retained control doctrine as discussed at length above, and 
after articulating the elements and details of the *active 
participation'7 standard, stated and explained as follows: 
We note that the term "retained control" is somewhat of a 
misnomer. Under the standards announced herein, a duty of care 
is imposed if the principal employer asserts affirmative 
control over or actually participates actively in the manner 
of performing the contracted for work. uRetained," to the 
extent the word implies passivity or nonaction, is inapt. 
The term "retained control" may have a more syntactically 
correct application to sophisticated parties who, by contract, 
stipulate which party will control the manner or method of 
work or the safety measures to be taken—such as in contracts 
between general contractors and subcontractors involved in 
construction projects. See Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 
408, 411-12 (Utah 1914)], at 411, (noting that under terms of 
contract, principal employer did not reserve right to direct 
or control prosecution of work or any of contractor's 
workers). The issue, however, of whether a duty of care may be 
imposed solely as a result of such a contractual reservation 
is not before us. 
Thompson, 1999 Utah at 26, note 3, 979 P.2d at 328, note 3. 
The district court's findings on this issue were as 
follows: 
The Court also finds that (H & W) and its employees were not 
employees of the CPB; the Court finds that (H & W) was an 
independent contractor of the CPB. Further the contracts and 
their provisions do not preclude summary judgment in favor of 
(H & W) and the CPB. 
Order for Summary Judgment, at Page 7, attached to the 
Addendum as Exhibit 12; See Also R. 1043. 
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Appellee CPB's motion for summary judgment should have been 
denied because, under the contract documents, Appellee CPB 
retained control over the construction and particulars of the 
work such that it was not insulated from liability. Appellants 
identify the following contractual provisions that demonstrate 
Appellee CPB retained adequate control such that it may be 
liable to Appellants: 
a. The Contract provided that Appellee CPB would establish the 
property lines and benchmarks for grading. See Conditions of 
the Contract, at Paragraph 2.1(A), page 2 of 12, attached as 
Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. Appellee did in fact assert this 
right. See Schick Depo at page 22, attached as Exhibit 1 to 
the Addendum; See Also Evans Depo at page 24, attached as 
Exhibit 8 to the Addendum. 
b. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB furnished 
information and services that were required for the orderly 
progress of the work. See Conditions of the Contract, at 
Paragraph 2.1(B), page 2 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the 
Addendum. Appellee furnished numerous information and services 
through its agent, Dean Schick, and its architect, Paul Evans. 
See Schick Depo at page 22, attached as Exhibit 1 to the 
Addendum. 
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c. The Contract provided that the Appellee CPB could inspect the 
work and progress of the work at any location and at any time. 
See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 2.2, page 2 of 
12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
d. The Appellee CPB's architect inspected the work no less than 
once a week. See Deposition Exhibit 27, weekly and monthly 
reports authored by Paul Evans); See Also Evans Depo at pages 
44-45, attached as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum. 
e. The Appellee CPB's Project director, Dean Schick inspected the 
work approximately once every two or three weeks. Schick Depo 
at page 33, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Addendum. 
f. The contract gave the Appellee CPB a right to stop the 
activities of the Appellee H & W Construction, Inc., or any 
portion its activity, until the Appellee CPB determined that 
Appellee H & W Construction, Inc. was performing its 
obligations in the manner that Appellee CPB deemed 
appropriate. See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 2.3, 
page 2 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
g. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB, and its agent, 
"the Architect,'' (Paul Evans), had access to the work wherever 
located. See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 3.12, 
page 4 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
40 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
h. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could condemn and 
remove any portion of the work that Appellee CPB determined 
did not comply with the contract or which Appellee CPB 
determined was unsuitable because of a method of installation 
or protection that the Appellee CPB determined was 
inappropriate. See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 
4.2(E), page 5 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
i. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB, through its agent 
uthe Architect," (Paul Evans), had the authority to stop work 
in order to ensure the performance of the work in a manner the 
Appellee CPB deemed proper. See Conditions of the Contract, at 
Paragraph 4.2(F), page 5 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the 
Addendum. 
j . The contract provided that the Appellee CPB had final and 
ultimate authority to reject any subcontractor and/or 
employees, chosen by Appellee H & W Construction, Inc., and no 
substitutions of Subcontractors could be made without approval 
of the Appellee CPB. See Conditions of the Contract, at 
Paragraph 5.1(B) through (C), page 5 of 12, attached as 
Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. (Appellant discusses in the section 
below, Section V(3), facts regarding the approval and 
rejection of subcontractors and employees). 
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k. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could perform any 
an all portions of the construction project, or enter into a 
separate contract with other parties to perform any portion of 
the work otherwise required by the contract. See Conditions of 
the Contract, at Paragraph 6.1(A), page 6 of 12, attached as 
Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
1. The Appellee CPB installed its own seating (pews), carpet and 
possibly certain other materials, (marker boards). Evans Depo 
at page 81, excerpts attached as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum. 
m. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could enter the 
job site and conduct any cleaning or removal of waste, and 
allocate the cost of such clean up to whomever it wanted. See 
Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 6.3, page 6 of 12, 
attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
n. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could instruct the 
Appellee H & W, to make any changes of any nature in the work 
so long as it paid for the additional cost of such changes. 
See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 7.1(A) through 
(F), page 6 of 12; Paragraph 7.5(A), page 7 of 12; Paragraph 
7.6(A) through (E), page 8 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the 
Addendum. 
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o. The contract provided that the Appellee H & W had to obtain 
specific permission from Appellee CPB to take measures to 
safeguard persons or property, except in cases of emergency. 
See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 10.3, page 10 of 
12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum, 
p. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could select the 
materials used in the construction of the building. See 
Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 15.4, page 12 of 12, 
attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. 
Last, Appellee CPB and the Appellee H & W included a 
variety of indemnity provisions in the contract they entered 
with one another. These provisions were included because 
Appellee CPB and Appellee H & W contemplated that Appellee CPB 
would be liable for various acts and omissions committed by the 
general contractor and subcontractors. This expectation was 
based on the control that Appellee CPB retained, by contract, 
over the methods, means and details of the work. The provisions 
existed not to limit or remove the Appellee CPB's control, but 
to allocate the cost (as opposed to liability and duty) of the 
damages proximately caused by these acts and omissions to the 
Appellee H & W. For assuming this indemnification obligation, as 
well as other obligations, Appellee H & W was paid 
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$1,633,900.00. See Agreement, at Article III, attached as 
Exhibit 2 to the Addendum. 
The indemnification provisions are located as follows in 
the Contract, (Conditions of the Contract), attached as Exhibit 
3 to the Addendum: Paragraph 3.2(C), page 3 of 12; Paragraph 
3.13, page 4 of 12; Paragraph 3.14(A) through (E), page 4 
through 12. These provisions should be read as important and 
meaningful. If Appellee CPB truly believed and fully expected 
that it would incur no liability because it had no control over 
the activities of Appellee H & W, and that Appellee H & W was in 
fact an independent contractor, it would not have inserted, or 
agreed to the insertion of, these indemnity provisions. The 
district court, in granting the Appellees7 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, impliedly concluded that these provisions were 
meaningless and unnecessary. 
Additional provisions that demonstrate Appellee's 
understanding and expectation that it was exercising sufficient 
control over Appellee H & W, such that it would be liable for 
any acts and omissions committed by Appellee H & W, include 
provisions similar to the indemnification provisions identified 
above. These provisions provide that Appellee H & W would be 
"responsible to" Appellee CPB for losses and acts and omissions 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that cause damages to persons. See Conditions of the Contract, 
at Paragraph 10.1, page 10 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the 
Addendum. Again, if Appellee CPB actually anticipated that it 
would incur no liability because it had no control over the 
activities of Appellee H & W, it would not have inserted, or 
agreed to the insertion of, these provisions. 
Appellee CPB's contemplated liability is also demonstrated 
by the fact that Appellee CPB required Appellee H & W to name 
Appellee CPB as an "insured" under the insurance policies 
Appellee H & W, had to obtain. See Conditions of the Contract, 
at Paragraph 11.1(A) (3) (c) and Paragraph 11.1.(B)(1) (a), page 10 
of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. Again, if the 
contract and the contracting parties actually contemplated that 
Appellee CPB would have no liability by virtue of any purported 
lack of control, these provisions would not have been placed in 
the contract. 
The amount of control, and the extent of the rights, 
retained in the contract, and otherwise exercised by Appellee 
CPB, is such that the Appellee CPB remains liable under the 
retained control doctrine as articulated by Thompson. The 
district court erred when it ruled that "the contracts and their 
45 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
provisions do not preclude summary judgment in favor of H & W 
and the CPB. 
3. Appellee CPB did not hold a relationship of principle-employer 
and independent-contractor with Appellee H & W. Appellee CPB 
possessed the right to right to accept or reject any 
subcontractor or employee selected by Appellee H & W. 
Appellants argued to the district court that the Appellee H 
& W was an employee or agent of the Appellee CPB, and is 
therefore liable for any acts or omissions committed on behalf 
of Appellee H & W, as well as any acts and omissions committed 
by itself. The district court erroneously found otherwise and 
ignored clear Utah precedent. (See Order for Summary Judgment, 
at page 7, attached as Exhibit 12); See Also, R. at 1043. 
In Ludlow v. Industrial Commission et. al., 65 Utah 168, 
179, 235 P. 884, 888 (Utah 1925), the Supreme Court of Utah held 
that xxan independent contractor can employ others to do the work 
and accomplish the contemplated result without the consent of 
the contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another in 
his place without the consent of his employer." This principle 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lodge v. Industrial 
Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228, 1977 Utah LEXIS 1082 (Utah 
1977). Pursuant to the contract documents executed between 
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Appellee CPB, and as revealed in the discovery identified below, 
(and attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Addendum), the Appellee 
CPB retained and exercised the right to choose those employees 
and subcontractors who would perform the work, or any portion of 
the work, as well as reject any subcontractor chosen by Appellee 
H & W. See Conditions of the Contract, attached as to the 
Addendum as Exhibit 3, at Paragraph 5.1(B) through (C), page 5 
of 12, and Paragraph 6.1 (A) , page 6 of 12. 
The Supreme Court impliedly held that this employment power 
was the sine qua non2 of an independent contractor and it is this 
authority and power that Appellee CPB withheld from Appellee H & 
W Construction, Inc. (See Ludlow, supra at 179, in which the 
Court describes the authority to employ others as the "crux" of 
the case; See Also Lodge, supra at 228, in which the Lodge Court 
quotes the Ludlow Court). Thus, because Appellee CPB had the 
authority to hire and fire employees and subcontractors of 
Appellee H & W, it lacked the sine qua non of the independent 
contractor relationship with Appellee H & W. 
Other determinative factors in the independent contractor 
analysis is whether the employer, (Appellee CPB), controlled, 
directed, supervised or retained the right to control, direct or 
2
 sine qua non is a Latin phrase meaning "that without which the thing cannot be; an indispensable requisite or 
condition." Black's Law Diet. 
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supervise, the entity employed, (Appellee H & W Construction, 
Inc.). Lodge, supra, citing Sommerville v. Industrial 
Commission, 113 Utah 504, 196 P. 2d 718, 720 (Utah 1948). These 
elements mirror those articulated by Thompson, and Plaintiffs 
identify above, in Section V(2), the contractual provisions and 
acts of Appellee CPB that indicate control, direction and 
supervision over Appellee H & W. Thus, Appellee CPB did not hold 
an independent contractor relationship with Appellee H & W, and 
the district court erred when if found that such a relationship 
existed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it granted the Appellees' 
respective motions for summary judgment. This Court should 
reverse the trial court and instruct it to deny the motions and 
allow Appellants' case to proceed for trial on the merits. 
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Page 6 
1 A Project manager. 
2 Q And what does a project manager do for the LDS 
3 Church? 
4 A Oversees construction projects. 
5 Q Construction proj ects of what nature? 
6 A New buildings, remodels, parking lots and HVAC 
7 work. 
8 Q Do you manage projects other than construction 
9 or renovation or expansion of religious sites? In other 
10 words, is it only churches or is it other things? 
11 A No. 
12 Q And how long have you been-was it project 
13 manager? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q How long have you been a project manager? 
16 A About eight years. 
17 Q Is there more than one proj ect manager at the 
18 LDS Church? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Can you describe for me the structure of your 
21 employer? In other words, there's you, and do you 
22 manage other people and report to other people? 
23 A I report to a regional project manager, and 
24 he, in turn, reports to the DTA or director of temporal 
Page 7 
1 bishopric. 
2 Q And are all of those people located in the 
3 same building? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Where is your office? 
6 A American Fork. 
7 Q And where is the regional manager's office? 
8 A Currently, in our office. 
9 Q And then he reported to a DTA. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q His office would be where? 
12 A Salt Lake. 
13 Q Okay. Are there employees equal to you, other 
14 project managers, in your office? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q What do they do? 
17 A The same thing. 
18 Q In the same area? 
19 A Yes. 
10 Q And what, if any, training or qualifications 
l\ do you have, or education do you have, that allows you 
12 to do your job? 
13 A Are you talking about college education? 
14 Q Well, what do you need to have to be a project 
15 manager for the LDS Church? 
_ .... ,
 ; . . : . , : : , , , . . . . ,-, ~ .. ; . . . . • •• , , • : _ _ _ , . . . . . . . . . ' . , . , , , , , . . j 
Page 8 
1 A Construction background. 
2 Q And could you be more specific about 
3 "construction background"? 
4 A Myself? 
5 Q Yes, sir. Why don't we start with your 
6 education and work experience. 
7 A I spent 15 years as a brick mason, six years 
8 in manufacturing and producing blocks and building J 
9 retaining walls. 
10 Q For one or more - j 
11 A Other entities. 
12 Q And what, if any, education do you have? 
13 A Two years of college. General ed. 
14 Q And what was your first position with the LDS I 
15 Church? 
16 A I was called a PM supervisor, preventative 
17 maintenance supervisor. j 
18 Q And where did you go from PM supervisor? 
19 A I was then hired as an area field rep, which 
20 that title then changed to project manager. 
21 Q And you've been a project manager for eight 
22 years? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q What exactly does a project manager do? 
25 A We hire the architect and engineers on the 
1 
Page9 
1 projects. 1 
2 Q How do you know you have a project? Do you j 
3 decide what projects will be built or does someone tell 
4 you, We want to do something? 
5 A No, that comes out of Salt Lake. 
6 Q Well, let's talk about this project at which 
7 Jason Smith lost his life. 
8 What is the name of that project? The 
9 Highland project, can I call it that? 
10 A Highland 4 and 20. 
11 Q How did the Highland 4 and 20 project come to 
12 exist? 
13 A There's a department called planning, and they 
14 decide who should get a building. And once that 
15 happens, then they issue a work order to us, and then I I 
16 go out and hire the architect to design the building. 
17 Q How do you know whether to make the building I 
18 as big as this room or as big as this entire building? 
19 A The Church has a standard plan. 
20 Q They build the same building everywhere they 
21 go? 
22 A It's cookie cutter, yes. 
23 Q Regardless of the size of the congregation 
24 that they're going to serve? 
25 A Yes. 
t • ; 1 
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1 A You can just tell, looking at it, observing. 
2 Q I was reviewing Exhibit 23, and there's an 
3 indication in there that the owner would establish the 
4- property lines and bench marks for grading. 
5 Do you know what I'm talking about? 
5 A Yes. 
7 Q What does that mean? 
3 A The surveyor comes out and says, Here's the 
9 bench line for this project, which establishes the 
0 height or elevation of the building, and then he'll 
1 establish where the corners of the building are at. 
2 Q And then the general contractor fills in the 
3 rest? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And there's also a provision in the contract 
6 about furnishing information and services required for 
7 the orderly progress of work. 
8 If you need to review it, it's paragraph 
9 2.1 B. What does that mean? It's Exhibit 23,2.1 B. 
0 A Sometimes we'll have delays, for example, in 
1 the building permit. Sometimes we have things that we 
2 order, meaning the Church, for example, the pews and the 
3 carpet we order, and those are items that we have to 
4 order and make sure they get there on time. 
5 Q Okay. Did you ever stop Hales & Warner from 
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1 working on any part of the Highland 4 and 20 project, 
2 because whatever it was they might be doing or the 
3 subcontractors were doing didn't meet your standards? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Did you inspect the Highland 4 and 20 project 
6 at any time after the work began? 
7 When I say "work," I mean construction. 
8 A Let's put it this way; I observed. I don't 
9 inspect. 
0 Q Okay. What exactly did you do? You drove out 
1 there; right? 
2 A We would hold monthly meetings. 
3 Q Where? 
4 A On the site. 
5 Q Where? 
6 A In the construction trailer. 
Q In a trailer? And what did those entail? 
8 A We would review the schedule, mostly payment 
9 requests, any subcontractor problems or change orders, 
0 things of that nature. 
1 Q And what else, if anything, did you do? 
2 A We would go out and look at the work that had 
3 been done. 
4 Q You would walk around the site? 
5 A Yes. 
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1 Q And look at the work that had been done? 
2 Inspect it? What exactly did you do? 
3 A We'd look at it, observe it. 
4 Q And would you compare it to your plans or 
5 designs? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q For what purpose? 
8 A Make sure it was installed correctly. 
9 Q In the Highland 4 and 20 project, was anything 1 
10 installed incorrectly? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Were all the components as you specified in 
13 your designs or otherwise? 
14 A When you say "all," you know, we're all human. 
15 I couldn't have caught everything, but to my knowledge, 
16 yes. 
17 Q Do you recall whether or not you made any 
18 change orders? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Did you make any change orders? 
21 A I always do. I have yet to build one that we 
22 don't. 
23 Q What sort of change orders did you make? 
24 A I don't remember right offhand. I'd have to 
25 look back on that project. It's been too long ago to 
Page 25 
1 remember how many we had there. 
2 Q Earlier on, we were talking about Mr. Evans, 
3 the architect. Did his involvement in the Highland 4 
4 and 20 project end after he made the designs and plans? 
5 A No. I 
6 Q What sort of involvement did he have? 
7 A He has what we call "contract administration" 
8 from that point on. 
9 Q And what is "contract administration"? 
10 A It's to basically make sure that that building 
11 is built as per plans and specs. 
12 Q Did he report to you? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q How often did he report to you? 
15 A We would - every month we would talk about 
16 things, and he would send a report every week. 
17 Q To? 
18 A Tome. 
19 Q And the report was in writing, was it not? 
20 A Yes. It's a job site report. 
21 Q Is that what it says at the top of it, job 
22 site report? | 
23 A I believe that's sort of - every architect 
24 does it differently, but it is a weekly report; maybe 
25 his visit to the site. 1 
— .. : • : . - . . . : . . ; : : : . ; - . , • : 
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A No. 
Q Were there any standards that you imposed on 
Hales & Warner in the selection of their subcontractors? 
A No. 
Q Were there any subcontractors that Hales & 
Warner tried to use that you told them they couldn't? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Did you have to hire any subcontractors to 
complete any portion of the work at Highland 4 and 20? 
A No. 
Q Had you known that the subcontractors were 
using untrained laborers, would you have had an opinion 
or desire about that? 
A Probably not. 
Q Were you familiar with any safety rules or 
regulations at the Highland 4 and 20 project? 
A You mean like their safety meetings and stuff 
like that? 
Q That's a good start, yes. 
A I knew they had some. I don't know the 
frequency. 
Q Do you know who was in charge of conducting 
the safety meeting? 
A Maurice. 
Q Of course, you never attended one of these 
Page 31 
safety meetings. 
A No. 
Q How do you know they had them? 
A They just told me they did. 
Q Do you know whether Hales & Warner was using 
subcontractors? 
A Yes. 
Q Were they using subcontractors? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you know? 
A Because they don't have that many guys that 
they employ to do all of that work. 
Q Couldn't they just hire a bunch of people to 
do it all on a non-permanent basis? 
A I guess they could if they wanted. They'd be 
insane, but . . . 
Q I'm wondering how you knew they were using 
subcontractors? 
A Just because they gave us a subcontractor 
list. 
Q Did they? And did you review the list? 
A Yes. 
Q And how often did you receive the list? 
A Just at the bid opening. 
5 Q Why did they give you a subcontractor list? 
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A We usually like to review it. 
Q Why? 
A To see if there's anybody on there we don't 
want to have to deal with. 
Q Did you see anybody on the subcontractor list 
that you didn't want to have to deal with? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Did you make any inquiry or investigation 
regarding any of the subcontractors on the contractor 
list? 
A Not that I recall on that one. 
Q Did all of them meet your standards with 
regard to minimum limits and length of time in business, 1 
and ability to meet this timing schedule and the quality 1 
of their work? Did they meet all of those standards? 
A That's up to the general contractor. 
Q You trusted the general contractor to make an 
appropriate selection? 
A Yes. 
Q And in this case, that was Hales & Warner. 
A Yes. I 
Q When you would visit the site, did you tell 
Hales & Warner or anybody else that you were coming? 
A No. 
Q Did you go at the same time every month? 
1 
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A No. 
Q How often did you go? 
A Just depended on my schedule. 
Q Looking back, approximately how much did you 
visit the site? 
A Probably every two or three weeks. 
Q And when you got there, did anyone show you 
around or did you show yourself around? 
A No, Maurice would go with me. 
Q How would you know that he would be there and 
be available? ' 1 
A Because he was always there. 
Q How did you know he would be available? 
A He just made himself available. 
Q Did you determine whether or not the 
subcontractors on the subcontractor list were licensed 
or permitted to do whatever it was they were doing? 
A No. 
Q Now, for example, with installing the 
electrical work or system, how do you know it's being 
done by an electrician as opposed to somebody who thinks 
they know how to do wiring? 
A It's up to the general contractor. 
Q You would agree with me, would you not, that 
you'd want a competent professional to install the 
ft 
• _ _ _ — i 
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AGREEMENT 
This Agreement made and entered into this / day of M&Y in the year Nineteen 
Hundred and Ninety-nine by and between the CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, A Utah Corporation Sole, hereinafter called 
"OWNER" and HALES& WARNER CONSTRUCTION, INC. hereinafter called ,,CONTRACTORn. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS: Owner intends to have certain work performed as outiined below, and 
WHEREAS: Contractor is able and willing to perform such work. 
NOW THEREFORE: Owner and Contractor for the considerations hereinafter provided agree 
as follows: 
ARTICLE I. SCOPE OF WORK 
Contractor shall furnish all of the materials and equipment and perform all of the labor 
necessary to complete all of the work as required in the Contract Documents entitled HIGHLAND 4, 20 
5 II WARDS; HIGHLAND 4, 20 WARDS as prepared by BUTLER & EVANS ARCHITECTS, L.L.C. hereinafter 
6 referred to as "ARCHITECT". 
7 | | ARTICLE II. THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The General Conditions of the Contract, Supplementary Conditions, the Manual entitled 
9 [J HIGHLAND 4, 20 WARDS numbered Divisions 01 through 13, 15, 16, dated January 1999, Addenda No. 1, 
3 2, 3, and the Drawings dated January 1999 entitled HIGHLAND 4, 20 WARDS and numbered G1.0 - G1.6, 
i jj SD1.1, SD1.2, Ll . l - LL4, Al.l - A1.6, A2.1, A2.2, A3.I - A3.7, A4.1 - A43, A5.1 - A5.4, A6.1 - A6.6, A7.1 
A7.3, A8.1, Fl . l , F2.1, F2.2, F3.1, F3.2, S1.0 - Sl.4, S2.1 - S2.8, S3.1, S3.2, Pl . l , P1.2, P2.1, P3.1, Ml.l. 
\ || M2.1, M3.1, M4.1,M4.2, M5.1, ME1.1, ME2.1 - ME2.4, El . l - E1.3, E2.1, E2.2, E3.1, E4.1, E4.2, AV1.1, 
|| AY1.2 together with this Agreement form the Contract and are as fully a part thereof as if attached hereto or 
repeated herein. 
ARTICLE HI. THE CONTRACT SUM 
Owner shall pay and contractor shall accept as full payment of this Contract the sum of ONE 
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS 
($1,633,900.00), subject to additions and deductions provided in the Contract. 
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ARTICLE IV. TIME OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION 
Work under this Contract shall commence upon written notice to proceed from Owner, and 
be completed and ready for Owner's final inspection within 300 calendar days from the date of such notice. 
Time is of the essence. 
ARTICLE V. INSPECTION 
The fact that any particular work has been, inspected shall not be considered a waiver of the 
requirements of strict compliance with the Contract Documents. 
ARTICLE VI. CONTRACTOR NOT AGENT OF OWNER 
It is expressly agreed that Contractor is not the agent or employee of Owner, but that he is an. 
independent Contractor. 
ARTICLE VII. PROGRESS PAYMENTS. FINAL ACCEPTANCE AND FINAL PAYMENT 
Payments shall be made in accordance with the applicable Sections of the Contract Documents. 
ARTICLE VIII. ASSIGNS 
Neither party to the Contract shall assign the Contract or sublet it as a whole without, the 
written consent of the other. Contractor shall not assign any monies due or to become due to him hereunder 
nor shall he pledge or attempt to pledge the credit of Owner or bind the Owner to any third party. 
ARTICLE IX. ACCEPTANCE 
The work shall be inspected for acceptance by Owner promptly upon receipt of notice from 
Contractor and Architect that all work is complete and ready for inspection. The building and all materials 
and work connected therewith shall be at Contractor's risk until accepted by Owner in. writing. 
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ARTICLE X, DEFAULT1 AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Should any dispute arise between the parties hereto, with regard to the performance of their 
respective obligations under the Contract Documents, which dispute cannot be settled between the parties and 
litigation is commenced, then the losing party in the litigation agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees of the 
prevailing party. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement, the day and year 
first above written, binding themselves, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and representatives 
to the full performance of the contract. 
REVIEWED 
ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING 
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
PHYSICAL FACILITIES FIELD 
OPERATION SUPPORT SECTION 
ACCEPTED 
OWNER: 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
A Utah Corporation Sole 
By. & 
Member, Executive Staff 
By. yjt^^T A&0* £"~x\n^\s^^ 
Goo^ges^I-Ronnet, Authorized Agent 
CONTRACTOR: 
HALES& WARNER CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
1460 NORTH MAIN, UNIT 1 
SPANISH FORK, UT 84660 
4/ Mfe' ^ W» / ' 
Name and Title-
License Number 
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GENERAL CONDITIONS 
. (FIXED SUM) 
ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING SERVICES DIVISION 
TEMPLE CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
T A B L E O F C O P J T E N T S 
SECTION 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTION 9 
SECTION 2 OWNER SECTION 10 
SECTION 3 CONTRACTOR 
SECTION 4 ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 11 
CONTRACT SECTION 12 
SECTION 5 SUBCONTRACTORS 
SECTION 6 CONSTRUCTION BY OWNER OR SECTION 13 
BY SEPARATE CONTRACTORS SECTION 14 
SECTION 7 CHANGES IN THE WORK 
SECTION 8 TIME SECTION 15 
PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY 
INSURANCE AND BONDS 
UNCOVERING AND CORRECTION 
OF WORK 
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION 
OF THE CONTRACT 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
SECTION 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1.1 DEFINITIONS 
A . Agreement: The Agreement is the document entitled 
"Agreement Between Owner and Contractor" executed by 
the Owner and the ContraStdr f or performance of the Work. 
B. Architect: The Architect is the entity identified as such in 
the Agreement. 
C. Change In The Work: A Change in the Work is: 
1. A modification to the requirements of the Contract 
Documents or a delay in Substantial Completion 
resulting from' an instruction from the Owner or 
Architect to the Contractor; 
2, A modification to the requirements of the Contract 
Documents or a delay in Substantial Completion 
resulting from an event or circumstance other than an 
instruction from the Owner or Architect to the Contrac-
tor. 
D- Contract: The Contract Documents form the Contract. 
E. Contract Documents: The Contract Documents consist of 
the documents identified as such in the Agreement. 
P- Contractor. The Contractor is the entity identified as such 
in the Agreement. 
G. Contract Sum: The Contract Sum is the total amount 
stated in the Agreement as amended by Modifications 
payable by the Owner to the Contractor for performance 
of the Work. 
H. Contract Time: The Contract Time is the period of time 
stated in the Agreement as amended by Modifications for 
Substantial Completion of the Work. 
L Oav: The term "day" means calendar day unless otherwise 
specifically defined. 
J . Drawinas: The Drawinas consist of the documents 
Contract in the form of a: 
1. Change Order; 
2. Construction Change Directive; or 
3. Field Change. , . 
L. Owner: The Owner is the entity identified as such in the 
Agreement. 
M . Protect: The Project is the total construction designed by 
the Architect of which the Work performed under the 
Contract Documents may be the whole or a part. 
I\J. Product Data: Product Data consists of standard illustra-
tions, schedules, performance charts, instructions, bro-
chures, diagrams, and other information furnished by the.. 
Contractor to illustrate details regarding materials or 
equipment to be used in the Work, or the manner of 
installation, operation, or maintenance of such materials or 
equipment. 
0 . Project Manual: The Project Manual is the volume assem-
bled for the Work which includes the bidding requirements, 
sample forms, the Conditions of the Contract, the Specifi-
cations, and other information. 
P. Samples And Mock-ups: Samples and Mock-ups are 
physical examples which illustrate materials, equipment, or 
workmanship and establish standards by which the Work 
will be judged. 
Q. Shop Drawings: Shop Drawings are drawings, diagrams, 
illustrations, schedules, performance charts, fabrication and 
installation drawings, setting diagrams, patterns, templates, 
and other data which are specially prepared by the Contrac-
tor or any Subcontractor, manufacturer, supplier, or 
distributor. Shop drawings illustrate some portion of the 
Work and confirm dimensions and conformance to the 
Contract Documents. 
R. Specifications: The Specifications consist o f the documents 
identified as such in the Agreement. 
S. Subcontractor: A Subcontractor is any entity supplying 
labor, materials, or equipment for the Work under separate 
contract with the Contractor or anv other Subcontractor. 
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for the Work from the local governmental authority having 
jurisdiction over the Work and the Work is sufficiently 
complete that Owner can use the Work for its intended 
purpose. The date of Substantial Completion is the sub-
stantial completion date certified by the Architect in 
accordance with the Contract Documents. 
U. Work: The Work includes all labor, materials, equipment 
and construction required by the Contract Documents. 
[ V . Written Notice: Written-notice is notice in writing given 
from one party to the other. Written Notice shall be 
effective: 
1. On the date of personal delivery to the other party; 
2. On the date sent by facsimile transmission to the other 
party provided receipt of the facsimile is verified by 
telephone or an electronic confirmation report by the 
party sending the facsimile transmission; 
3. Three days after the date of mailing by first class mail 
postage prepaid to the other party's last known 
business address; or 
4. Or the date of receipt by the other party as stated on 
the return receipt if sent by registered or certified mail, 
or by courier. 
1.2 EXECUTION, CORRELATION, AMD INTENT 
A . By executing the Agreement, the Contractor represents that 
it has visited the site, familiarized itself with the local 
conditions under which the. Work is to be performed, and 
correlated its own observations with the requirements of 
the Contract Documents. 
B. The intent of the Contract Documents is to include all labor, , 
materials, equipment, and other items necessary for the • 
proper execution and completion of the Work. The 
Contract Documents are complementary and what is .: 
required by any one shall be as binding as if required by all. • 
Performance by the Contractor shall be required only to the 
extent consistent with the Contract Documents and • 
reasonably inferable from them as being necessary to pro-
dues the.intended result. ! 
C. The organization of the Contract Documents is not intended 
to control the Contractor in dividing the Work among 
Subcontractors or to establish the extent of the Work to be 
performed by any trade.. 
D. Words used in the Contract Documents which have well 
known technical or trade meanings are used therein in 
accordance with such recognized meanings. 
E. In the interest of brevity, the Contract Documents may omit 
modifying words such as "all" and "any" and articles such 
as "the" and "an," but the fact that a modifier or an article 
is absent from one statement and appears in another is not 
intended to affect the interpretation of either statement. 
1.3 OWNERSHIP AND USE OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Drawings, the Project Manuals, and copies thereof are 
the property of the Owner. The Contractor shall not use 
these documents on any other project. The Contractor may 
retain one copy of the Drawings and the Project Manual as 
a Contract record set and shall dispose of all remaining 
copies following final .completion of the Work. 
SECTION 1 - OWNER 
2.1 INFORMATION AND SERVICES REQUIRED OF OWNER 
B. The Owner will furnish to the Contractor any information 
or services it is required to furnish under the Contract 
Documents with reasonable promptness to avoid delay in 
the orderly progress of the Work, 
C. The Owner will furnish to the Contractor up to thirty-six (36) 
copies of the Drawings, the Project Manual, and the 
Addenda. 
2.2 OWNER'S RIGHT TO INSPECT THE W O R K 
The Owner and its representatives shall have the right to 
inspect any portion of the Work wherever located at any 
time. 
2.3 OWNER'S RIGHT T O STOP THE WORK 
If the Contractor fails to carry-out the Work in accordance 
with the Contract Documents or fails to correct Work which 
is not in accordance with the Contract Documents in a 
timely manner, the Owner may order the Contractor in 
writing to stop the Work, or any portion thereof, until the 
cause for such order has been eliminated. 
SECTION 3 - CONTRACTOR 
3.1 REVIEW OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS AND FIELD 
CONDmONS BY CONTRACTOR 
A . The Contractor shall carefully compare the Contract Docu-
ments with each other and with other information relating 
to the Project prior to commencing the Work and during 
performance of the Work and shall immediately report to the 
Architect errors, inconsistencies, and omissions discovered. 
B. Should the Contractor or any of its Subcontractors become 
aware of any question regarding the meaning or intent of 
any part of the Contract Documents prior to commencing 
that portion of the Work about which there is a question, 
the Contractor shall request an interpretation or clarification 
from the Architect before proceeding. The Contractor 
proceeds at its own risk if it proceeds with the Work 
without first making such a request and receiving an 
interpretation or clarification from the Architect. If neither 
the Contractor nor the affected Subcontractors become 
aware of the question until after work on the relevant 
portion of the Work has commenced, then the following 
precedence shall govern for purposes of determining 
whether resolution of the question constitutes a Change in 
the Work: 
1. The Agreement takes precedence over all other docu-
ments. 
2. The Supplementary Conditions take precedence over the 
General Conditions. 
3. The General Conditions and Supplementary Conditions 
. take precedence over the Drawings and the Specifica-
tions. 
4 . An Addendum or Modification takes precedence over 
the document(s) modified by the Addendum or Modifica-
tion. 
5. The Specifications take precedence over the Drawings. 
6. Within the Drawings, larger scale drawings take prece-
dence over smaller scale drawings, figured dimensions 
over scaled dimensions, and noted materials * over 
graphic indications. 
C. It is not the Contractor's responsibility to ascertain that the 
Contract Documents are in accordance with requirements 
of governing public authorities. However, if the Contractor 
observes that portions of the Contract Documents are at 
wflrianee with those requirements, the Contractor shall 
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laws, regulations, and ordinances have been effected. The 
Contractor shall be fully responsible for any work knowingly 
performed contrary to such laws, regulations, and ordinan-
ces and shall fully indemnify the Owner against loss and 
bear all costs and penalties arising therefrom. 
D. The Contractor shall take field measurements and verify 
field conditions and shall compare such field measurements 
and conditions and other information known to the Contrac-
tor with the Contract Documents before ordering any 
materials or commencing construction activities. The 
Contractor shall immediately report errors, inconsistencies, 
and omissions which it discovers to the Architect. If the 
Contractor orders materials or commences construction 
activities before taking field measurements and verifying 
field conditions, the Contractor shall not be entitled to any 
compensation for additional costs to the Contractor 
resulting from field measurements or conditions different 
from those anticipated by the Contractor which would have 
been avoided had the Contractor taken field measurements 
and verified field conditions prior to ordering the materials 
or commencing construction activities. 
E. If site conditions indicated in the Contract Documents differ 
materially from those the Contractor encounters in perfor-
mance of the Work, the Contractor shall Immediately notify 
the Architect in writing of such differing site conditions. 
3.2 SUPERVISION OF CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES 
A. The Contractor shall supervise and direct the Work using 
its best skill and attention. The Contractor shall be solely 
responsible for all construction means, methods, tech-
niques, sequences, and procedures and for coordinating all 
portions of the Work. 
B. The Contractor shall be responsible for: 
1. The proper observance of property lines and set back 
requirements as shown in the Contract Documents; and 
2. The location and layout of the Work as shown in the 
Contract Documents with respect to the position of the 
Work on the property and the elevation of the Work in 
relation to grade. 
C. The Contractor shall be responsible to the Owner for the 
acts and omissions of the Contractor's employees, 
Subcontractors, and their agents and employees, and other 
persons performing pohi6ns of the Work under a contract 
with the Contractor or any Subcontractor. 
D. The Contractor shall not be relieved of its obligation to 
perform the Work in accordance with the Contract Docu-
ments either by the activities or duties of the Architect in 
the Architect's administration of the Contract, or by tests, 
inspections, or approvals required or performed by persons 
other than the Contractor. 
E. The Contractor shall be responsible for inspection of 
portions of the Work already performed under the Contract 
to determine that such portions are in proper condition to 
receive subsequent portions of the Work. 
3.3 LABOR AND MATERIALS 
A. Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the 
Contractor shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, 
equipment, tools, water, .heat,, utilities, transportation, and 
other facilities and services necessary for the proper 
execution and completion of the Work. 
B. The Contractor shall at all times enforce strict discipline and 
good order among those performing the Work and shall not 
C. The Contractor is fully responsible for the Project an{ 
materials and work connected therewith until the Owner 
accepted the work in writing. The Contractor shall repl 
or repair at its own expense any materials or work dama 
or stolen, regardless of whether it has received payment 
such work or materials from the Owner. 
D. The Contractor shall remedy all damage or loss to i 
property caused in whole or in part by the Contractor, i 
Subcontractor, or anyone directly or indirectly employed 
any of them, or by anyone for whose acts any of them rr 
be liable. 
3.4 WARRANTY 
The Contractor warrants to the Owner that the materii 
and equipment furnished under the Contract will be 
specified quality and new unless otherwise required 
permitted by the Contract Documents, that the Work w 
be free from defects, and that the Work will conform wi 
the requirements of the Contract Documents. Work n> 
conforming to these requirements, including substitutior 
not properly approved and authorized, may be considere 
defective. If required by the Architect, the Contractor shf 
furnish satisfactory evidence as to the kind and quality c 
the materials and equipment used in performing the Worl 
3.5 TAXES 
A . The Contractor shall pay ail sales, use, consumer, payroll 
workers compensation, unemployment, old age pension 
surtax, and similar taxes assessed in connection with thi 
performance/of the work. 
B. The Owner will pay all taxes and assessments on the rea 
property comprising the Project site. 
3.6 PERMITS, FEES, AND NOTICES 
A . The Owner will obtain and pay for ail permanent easements 
necessary for completion of the Work. 
EL The Owner will pay the cost of permits, fees, and improve-
ment bonds required by local agencies necessary for the 
proper execution and completion of the Work. The Owner 
will arrange for issuance of permits and the Contractor shall 
be responsible for picking up the permits from the local 
agencies. 
C. The Contractor shall obtain and pay the cost of licenses 
necessary for the proper execution and completion of the 
Work. 
D. The Contractor shall secure any certificates of inspection 
and of occupancy that may be required by authorities having 
jurisdiction over the Work. The Contractor shall deliver 
. these certificates to the Architect prior to execution of the 
Certificate of Substantial Completion. 
E. The Contractor shall comply with and give any notices re-
quired by the laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and 
lawful orders of any public authorities bearing on perfor-
mance of the Work. 
3.7 CONTRACTOR'S ON-SITE REPRESENTATIVE 
The Contractor shall employ a competent representative to 
supervise the performance of the Work. This representative 
shall be in attendance at the Project site during the perfor-
mance of the Work. This representative shall represent the 
Contractor for all purposes, including communication with 
the Owner. All communications will be confirmed in 
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3.8 CONTRACTOR'S CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULES 3.13 ROYALTIES AND PATENTS 
A . The Contractor shall prepare and submit for the Owner's 
and the Architect's information the Contractor's con-
struction schedule for the Work. The schedule shall cover 
the time limits stated in the Contract Documents, shall be 
revised at specified intervals, shall relate to all of the work, 
and shall provide for the expeditious and practicable 
execution of the Work. 
B. The Contractor shall prepare and keep current a submittal 
schedule which is coordinated with the Contractor's 
construction schedule and which allows the Architect 
specified times to review submittals. 
3.9 DOCUMENTS A N D SUBMITTALS A T T H E SITE 
The Contractor shall keep at the Project site for use by the 
Owner, the Architect, or their representatives, a record 
copy of the Project Manual, the Drawings, all Addenda, and 
all Modifications. These documents shall be maintained in 
good order and currently marked to record changes and 
selections made during construction. In addition, the 
Contractor shall keep at the Project site one copy of all 
Product Data, Shop. Drawings, Samples, and similar 
submittals requited by the Contract Documents. 
3.10 PRODUCT D A T A , SHOP DRAWINGS, A N D SAMPLES 
A . Product Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and similar 
submittals are not Contract Documents and do not alter the 
requirements of the Contract Documents unless incorporat-
ed into the Contract Documents b/a Modification. 
The Contractor shall review, approve, and submit to the 
Architect Product Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and 
similar submittals in accordance with the Contract Docu-
ments, Submittals not required by the Contract Documents 
may be returned without action. By approving Product 
Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and similar submittals, the 
Contractor represents that it has determined and verified 
field measurements, field construction criteria, materials, 
catalog numbers, and similar data, and that it has checked 
and coordinated each submittal with the requirements of 
the Work and of the Contract Documents or will make such 
determination, verification, check, and coordination prior 
to commencing the relevant portion of the Work. 
C. The Contractor shall not perform any portions of the Work 
requiring submittals until the respective submittal has been 
reviewed and accepted by the Architect. 
D. The Contractor shall not be relieved of responsibility for 
deviations from the requirements of the Contract Docu-
ments by the Architect's acceptance of submittals unless 
the Contractor has specifically informed the Architect in 
writing of such deviations at the time of submission and the 
Architect has incorporated the deviation into the Contract 
Documents by a Modification. The Contractor shall not be 
relieved of responsibility for errors or omissions in submit-
tals by the Architect's acceptance of the submittal. 
ZA1 CUTTING AND PATCHING 
The Contractor shall be responsible for any cutting, fitting, 
and patching that may be required to complete the Work 
and make its parts fit together properly. 
S.T2 ACCESS TO WORK 
The Contractor shall provide the Owner and the Architect 
The Contractor shall pay all royalties and license fees 
required by the Work or by the Contractor's chosen method 
of performing the Work. The Contractor shall defend and 
hold the Owner harmless from all suits or claims for 
infringement of any patent or license rights or any loss on 
account thereof. 
3.14 INDEMNIFICATION 
A. The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the 
Owner, the Architect, their consultants, and the agents and 
employees of any of the foregoing from and against any and 
all claims, damages, liability, demands, costs, judgements, 
awards, settlements, causes of action, losses and expenses, 
including but not limited to attorneys fees, arising out of or 
resulting from performance of the Work, attributable to 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or tD injury to or 
destruction of tangible or real property, including loss of use 
resulting therefrom, but only to the extent caused in whole 
or in part by the negligent acts or omissions of the Contrac-
tor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly 
employed by them, or anyone for whose acts they may be 
liable, regardless of whether such claim, damage, loss, or 
expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder. 
In the event that any such claim, damage, loss, or expense 
is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder, that 
party shall bear the cost of such claim, damage, loss, or 
expense to the extent it was the cause thereof, in the event 
that the claimant asserts a claim for recovery against any 
party indemnified hereunder, the party indemnified hereun-
der may tender the defense of such claim to the Contractor. 
If the Contractor rejects such tender of defense and it is 
later determined that the party indemnified hereunder did 
not cause any part of the claim, damage, loss, or expense, 
the Contractor shall reimburse the party indemnified 
hereunder for costs and expenses incurred by that party in 
defending against the claim. The Contractor shall not be 
liable hereunder to indemnify any party for damages 
resulting from the sole negligence of that party. 
B. in addition to the foregoing, the Contractor shall be liable 
to defend the Owner in any lawsuit filed by any Subcontrac-
tor relating to the Project. Where liens have been filed 
against the Owner's property, the Contractor and/or its 
bonding company which has issued bonds for the Project, 
shall obtain Hen releases and record them in the appropriate 
county and/or local jurisdiction and provide the Owner with 
a title free and clear from any liens of Subcontractors. In 
the event that the Contractor and its bonding company are 
unable to obtain a lien release, the Owner in its absolute 
discretion may require the Contractor to provide a bond 
around the lien or a bond to discharge the lien at the 
Contractor's sole expense. 
C. in addition to the foregoing, the Contractor shall indemnify 
and hold the Owner harmless from any claim of any other 
contractor resulting from the performance, nonperformance 
or delay in performance of the Work by the Contractor. 
D. No subcontract shall relieve the Contractor of any of its 
liability or obligations to the Owner under the Contract 
Documents. The Contractor agrees that it is fully responsi-
ble to the Owner for acts or omissions of Subcontractors 
and of persons either directly or indirectly employed by 
them. 
E. In claims against any person or entity indemnified under this 
Article 3.14 by an employee of the Contractor or any 
Subcontractor or anyone employed directly or indirectly by 
+ k D m n r
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Subcontractor under worker's compensation acts, disability 
benefit acts, or other employee benefit acts. 
SECTION 4 - ADIVliNIStRATlOM OF THE CONTRACT 
4.1 ARCHITECT 
In case of the termination of the employment of the 
Architect, the Owner shall appoint in writing an Architect 
against whom the Contractor makes no reasonable 
objection, whose status under the Contract Documents 
shall be that of the former Architect in all respects. 
4.2 ARCHITECT'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT 
A . The Architect shall be the Owner's representative during 
the construction period. He shall have authority to act on 
behalf of the Owner only to the extent provided in the 
Contract Documents. ' * 
B. The Architect will make frequent visits to the site to 
familiarize itself generally with the progress and quality of 
the Work and to determine if the Work is proceeding in 
accordance with the Contract Documents. Although the 
Architect is required to make periodic inspections, it is not 
required to make exhaustive or continuous onsite inspec-
tions. On the basis of its observations while at the site, the 
Architect will keep the Owner informed of the progress of 
the Work and will endeavor to guard the Owner against 
defects and deficiencies in the Work. The fact that the 
Architect has failed to observe a defect or deficiency in the 
Work shall not relieve the Contractor of its duty to perform 
the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents. 
C. Communications between the Contractor and the Owner 
relating to the Work shall be through the Architect. Com-
munications between the Owner or the Contractor with the 
Architect's consultants relating to the Work shall be 
through the Architect. Communications between the 
Owner or the Architect and the Subcontractors relating to 
the Work shall be through the Contractor. Communications 
between the Contractor and any separate contractor shall 
be through the Architect, except as otherwise specified in 
the Contract Documents. 
D. The Architect will review the Contractor's Payment 
Requests and determine the amounts due the Contractor 
in accordance with Section 9. 
E. The Owner and/or the' Architect shall have the right to 
condemn and require removal of the following at the 
Contractor's expense: 
1. Any portion of the Work which does not meet the 
requirements of the Contract Documents. 
2. Any portion of the Work damaged or rendered unsuit-
able during installation or resulting from failure to 
exercise proper protection. 
F. The Architect shall have authority to stop the Work, with 
concurrence of the Owner, whenever such stoppage-may 
be necessary in its reasonable opinion to insure the proper 
performance of the Work. 
G. The Architect will review the Contractor's submittals such 
as Product Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and Mock-ups 
and shall accept or take other appropriate action regarding 
the submittals. The Architect's review of the submittals 
shall be for the limited purpose of checking for general 
conformance with the Contract Documents and shall not 
be conducted for the purpose of determining the accuracy 
and completeness of details such as dimensions and 
quantities, or for substantiating instructions for installation 
review of submittals shall not relieve the Contractor of its 
obligations under the Contract Documents. The Architect's 
review of submittals shall not constitute acceptance of 
safety precautions or construction means, methods, tech-
niques, sequences or procedures. The Architect's accep-
tance of a specific item shall not indicate acceptance of an 
assembly of which the item is a component. 
H. The Architect has authority to order Construction Change 
Directives and Field Changes in accordance with Section 7. 
I. The Architect will conduct inspections to determine the 
dates of Substantial Completion and final completion, will 
receive and review written guarantees and related docu-
ments required by the Contract and assembled by the 
Contractor, and will review and approve or reject the 
Contractor's final payment request. 
J . The Architect shalf be the interpreter of the performance 
and requirements of the Contract Documents. The Archi-
tect 's interpretations shall be in writing or in the form of 
drawings. 
K. The Architect's decisions in matters relating to artistic 
effect will be final if consistent with the Contract Docu-
ments. 
SECTION 5 - SUBCOWTTWCTORS 
5.1 A W A R D OF SUBCONTRACTS A N D OTHER 
CONTRACTS FOR PORTIONS OF T H E WORK 
A . The Contractor shall enter into contracts with Subcontrac-
tors to perform all portions of the Work that the Contractor 
does not customarily perform with its own employees. 
B. The Contractor shall not contract with any Subcontractor 
who has been rejected by the Owner. The Contractor will 
not be required to contract with any Subcontractor against 
whom it has a reasonable objection. 
C. If the Owner refuses to accept any Subcontractor proposed 
by the Contractor, the Contractor shall propose an accept-
able substitute to whom the Owner has no reasonable 
objection. 
D. The Contractor shall not make any substitution for any 
Subcontractor which has been accepted by the Owner and 
the Architect without the prior written approval of the 
Owner and the Architect. 
5.2 SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
A . The Contractor's responsibility for the Work includes the 
work and materials of all Subcontractors including those 
recommended or approved by the Owner. The Contractor 
.shall be responsible to the Owner for proper completion and 
guarantee of all workmanship and materials under any • 
subcontracts. Any warranties required for such work shall 
be obtained by the Contractor in favor of the Owner and 
delivered to the Architect. It is expressly understood and 
agreed that there is no contractual relationship between the 
Owner and any Subcontractor, and under no circumstances 
shall the Owner be responsible for the non-performance or 
financial failure of any Subcontractor or any effects 
therefrom. 
B. The Contractor agrees to pay the Subcontractors promptly 
upon receipt of payment from the Owner for that portion 
of the funds received which represents the Subcontractor's 
portion of the Work completed to the Contractor's satisfac-
tion for which payment was made bv the Owner. 
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C. The Contractor shall require each Subcontractor to: 
1. Be licensed by the state in which the Project is located 
where such licensing is required by the governing 
authority; 
2. Be bound by the terms of the Contract Documents as 
far as they are applicable to the Subcontractor's work; 
3. Assume toward the Contractor the same obligations 
the Contractor has...assumed toward the Owner, 
including the prompt payment of its employees, 
subcontractors, and materialmen; 
4. Submit its applications for payment to the Contractor 
in time to permit the Contractor to make timely applica-
tion to the Owner; 
5. Execute claim or lien releases or lien waivers for 
payments made by the Contractor; and 
6. Make all claims for extra work done or for extensions 
. of time to the Contractor in the same manner as the 
Contractor is required to make such claims to the 
Owner.
 ; 
SECTION 6 - CONSTRUCTION BY OWNER OR 
SEPARATE CONTRACTORS 
6.1 OWNER'S RIGHT T O PERFORM WORK OR AWARD 
SEPARATE CONTRACTS 
A. The Owner reserves the right to perform work itself or to 
! award other contracts in connection with other portions of 
the Project. 
B. When separate contracts are awarded for different portions 
of the Project, "the Contractor" in the Contract Documents 
in each case shall mean the contractor who signs each 
separate contract. 
6.2 MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. The Contractor shall afford other contractors reasonable 
opportunity to place and store their materials and equip-
ment on site and to perform their work and shall properly 
connect and coordinate its Work with theirs where 
applicable. 
B. If any part of the Contractor's Work depends upon the work 
of any other separate contractor for proper performance or 
results, the Contractor shall inspect and promptly report to 
the Architect any apparent discrepancies or defects in such 
work that render it unsuitable for such proper performance 
and results. Failure of the Contractor to so inspect and 
t report shall constitute an acceptance of the work of the 
other contractor as fit and proper to receive the Contrac-
tor's Work, except as to defects not then reasonably 
discoverable. 
C. The Contractor shall promptly remedy damage caused by 
the Contractor or any Subcontractor to the completed or 
.partially completed work of other contractors or to the 
property of the Owner or other contractors. 
6.3 OWNER'S RIGHT TO CLEAN UP 
If a dispute arises among the Contractor and separate 
contractors as to the responsibility under their separate 
contracts for maintaining the Project free from waste 
materials and rubbish, the Owner may clean up the Project 
and allocate the cost among those responsible as the 
Owner and the Architect determine to be just. 
SECTION? - CHANGES IN THE WORK 
7.1 CHANttFS IN THP WORK" RPSIU TlteK PROM AN IMftTRflfi. 
A . If the Owner or the Architect gives the Contractor an 
instruction which modifies the requirements of the Contract 
Documents or delays Substantial Completion of the Work, 
the Contractor may be entitled to an adjustment in the 
Contract Sum and/or the Contract Time. If compliance with 
the instruction affects the cost to the Contractor to perform 
the Work, the Contract Sum shall be adjusted to reflect 
such increase or decrease in cost subject to the conditions 
set forth in Article 7.1, Paragraphs B through F. If compli-
ance with the instruction delays Substantial Completion, 
the Contract Time shall be extended for a period of time 
commensurate with such delay subject to the conditions set 
forth in Article 7.3, Paragraph A and the Contractor shall 
be paid liquidated damages for the delay as set forth in 
Articfe 7.3, Paragraph B. 
B. If the Contractor receives an instruction from the Owner or 
the Architect which the Contractor considers a Change in 
the Work, the Contractor before complying with the 
instruction shall notify the Architect in writing that the 
Contractor considers such instruction to constitute a 
Change in the Work. The Contractor agrees that if it 
complies with the instruction without first giving such 
written notice to the Architect, the Contractor is not entitled 
to any adjustment in the Contract Sum or the Contract Time 
as a result of the instruction and waives any claim therefor. 
C. If the Contractor claims that it is entitled to an adjustment 
in the Contract Sum (except for costs related to a time 
extension) as a result of an instruction by the Owner or the 
Architect, the Contractor shall furnish a proposal for a 
Change Order containing a price breakdown itemized as 
required by the Owner. The breakdown shall be in sufficient < 
detail to allow the Owner to determine any increase or 
decrease in direct costs (materials, labor, equipment, 
insurance, bondsr and subcontract costs) as a result of 
compliance with the instruction. Any amount claimed for 
subcontracts shall be supported by a similar price break-
down and shad itemize the Subcontractors'" profit and 
overhead charges. Profit and overhead shall be subject to 
the following limitations. 
1. The Subcontractors' profit and overhead shall not 
exceed twelve (12) percent of its direct costs. 
2. The Contractor's profit and overhead on worlc performed 
by its own crews shall not exceed twelve (12) percent 
of its direct costs. 
3. The Contractor's profit and overhead mark up on work 
performed by its Subcontractors shall not exceed frve 
(5) percent of the Subcontractor's charges for such 
work. 
4. On credit changes, profit and overhead on the originally 
estimated work will not be credited back to the Owner. 
D. If the Contractor claims that it is entitled to an adjustment 
in the Contract Time as a result of an instruction from the 
Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall include in its 
proposal justification to support the Contractor's claim that 
compliance with the instruction wil l delay Substantial 
Completion. 
E. The Contraqtor's proposal for a modification, together with 
the price breakdown and time extension justification, shall 
be furnished within ten (10) days of the date the Architect 
gives written notice requesting the proposal. 
F. If the Contractor is required to perform work which it claims 
constitutes a Change in the Work but which the Owner and 
the Architect do not agree constitutes a Change in the 
Work, the Contractor may submit its claim for additional 
compensation, additional time, or both as a dispute pursuant 
to Section 13 within thirty (30) days of completion of the 
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that the change does nv .rtitle it to additional compensa-
tion or time extensions and waives any claim therefor. 
CHANGE m THE WORK RESULTING FROM A N EVENT OR 
CIRCUMSTANCE 
If an event or circumstance, other than an instruction from 
the Owner or the Architect affects the cost to the Contrac-
tor of performing the Work or delays Substantial Completion 
of the Work, the Contractor may be entitled to an adjust-
ment in the Contract Sum and/or the Contract Time. If the 
circumstance or event affects the cost to the Contractor 
to perform the Work and is caused by a wilful or negligent 
act or omission of the Owner or the Architect, the Contract 
Sum shall be adjusted to reflect such increase or decrease 
in cost subject to the conditions set forth in Article 7.2, 
Paragraphs B through F. If the event or circumstance 
delays Substantial Completion and is described in Article 
7.3, Paragraph A, the Contract Time shall be extended for 
a period of time commensurate with such delay subject to 
the conditions set forth in such article. If the circumstance 
or event delays Substantial Completion of the Work and is 
caused by a wilful or negligent act or omission of the 
Owner or the Architect, then the Contractor shall be 
compensated for costs incident to the delay in accordance 
with Article 7.3, Paragraph B. The Contractor shall not be 
entitled to any adjustment to the Contract Sum or other 
damages from the Owner as a result of any event or 
circumstance unless the event or circumstance results from 
a wilful or negligent act or omission of the Owner or the 
Architect. 
ff a Change in the Work results from any event or circum-
stance caused by the wilful or negligent act or omission of 
the Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall give the 
Owner written notice of such event or circumstance within 
twenty-four hours after commencement of the event or 
circumstance so that the Owner can take such action as 
is necessary to mitigate the effect of the event or circum-
stance. The Contractor shall not be entitled to any 
adjustment in either the Contract Time or the Contract Sum 
based on any damages or delays resulting from such event 
or circumstance during a period more than twenty-four 
hours prior to the Contractor giving such written notice to 
the Owner. 
The Contractor shall submit any claims for an adjustment 
in the Contract Time and/or the Contract Sum resulting 
from a Change in the Work (other than a change resulting 
from compliance with an instruction from the Owner or 
Architect) within the time Hmits set. forth below. In the 
event that the Contractor fails to submit its claim within the 
limits set forth above, then the Contractor agrees it shall 
not be entitled to any adjustment in the Contract Time or 
the Contract Sum or to any other damages from the Owner 
due to the circumstance or event and waives any claim 
therefor. 
1. Claims for an adjustment in the Contract Time due to 
inclement weather shall be made by the tenth (10th) 
of the month following the month in which the delay 
occurred. 
2. Claims for an adjustment in the Contract Time and/or 
the Contract Sum due to any other circumstance or 
event shall be submitted within seven (7) days after the 
occurrence of the circumstance or event. 
If the Contractor claims that it is entitled to an adjustment 
in the Contract Sum (except for costs related to a time 
extension) because of an event or circumstance resulting 
from the wilful or negligent act or omission of the Owner 
or the Arch'rtect (other than an instruction), the Contractor 
shall furnish a proposal for a Change Order containing a 
price breakdown as described in Article 7.1. ParaaraDh C. 
7.3 
in the Contract Time as a result of an event or ci 
stance, the Contractor include with its claim copies a; 
logs, letters, shipping orders, delivery tickets, P 
schedules, and other supporting information necess; 
justify the Contractor's claim that the event or circurns 
delayed Substantial Completion. If the Contractor is en 
to a time extension as a result of an event or circumst 
caused by the wilful or negligent act or omission o 
Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall be compel 
ed for all costs related to the delay in accordance 
Article 7.3, Paragraph B. 
Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Contract 
claim, the Architect shall either approve or deny the ch 
If the Architect approves the claim, the adjustment in 
Contract Time and/or Contract Sum shall be reflected i 
Change Order pursuant to Article 7.5 or a Construe! 
Change Directive pursuant to Article 7.6. If the Archit 
denies the Contractor's claim, the Contractor may sub; 
its claim as a dispute pursuant to Section 13 within thi 
(30) days of receipt of the Architect's denial of the clai 
If the Contractor fails to submit its claim for resoluti 
pursuant to Section 13 within the thirty (30) day tir 
period, then the Contractor agrees it is not entitled to a 
adjustment m the Contract Time and/ or Contract Sum 
any other damages as a result of the event or circumstam 
from the Owner and waives any claim therefor. 
EXTENSIONS OF TIME 
A . If Substantial Completion of the Project is delayed becaus 
of any of the following causes, then the Contract Time sha 
be extended by Change Order for a period of time equal t 
such delay. 
1. Labor strikes or lock-outs; 
2 . fnclement weather; 
3 . Unusual delay in transportation; 
4. Unforeseen governmental requests or requirements; 
5. A Change in the Work pursuant to Article 7.1; or 
6. Any other event or circumstance caused by the wilful 
or negligent act or omission of the Owner or the 
Architect. 
B. If any delay referred to in Article 7.3, Paragraph A , subpara-
graphs 4, 5 or 6 is caused by the wilful or negligent act or 
omission of the Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall 
be paid liquidated damages in the amount per day set forth 
in the Supplementary Conditions to compensate the 
Contractor for all damages resulting from the delay, 
including but not limited to general conditions costs, 
additional job site costs, additional home office overhead 
costs, disruption costs, acceleration costs, increase in labor 
costs, increase in subcontract costs, increase in materials 
costs, and any other costs incident to the delay. The 
Contractor shall be entitled to no other compensation 
relating to the delay. 
7.4 DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES IN THE WORK 
If the Owner, the Architect and the Contractor reach 
agreement regarding the adjustment in Contract Sum, if any, 
and the adjustment in the Contract Time, if any, resulting 
from a Change in the Work, then the parties shall execute 
a Change Order pursuant to Article 7.5. if the Owner, the 
Architect and the Contractor cannot reach agreement 
regarding the adjustment in Contract Sum or the adjustment 
in Contract Time resulting from a Change in the Work, then 
the Owner and the Architect shall issue a Construction 
Change Directive pursuant to Article 7.6. 
7.5 CHANGE ORDERS 
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1. The occurrence of a Change; 
2. The amount of the adjustment in the Contract Sum, if 
any, as a result of the Change; and 
3. The extent of the adjustment in the Contract Time, if 
any, as a result of the .Change. 
B. The Contractor's signature upon a Change Order is the 
Contractor's acknowledgment that it is not entitled to any 
additional adjustment in the Contract Time or the Contract 
Sum or any other damages or compensation as a result of 
the Change in the Work other than that provided for in the 
Change Order, irrespective of whether a subsequent claim 
for additional compensation or time extensions relating to 
the Change in the Work is described as a change in the 
requirements of the Contract Documents, a delay, a 
disruption of the Work, ah acceleration of the Work, an 
impact on the efficiency of performance of the Work, an 
equitable adjustment, or other claim and irrespective of 
whether the impact of the Change in the Work is consid-
ered singly or in conjunction with the impact of other 
Changes in the Work. 
7.6 CONSTRUCTION CHANGE DIRECTIVES 
A . A Construction Change Directive is a written order, 
prepared by the Architect and signed by the Owner, stating 
a proposed basis for adjustment, if any, in the Contract 
Sum, the Contract Time, or both resulting from a Change 
in the Work. A Construction Change Directive-shall be used 
to order a Change in the Work if the terms of a Change 
Order cannot be agreed upon prior to performance of a 
Change in the work described in Article 7.1 or after the 
occurrence of an event or circumstance described in Article 
7.2. 
B. Upon receipt of a Construction Change Directive, the 
Contractor shall immediately perform the changed work 
with due diligence. 
C. Pending final resolution of any adjustment in the Contract • 
Sum or Contract Time relating to a Construction Change 
Directive, the amounts proposed by the Owner in the ! 
Construction Change Directive may be included in the 
Contractor's Payment Requests once the work relating 
thereto is completed. Amounts due the Owner as a result 
of a Construction Change Directive shall be the actual net 
savings to the Contractor from the Change in the Work as 
confirmed by the Architect. If both additions and credits 
are involved in a single Change in the Work, overhead and 
profit shall be figured on the basis of net increase, if any, 
related to that Change in the Work. 
D. If after the changed work is completed the Owner, the 
Architect, and the Contractor reach agreement on adjust-
ments in the Contract Sum, Contract Time, or both, such 
agreement shall be reflected in an appropriate Change 
Order. 
E. If the parties do not reach agreement regarding an adjust-
ment to the Contract Sum, Contract Time, or both relating 
to the Construction Change Directive within thirty (30) days 
of the completion of the changed work, then the Contractor 
may submit its claim for an adjustment pursuant to Section 
13 within thirty (30) days of the completion of the changed 
work. In the event that the Contractor fails to submit its 
claim for resolution pursuant to Section 13 within thirty 
(30) days of completion of the changed work, then the 
Contractor shall be deemed to acknowledge that it is not 
entitled to additional compensation or time extensions ': 
resulting from the Change in the Work except as set forth 
in the Construction Change Directive and waives any claim 
therefor. 
A . The Architect is authorized to order minor changes during 
the course of the Work which will not involve extra cost or 
time and which are consistent with the general intent of the 
Contract Documents. Further, the Architect is authorized 
to order on-the-spot minor Changes in the Work of a value 
of $1,000 or less and resulting in no time extension in order 
to avoid delaying the Work. The price of such Field Change 
will be mutually agreed upon between the Architect and the 
Contractor before the Contractor proceeds with the change 
and shall be recorded on a Field Change form. 
B. The Contractor will proceed with the changed work 
forthwith. The Field Change will subsequently be reduced 
to a Change Order. 
7.8 WAIVER OF CLAIMS 
The Contractor shall not be entitled to any adjustment in the 
contract Sum or the Contract Time or for any damages of 
any kind whatsoever resulting from an instruction from the 
Owner or the Architect, any event or circumstance, or any 
act or omission of the Owner or Architect and. the Contrac-
tor expressly waives any and all claims therefor, except as 
set forth in Articles 7.1. through 7.3. 
SECTION 8 - TIME 
E.1 TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE 
All time limits stated in the Contract Documents are of the 
essence of the Contract. By executing the Agreement, the 
Contractor confirms that the Contract Time is a reasonable 
period for performing the Work. The Contractor shall 
proceed expeditiously with adequate forces and shall 
achieve Substantial Completion within the Contract Time. 
8.2 COMIViENCEfVIENrr OF THE WORK 
The Contractor shall not commence work on the Project site 
until the date set forth in the written Notice To Proceed. 
However, the Contractor may enter into subcontracts and 
secure material for the Project after receipt of the Agree-
ment with the Owner's authorized signature. The Owner 
will issue the Notice To Proceed within forty-five (45) days 
after the Owner receives acceptable bonds and evidence of 
insurance pursuant to Section 11 unless the Owner earlier 
terminates the Agreement pursuant to Section 14. 
5.3 DELAY IN COMPLETION Or THE WORK ' ' 
A , : For each day after the expiration of the Contract Time that 
the Work is not substantially complete, the Contractor shall 
pay the Owner the amount set forth in the Supplementary 
Conditions as liquidated damages for the Owner's Joss of 
use of the Project and the added administrative expense to 
the Owner to administer the Project during the period of 
delay. In addition, the Contractor shall reimburse the Owner 
for any additional Architect's fees and legal fees incurred 
by the Owner as a result of the delay. The Owner may 
deduct any liquidated damages or reimbursable expenses 
from the money due or to become due to the Contractor. 
If the amount of liquidated damages and reimbursable 
expenses exceeds any amounts due to the Contractor, the 
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner within ten 
(10) days after receipt of a written request from the Owner 
for payment. 
B. At the time the Architect certifies the Project is substantially 
completed, the Architect shall identify the remaining items 
to be completed for final completion of the Project and shall 
establish with the Contractor a reasonable time for comple-
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Contractor exceeds the time allowed for completion of the 
items set forth in the Certificate of Substantial Completion, 
the Contractor shall pay to the Owner as liquidated 
damages for additional administrative expenses the amount 
set forth in the Supplementary Conditions. In addition, the 
Contractor shall reimburse the Owner for any additional 
Architect's fees and legal fees incurred by the Owner as 
a result of the delay. 
SECTIONS - PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION 
5.1 SCHEDULE OF VALUES 
The Contractor shall submit to the Architect a schedule of 
values which allocates the Contract Sum to various portions 
of the Work. The schedule of values shall be supported by 
such data to substantiate its accuracy as required by the 
Architect- This schedule, when accepted by the Architect, 
shall be used as a basis for reviewing the Contractor's 
payment requests. 
3.2 PAYMErTT REQUESTS 
A . Once each month, the Contractor shall submit to the 
Architect for its approval a payment request for the 
estimated value of the Work completed, materials stored 
on the site, and for materials stored offsite as approved by 
the Owner as of the date of the payment request as 
specified in Division 0 1 . 
1. The estimate shaff be in. accordance with the schedule 
of values submitted by the Contractor. 
2. Such payment requests may include requests for 
payment for Change Orders and for the Changes in the 
Work which have been authorized by Construction 
Change Directives, but not yet included in Change 
Orders. 
3. Such payment requests may not include requests for 
payment of amounts the Contractor does not intend to 
pay to a Subcontractor because of a dispute or other 
reason. 
B. The Contractor warrants and guarantees that upon the 
receipt of payment for work, materials, and equipment 
covered by each payment request, whether incorpo-
rated in the Project or not, titfe to such work, materials, 
and equipment shaff pass to the Owner free and clear 
of afl liens, claims, security interests, or encumbrances. 
The Contractor further warrants that no work, material, 
or equipment covered by a payment request has been 
acquired by the Contractor or by any other person 
performing the Work or furnishing material and equip-
ment for the Work, subject to an agreement under 
which an interest therein or an encumbrance thereon 
is retained by the seller or otherwise imposed by the 
Contractor or such other person. 
-3.3 PAYMENT REQUEST APPROVAL 
A . The Architect will, within seven (7) days after receipt of the 
Contractor's payment request, forward to the Owner the 
payment request approved for such amount as the Archi-
tect determines is properly due, and notify the Contractor 
and the Owner in writing of the Architect's reasons for 
withholding certification of any part of the payment request. 
B. The approval of the payment request will constitute a 
representation by the Architect to the Owner based upon 
the Architect's observations at the site and the data 
comprising the payment request, that the Work has pro-
gressed to the point indicated and that, to the best of the 
Architect's knowledge, information, and belief, the qualitv 
of the Work is in ar^ nr<~i~-~~ 
upon Substantial Completion, to results of subsequi 
and inspections, to minor deviations from the ( 
Documents correctable prior to completion, and to 
qualifications expressed by the Architect. Howe 
approval of the payment request shall not cons 
representation that the Architect has: 
1. Conducted exhaustive or continuous on-site insp 
to check the quantity or quality of the Work; 
2. Reviewed construction means, methods, techr 
sequences, or procedures; 
3. Reviewed copies of requisitions received from Si 
tractors or other data requested by the Owr 
substantiate the Contractor's right to payment; i 
4 . Made examination to ascertain how or for what pu 
the Contractor has used money previously pai 
account of the Contract Sum. 
9.4 DECISIONS TO WTTHHOiD APPROVAL AND PAYW 
i ' 
A . The Architect may disapprove a payment request in w 
or in part to the extent reasonably necessary to protect 
Owner if, in the opinion of the Architect, the representati 
to the Owner required by Article 9.3, Paragraph B can 
be accurately made. If the Architect is unable to cer 
payment in the amount of the payment request, 1 
Architect will notify the Contractor and the Owner 
provided in Article 9.3, Paragraph A . If the Contractor a 
the Architect cannot agree on a revised amount, t 
Architect will promptly approve a payment request fortl 
amount for which the Architect rs able to make such repr 
sentations to the Owner. The Architect may also decide m 
to certify payment or, because o f subsequently discovere 
evidence or subsequent observations, may nullify the whol 
or a part of a payment request previously approved, to sue 
extent as may be necessary in the Architect's opinion ti 
protect the Owner from loss because of: 
1. Defective Work not remedied; 
2. Third-party claims filed or reasonable evidence indicatinc 
probable fifing of such claims; 
3 . Failure of the Contractor to make payments properly to 
Subcontractors for labor, material or, equipment; 
4 . Reasonable evidence that the Work cannot be complet-
ed for the unpaid balance of the Contract Sum; 
5. Damage to the Owner or another contractor for which 
the Contractor is responsible; 
6. Reasonable evidence that the Work will not be complet-
ed within the Contract Time and that the unpaid balance 
would not be adequate to cover the cost of completing 
the Work and actual or liquidated damages for the 
anticipated delay; or 
7. The Contractor's persistent failure to carry out the Work 
in accordance with the Contract Documents. 
B. The Owner reserves the right to withhold payments to the 
Contractor, subsequent to the Architect's approvaf of any 
payment request, in order to protect the Owner from loss 
due to any condition described in Article 9.4, Paragraph A, 
Subparagraphs 1 through 7. Upon satisfactory removal of 
any such grounds for withholding, payments so withheld 
will be made. 
9.5 PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
A. Subject to the Owner's right to withhold payment set forth 
in Article 9.4, Paragraph B, the Owner shall pay to the 
Contractor ninety (90) percent of the amount certified by 
the Architect, less previous payment thereon within fifteen 
(15) days after receipt of the payment request from the 
Architect. However, at any time after fifty (50) percent of 
the Work has been completed, the O w n or -~~.- — •-
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B. Upon receipt of any payment from the Owner, the Contrac-
tor shall pay to each Subcontractor the amount paid to the 
Contractor on account of such Subcontractor's portion of 
the Work. v 
C. The Contractor shall maintain a copy of each payment 
request at the Project site for review by the Subcontractors. 
D. No payment made under the Contract, either in whole or 
in part, shall be construed to be an acceptance of defective 
or improper materials or workmanship. 
9.6 FINAL PAYMENT 
A . The Owner shall make full and final payment of the Con-
tract Sum within thirty (30) days of the completion of all 
of the following requirements: 
1. The Architect has declared to the Owner in writing that 
the Work is complete; 
2, The Architect has received ail final lien waivers and/or 
releases of lien from all Subcontractors; 
3, • The Architect has received the Affidavit of Contractor 
and Consent of Surety on the Owner's prescribed form 
fully executed by the Contractor and its surety; and 
4. The Owner has accepted the Work in writing. 
B. Acceptance of final payment by the Contractor or any 
Subcontractor shall constitute a waiver of claims by that 
payee except those previously made in writing pursuant to 
Sections 7, 8, or 9 and identified by the Contractor on the 
Affidavit of Contractor and Consent of Surety as being 
unsettled at the time of the final payment request. 
SECTION 10 - PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY 
10.1 SAFETY P R E C A U T I O N AND PROGRAMS 
The Contractor shall be responsible to the Owner for 
initiating and supervising all safety programs in connection 
with the performance of the Work. 
10.2 SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
A . The Contractor shall take reasonable precautions to prevent 
damage, injury, or loss to:' 
1. All persons on the site; 
2. The Work and materials and equipment to be incorpo-
rated into the Work; and 
3. Other property at the site or adjacent to it. 
B. The Contractor shall give notices and comply with applica-
ble laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and other lawful 
requirements of public authorities bearing on the safety or 
protection of persons and property. 
C. The Contractor shall designate a responsible member of its 
organization at the site whose duty shall be the prevention 
.of accidents. This person shall be the Contractor's superin-
tendent unless otherwise designated in writing by the 
Contractor to the Owner and the Architect. 
10.3 EMERGENCIES 
In case of an emergency endangering life or threatening the 
safety of any person or property, the Contractor may, 
without waiting for specific authorization from the Architect 
or the Owner, act at its own discretion to safeguard 
persons or property. The Contractor shall immediately 
notify the Architect of such emergency action and make 
a full written report to the Architect within five (5) days 
SECTSON11 - INSURANCE AMD BONDS 
11.1 CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY INSURANCE 
A . The Contractor shall obtain the following insurance and 
provide evidence thereof as described below prior to 
commencement of the Work or within ten (10) days after 
signing the Agreement, whichever is earlier: 
1. Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insur-
• ance with limits and coverages as required by the law 
of the state in which the Project is located. 
2. Commercial General Liability Insurance - ISO Form CG 
00 01 (10/93) or equivalent Occurrence Policy, with: 
a. Limits of not less than: 
1) $2,000,000 General Aggregate; 
2) $2,000,000 Products- Comp/OPS Aggregate: 
3) $1,000,000 Personal and Advertising Injury: 
4) $1 r000,000 Each Occurrence; 
5) $50,000 Fire Damage (any one fire); and 
6) $5,000 Medical Expense (any one person). 
b. Endorsements attached thereto" including the 
following or their equivalent: 
1) ISO Form CG 25 03 (10/93), Amendment Of 
Limits of insurance (Designated Project or 
Premises), describing the subject Contract and 
specifying limits as shown above. 
2) ISO Form CG 20 10 (10/93), Additional Insured 
— Owners, Lessees, Or Contractors (Form B), 
naming the Owner as an additional insured and 
containing the following statement: "This 
Endorsement Also Constitutes Primary Coverage 
In The Event Of Any Occurrence, Claim, Or 
Suit". 
c. Automobile Liability Insurance, with: 
1) /s[ minimum limit of $1,000,000 Combined 
Single Limit per accident; and 
2) Coverage applying to "Any Auto." 
3. All-Risk Builders Risk Insurance Policy - ISO Form CP 
00 20 (10/91)), Builders' Risk Coverage (or equivalent) 
and ISO Form CP 10 30 (10/91), Causes of Loss-
Special, including Additional Coverage-Collapse and 
Additional Coverage-Extensions (or equivalent) with 
Limits of Insurance not less than the Contract Sum. An 
installation floater may be used, if approved in writing 
by Owner. 
a. Policy shall cover materials stored at temporary 
storage locations and materials in transit. 
b. Policy shall not cover Flood or Earthquake. Rood 
and Earthquake coverage will be provided by the 
Owner. 
J
 c. Include the Owner and all Subcontractors as 
Insureds with the Contractor on the policy. 
B. The Contractor shall provide evidence of such insurance to 
the Owner as follows 
1. Deliver to the Owner a Certificate of Insurance, on . 
ACORD 2S-S (3/93) Form, or equivalent: 
a.. Listing the Owner as a Certificate Holder and 
Additional Insured on general liability and any 
excess liability policies; 
b. Listing the endorsements set forth above. (Note: 
If forms other than ISO forms are used, copies of 
the non-ISO forms shall be attached to this certifi-
cate); 
c. Identifying the Project; 
d. Containing a cancellation clause of the certificate 
amended to read: "Should any of the above 
described policies be cancelled before the natural 
expiration date thereof, the issuing company will 
mail thirty (30) days' written notice to the certificate 
holder named to the left"; 
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insurance shall be rated _ r' Class VHP or better, 
in the A . M . Best Company Key Rating Guide-Prop-
erty-Casualty, current edition); and 
f. Bearing the name, address and telephone number 
of the "Producer" and an original signature of the 
authorized representative of the Producer. 
(Facsimile or mechanically reproduced signatures 
will not be accepted.) 
2. Upon request, provide copy of All-Risk Builder's Risk 
Insurance Policy for Owner's approval. 
C. The Contractor shall maintain such insurance in effect from 
the commencement of the Work until the expiration of the 
time period covered by the warranty specified in Article 
11.2, paragraph B. and the completion of any repairs 
covered by said bonds. 
D. The Owner reserves the right to reject any insurance 
company, policy, endorsement, or certificate of insurance 
with or without cause. 
E. The cost of insurance as required above shall be the 
obligation of the Contractor. 
11.2 PERFORMANCE BOND AND LABOR AND MATERIAL 
PAYMENT BOND 
A . Prior to commencing the Work or within ten days after 
signing the Agreement, whichever is earlier, the Contractor 
shall furnish to the Owner a performance bond and a labor 
and material payment bond each in an amount equal to one 
hundred (100) percent of the Contract Sum as security for 
all obligations arising under the Contract Documents. Such 
bonds shall: 
1. Be written on Form AlA Document A312 . 
2. Be issued by a surety' dompany or companies licensed 
in the state in which the Project is located and holding 
valid certificates of authority under Sections 9304 to 
9308, Title 31, of the United States Code as accept-
able sureties or reinsurance companies on federal 
bonds. 
3. Have a penal sum obligation not exceeding the authori-
zation shown in the current revision of Circular #570 
as issued by the United States Treasury Department, 
Le. the "Treasury List". 
4. Be accompanied by a certified copy of the Power of 
Attorney stating the authority of the Attorney-in-fact 
executing the bonds on behalf of the Surety. 
B. The Owner reserves the right to reject any surety company, 
performance bond, or labor and material payment bond with 
or without cause. 
C . The cost of such bonds as required above shall be the 
obligation of the Contractor.. 
SECTION 12 - UNCOVERING AF\SD CORRECTION 
OF WORK 
12.1 UNCOVERING OF WORK 
The Contractor shall notify the Architect at least 24 hours 
in advance of performing work which would cover up work 
or otherwise make it difficult to perform inspections 
required by the Specifications or by applicable governing 
authorities. Should any such work be covered without 
proper notification having been given to the Architect, the 
Contractor shall uncover that"work for inspection at its own 
expense. 
12.2 CORRECTION WORK 
A . The Contractor shall promptly correct any portion of the 
Work which is rejected by the Architect or which fails to 
conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents, 
whether observed before or after Substantial Completion 
and whether or not fabricated, installed, or completed. The 
Contractor shall bear the costs of correcting such rejected 
Work, including additional testing and inspection costs, 
compensation for the Architect's services, and any other 
expenses made necessary thereby. 
B. The Contractor shall remedy any defects due to faulty 
materials, equipment, or workmanship which appear within 
a period of one year from the date of Substantial Completion 
or within such longer period of time as may be prescribed 
by law or by the terms of any applicable special warranty 
required by the Contract Documents. The Contractor shall 
pay all costs of correcting faulty work, including additional 
Architect's fees when incurred. 
C. Nothing in the Contract Documents shall be construed to 
establish a period of limitation within which the Owner may 
enforce the obligation of the Contractor to comply with the 
Contract Documents. The one year period specified above 
has no relationship to the time within which compliance 
with the Contract Documents may be sought to be en-
forced, nor to the time within which proceedings may be 
commenced to establish the Contractor's liability with 
respect to the Contractor's obligations. 
12.3 ACCEPTANCE OF NONCONFORMING WORK 
A . If the Owner prefers to accept work not in conformance 
with the Contract Documents, the Owner may do so instead 
of requiring removal and correction of the nonconforming 
Wotk. In that event, the Contract Sum will be reduced by 
an amount agreed upon by the parties which reflects the 
difference in value to the Owner between the Work as 
specified and the nonconforming work. Such adjustment 
may consider increased maintenance costs, early replace-
• ment costs, increased inefficiency of use, etc. and shall be 
effective whether or not final payment has been made. 
Such adjustment shall be reflected in a Change Order 
pursuant to Article 7.5. 
B. Temporary or trial usage by the Owner or the Architect of 
mechanical devices, machinery, apparatus, equipment, or 
other work or materials supplied under this Contract prior 
to written acceptance by the Architect, shall not constitute 
the Owner's acceptance. 
SECTION 13 -RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
A . In the event any claim asserted under Section 7 or any ' 
dispute regarding any other provision of the Contract 
Documents cannot be resolved by agreement between the 
Owner and the Contractor, either party may submit the 
claim as a dispute to the Owner's Director of Facilities 
Magement Department (the "Director") who will review the 
matter and render a written decision resolving the dispute. 
A copy of the Director's written decision will be provided 
to the parties. The decision of the Director will be final and 
conclusive of the dispute unless within thirty (30) days after 
the Contractor receives the Director's written decision, the 
Contractor mails or otherwise delivers to the Director a 
written notice of appeal addressed to the Presiding Bishop-
ric, Attention: Counselor for Physical Facilities. If a notice 
of appeal is filed, the Presiding Bishopric shall review the 
matter and render its written decision regarding the matter 
and deliver a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision 
of the Presiding Bishopric shall be final and conclusive of 
the dispute unless within thirty (30) day's after the Contrac-
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Contractor commences legal action for adjudication of the 
dispute. Submission of the dispute to the Director and the 
Presiding Bishopric as outlined above is a condition prece-
dent to the right to commence legal action to adjudicate any 
dispute. In the event that the Contractor commences legal 
action to adjudicate any dispute without first submitting the 
dispute to the Director and the Presiding Bishopric, the 
Owner shall be entitled to obtain an order dismissing the 
litigation without prejudice and awarding the Owner any 
costs and attorneys fees incurred by the Owner in obtaining 
the dismissal. In the event that the Contractor commences 
legal action to adjudicate a dispute, the decisions of the 
Director and the Presiding Bishop shall be deemed to be 
settlement proposals to the Contractor which the Contrac-
tor rejected and are admissible as evidence only to extent 
that settlement negotiations are admissible, but not 
admissible as evidence of liability. However, the initial 
action or inaction by the Owner giving rise to the dispute 
as well as the Owner's initial response to any claim by the 
Contractor are not settlement proposals and shall be 
admissible subject to the customary objections provided by 
law. 
B. Pending final resolution of a dispute hereunder, the 
Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of 
the Contract and in accordance with the Architect's 
decision. 
SECTION 14 - TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION ' 
OF THE CONTRACT 
14.1 TERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTOR 
In the event the Owner materially breaches any term of the 
Contract Documents, the Contractor may give written 
notice of the breach to the Owner. If the Owner fails to 
cure the breach within ten {10) days of the written notice, 
the Contractor may terminate this Contract by giving writ-
ten notice to the Owner and recover from the Owner the 
percentage of the Contract Sum represented by the Work 
completed as of the date .of. termination together with any 
loss other than unearned profits it has sustained with 
respect to materials and equipment as a result of the 
termination prior to completion of the Work.. The Contrac-
tor shall not be entitled to any other compensation or 
damages as a result of the termination. 
14.2 TERMINATION BY THE OWNER FOR CAUSE 
Should the Contractor fail to provide the Owner with the 
bonds and certificate of insurance required by Section 11 
within the time specified in Article 11.1 and Article 11.2, 
make a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors, 
fail to apply enough properly skilled workmen or specified 
materials to properly prosecute the Work in accordance 
with the approved construction schedule, or otherwise 
materially breaches any provision of the Contract, then the 
Owner may, without any prejudice to any other right or 
remedy give the Contractor written notice of Owner's 
complaint. If the Contractor fails to satisfy the Owner's 
complaint within ten (10) days, the Owner may terminate 
the Contract by giving written notice to the Contractor and 
take possession of the premises and all material, tools, and 
appliances thereon, and finish the Work by whatever 
method the Owner deems expedient. In such case, the 
Contractor shall not be entitled to receive any further 
payment until the Work is finished. If the unpaid balance 
of the Contract Sum exceeds the expense of finishing the 
Work, including compensation for additional administrative, 
architectural, and legal services, such excess shall be paid 
to the Contractor. If such expense shall exceed the unpaid 
14.3 TERMINATION BY THE OWNER FOR CONVENIENCE 
The Owner may, without cause and in its absolute discre-
tion, terminate the Contract at any time. In the event of 
such termination, the Contractor shall be entitled to recover 
from the Owner the percentage of the Contract Sum repre-
sented by the Work completed as of the date of termination 
together with any loss it has sustained other than unearned 
profits with respect to materials, equipment, and tools as 
a result of the termination prior to completion of the Work. 
The Contractor shall not be entitled to any other compensa-
tion as a result of the termination. 
SECTION 15 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
15.1 GOVERNING L A W 
The Contract shall be governed by the law of the State 
where the Project is located. 
15.2 NO WAIVER 
No action or failure to act by the Owner, the Architect, or 
the Contractor shall constitute a waiver of a right or duty 
afforded them under the Contract, nor shall such action or 
failure to act constitute approval of or acquiescence in a 
breach thereunder, except as may be specifically agreed in 
writing. 
15.3 AUTHORSHIP 
The Owner "and the Contractor agree that the Contract 
Documents shall be deemed to be the product of both the 
Owner and the Contractor and shall not be construed 
against either the Owner or the Contractor because of 
authorship. 
15.4 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 
A. The Owner and the Architect have the right to have tests 
made when they deem it necessary. Tests conducted by 
the Owner or the Architect shall be paid for by the Owner. * 
Should a test reveal a failure of the Work to meet Contract 
Document requirements, the cost of the test as well as 
subsequent tests related to the failure necessary to deter-
mine compliance with the Contract Documents will be paid 
for by the Owner, with the cost thereof deducted from the 
Contract Sum by Change Order. 
B. Where necessary, tests shall be made in accordance with 
recognized standards by a competent, independent testing 
laboratory. Materials found defective or not in conformity 
with Contract Document requirements shall be promptly 
replaced or repaired at the expense o f the Contractor. 
C. The Owner and the Architect have the right to obtain 
samples of materials to bo used in the Work and to test 
samples for determining whether they meet Contract Docu-
ment requirements. Samples required for testing shall be 
furnished by the Contractor and selected as directed by the 
Architect. Samples may be required from the sample's 
source, point of manufacture, point of delivery, or point of 
installation at the Architect's discretion. Samples not 
required as a submittal in a specification section shall be 
paid for by the Owner. Should tests reveal a failure of the 
sample to meet the Contract Document requirements, the 
Contractor shall provide other samples which comply with 
the requirements of the Contract Documents. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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S U P P L E M E N T A R Y C O N L / T I O N S 
ITEM 1 - LIQUIDATED DAMAGE AMOUNTS: 
1. The amount of liquidated damages to be paid to the Contractor for delays under General 
Conditions Article 7.3, Paragraph B is $325 per day. 
2. The amount of liquidated damages to be deducted by Owner from final payment for delays in 
Substantial Completion of the Work under General Conditions Article 8.3, Paragraph A is $225 
per day. 
3. The amount of liquidated damages to be deducted by Owner from final payment for delays in 
completing work itemized on the Substantial Completion Certificate under General Conditions 
Article 8.3, Paragraph B is $75 per day. 
ITEM 2 - PERMITS 
1, Delete General Conditions Article 3.6, Paragraph B and replace with the following: 
B. The Contractor will pay the cost of permits, fees, and improvement bonds required by 
local agencies necessary for the proper execution and completion of the Work. Prior to 
bid opening the Owner will arrange for issuance of permits to the selected Contractor. 
The Contractor shall be responsible for picking up the permits from the local agencies. 
ITEM 3 - LIABILITY INSURANCE 
1. For Projects involving removal of asbestos-containing roof materials, add the following to 
Article Section 11.1, Paragraph A , 2 -
d. Contractor's general liability insurance shall not have an asbestos exclusion 
clause. 
ITEM 4 - UTAH STATE NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT FILING: 
1. In compliance with Section 38-1-27 Utah Code Annotated, Contractor shall file with County 
Clerk of county in which Project is located a Notice of Commencement. Notice shall be filed 
within 30 days of date of Notice to Proceed. Notice of Commencement shall include, but not 
be limited to, following -
a. Name and address of Owner. 
b. Name and address of Contractor. 
c. Name and address of surety providing payment bond for Project. 
d. Project name 
e. Legal description of Project. 
2, The parties to the Contract agree that any breach or failure to comply with this Section by the 
Contractor shall constitute a breach of Contract and the Contractor shall be liable in any direct, 
indirect, or consequential damages to the Owner flowing from said breach. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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A Bid limit. 
Q I'm sorry? 
A Bid limit, their bid limit was higher. 
Q Mindful of the bid limit, you could basically 
perform all sorts of general contracting services. 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have any involvement in the 
Highland 4 and 20 project? 
A To a point, yes. 
Q Okay. And let me ask you this. Do you know 
what the Highland project is? 
A Yes. 
Q What is the Highland project? 
A It's an LDS chapel. 
Q And the Highland 4 and 20 project, that's a 
sufficiently specific reference to that project for you 
to know what I'm talking about? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your involvement in the Highland 4 
and 20 project? And when I say "your," I mean BRC's. 
A I was the framing contractor on the job. I 
bid the work and acquired the bid for that work. 
Q You say you bid the work? 
A Yes. 
Q And what does that mean, "bid the work"? 
Page 7 
A I gave Hales & Warner a bid to do the framing 
on the job. 
Q I want to show you Exhibit 32. 
(Exhibit No. 32 is marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Can you take a look at 
Exhibit 31 for me. 
A This says 32. 
Q That's what I meant, Exhibit 32. Just 
checking to see if you're paying attention. 
Could you please take a look at Exhibit 32. 
A Yes. 
Q Is Exhibit 32 the bid you sent to Hales & 
Warner? 
A Yes. 
Q For the framing? 
A Yes. 
Q And what happened next? 
A They sent me a contract, and I signed it and 
sent it back to them. 
Q And then what? 
A I was busy and didn't finish up some other 
work that I had going and couldn't get to this one. 
They scheduled it, and so I got Ken Egbert to do the 
work. 
Q How exactly did you go about getting Ken 
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Egbert to do the work? 
A I called him up and asked him if he'd be 
interested in doing this job. 
Q Who is Ken Egbert? 
A A contractor. 
Q Is he an employee of yours? 
A No. 
Q Is he a friend of yours? 
A He's an acquaintance. 
Q Is he a business associate? 6 
A Yes. 
Q And what did Mr. Egbert say about doing some 
framing for you? 1 
A He said he would be interested in doing it. 
Q I was looking at Exhibit 32. There's more 
than framing; am I correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ask Mr. Egbert to help you out with 
all aspects of the work described on Exhibit 32 or just 1 
the framing? What did you ask Mr. Egbert to do? 
A Just the framing on it. I told him I would 
still supply the material and he could do the framing on 
it. 1 
Q And what is "framing"? 
A Putting the frame structure together, the 
Page 9 
boards. 
Q The boards? 1 
A The structure of it. 
Q And the structure -- you've got to understand 
I don't know as much about the construction business as 
you do. 
A Build the walls, put the roof on. 
Q That's something I can understand. You wanted I 
Mr. Egbert to build the walls? 
A Yes. 
Q And stand them up? 
A Yes. | 
Q What about the roof? 
A Do the roof, too. 
Q And you were going to supply him all the wood 1 
and nails that he needed to build these walls? 
A He supplied the nails. 
Q Okay. And what about the men who were going 
to do all of this work? 
A His employees. 
Q What, if any, involvement did you have in the 
selection of those men? 
A None. 
Q Did you tell him how many men you needed? 
A I told him he would need 12 to 14 men. 
i 
3 (Paees 6 to 9) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Page 10 
Q And did he provide 12 to 14 men? 
A Not all the time. 
Q And what, if anything, did you do about that? 
A I sent some men down there - my men down 
there, under his direction and payroll, to supplement 
his workers. 
Q And they were to do what, these men? 
A Help him with the framing. 
Q Did you have an agreement with Ken Egbert? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your agreement? 
A That he would do it for a certain price. 
Q What was the certain price? 
A I think it was about $72,000. 
Q And did you have this agreement in writing? 
A No. 
Q How was the agreement made? 
A Verbal. 
Q Did you shake hands on it? 
A Yes. 
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to ask you to speak 
up a little bit. There's some type of motor over there. 
Just speak up a little bit. 
Q (BY MR BADARUDDIN) So you said you shook 
hands on it; correct? 
Page 11 
A Yes. 
Q So you were in person? 
A Pardon? 
Q The discussion occurred standing face-to-face, 
in person? 
A Yes. 
Q Not on the telephone? 
A Originally on the telephone. Then I gave him 
some plans and we went over it and agreed and shook 
hands on it. 
Q What plans did you go over? 
A Plans for the building down there. 
Q And where did those plans come from? 
A From Hales & Warner. 
Q And do you know if they were stamped by an 
architect or anything like mat, the plans? 
A They were the architectural plans for the 
building. 
Q And whether they were stamped or not, those 
contained the specifications for your framing work? 
A There was a specifications book that goes with 
them. 
Q And you reviewed that book? 
A Yes. 
25 Q At least as it related to the framing portion 
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of the business. 
A Yes. 
Q I mean project, but okay. 
So do you remember when the framing started? 
A Day-wise, I don't remember. 
Q Do you remember whether anyone contacted you 
and said, Mr. Reynolds, let's get started framing? 
A Hales & Warner contacted me and I told them 
that I couldn't do it, but I had this other ~ 
Mr. Egbert that was going to do it. And they weren't 
sure they wanted him to do it. And they got back with 
me and said that that would be fine. And so I sent him 
down and met with the superintendent, and he worked with 
their schedule. 
Q Who was the superintendent, if you recall? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Did you meet with them before any framing 
began? 
A I met with him on the preconstruction meeting 
before anything on the project started. 
Q Did you meet with him subsequent to the 
preconstruction meeting but prior to beginning framing? 
A The only time I met with them was the 
preconstruction meeting. J 
Q Okay. Had you ever done any work for the 
Page 13 1 
LDS Church? 
A Yes. 1 
Q Do you know whether or not you were favored or 1 
approved or disapproved as a subcontractor by the 
LDS Church? 
A Not exactly. 
Q But how many occasions did you do work for the 1 
LDS Church? 
A I framed about 10 buildings. I was 
superintendent on six or seven other buildings in 
Hawaii. 
Q Did they ever complain about your work? 
A No. 
Q At least not to you? 
A Right. 
Q And do you know Paul Evans? 
A No. 
Q Do you know Dennis Butler? 
A No. ft 
Q Are you familiar with the architectural firm 
of Butler & Evans Architects, LLC? 
A I've heard of it. 
Q Do you know whether or not you've done any 
work that may have been under their supervision? 
25 A Not that I'm aware of right now. 
P p 
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some more men down there? 
A I felt that there needed to be more men down 
there. 
Q Whether they were provided by you or Egbert? 
A Yes. 
Q Well, did you subsequently provide a written 
framing schedule outlining manpower and target dates? 
A No, I did not. I told Ken to. 
Q Do you know whether he did? 
A I don't know. 
Q Okay. Did you ever call Cliff Hales to 
discuss this letter of August 11 with him? 
A I don't know. 
Q Did you ever talk to Ken Egbert about bis 
hiring criteria? 
A No. 
Q Do you know what his hiring criteria was? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if Ken Egbert had experienced men 
on his crew? 
A No. 
Q Do you know how many men Ken Egbert had on his 
crew? 
A No. 
Page 19 
Mr. Egbert had a crew or if he hired people as needed. 
Do you know if Ken Egbert had employees on 
staff or did he hire people according to the job he 
might have to do? 
A I don't know. 
Q Let me ask you about what I'm going to have 
marked as Exhibit 35. 
(Exhibit No. 35 is marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDDSf) If you could take a look 
at what's been marked as Exhibit 35, a copy of exactly 
what you were reading; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And, again, there's some allegations in the 
letter that I'd like to ask you about. 
The second sentence says, "You still have not 
had 12 men on the job as promised, and the job is 
getting further behind." 
Do you know how many men were on the job? 
A I talked to Ken a couple of times about how 
many men he had on the job, and he told me he would get 
the men to do the job, and he evidently didn't. 
Q Did you tell him he needed more men? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you know whether the job was, in fact, 
getting behind? 
—^— _—.
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A All I know is according to this and what I 
talked with Ken about. 
Q But you don't think that the job was right on 
schedule and Mr. Hales was just being unreasonable? 
A No. 
Q And then it talks about your construction 
subcontract, and I don't have any questions about that. 
What, if anything, did you do after you 
received this letter? 
A I called Ken Egbert. 
Q And told him? 
A That he needed more men on the job. 
Q Did you do anything else? 
A I think about this time I told him I would 
send some men down off of my crew, and on his payroll, 
and he could use them however he saw fit. 
Q And these men of yours, were they experienced 
or inexperienced, or did it vary? 
A They were experienced on churches. 
Q And on framing? 
A Framing churches. 
Q How many men did you send? 
A I don't remember. I think there was four or 
five. 
Q Okay. Let me ask you about what I'm going to 
Page 21 1 
have marked as Exhibit 36. 
(Exhibit No. 36 is marked for identification.) 
Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) Have you had an 1 
opportunity to review Exhibit 36? 
A Yes. 
Q And what is Exhibit 36? 
A It — basically it's a back charge to me of 
$12,825 for delay of the project. 
Q And this letter is much later than Exhibit 35, 1 
is it not? It's dated March 30, 2000. 
A Yes. ) 
Q I guess the project would be about finished by 
then, would it not? 
A Yes. 
Q And what does all that mean, "back charge"? 1 
A It means they charged me for the extra time it 
took to build the building. 
Q And essentially, are they saying that you 
caused a delay in the project and that you have to pay 1 
this amount of money as they've calculated? 
A That's what they say. 
Q Did you respond to this letter; do you know? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And let me show you Exhibit 37. 
25 (Exhibit No. 37 is marked for identification.) 
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1 Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) What is Exhibit 37? 
2 A It's my response to their back charge.. 
3 Q And it's dated April 3, 2000. 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q I wanted to ask you about some of the 
6 allegations in the letter. Did you write this letter? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q In the first sentence, it says, "Before the 
9 framing on the project was started, I called you and 
10 told you I was having difficulty and could not frame 
11 your project." 
12 That's something we already discussed; is that 
13 right? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And then you mention, "I told you that another 
16 framer was available and could frame the building." 
17 I don't remember asking you about that. Is 
18 that what you told Mr. Hales or Mr. Warner? 
19 A Mr. Hales. 
20 Q You recommended another framer? I don't 
21 understand. Can you tell me what you meant by that, "I 
22 told you that another framer was available"? 
23 A That's when I asked Ken Egbert to do the job. 
24 Q You're referring to Egbert. 
25 A Right. 
Page 24 
1 supplement the work force there and try and get your 
2 project framed." 
3 What are you talking about there, getting in 
4 hot water? 
5 A I was in trouble on another job. It slowed me 
6 down on another project I was on. 
7 Q So that you could help him? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Do you know what sort of time frame we're 
10 talking about there where you were in hot water and 
11 you're sending your men to help him with his job? 
12 A What do you mean? 
13 Q Like a date, a month, a year? 
14 A How long my men were down there, or what? 
15 Q Let me say this. You know who Jason Smith is? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did you know whether or not Mr. Egbert had a 
18 man on his crew that died? 
19 A I knew that. Mr. Hales called me and told me 
20 that when it happened. 
21 Q And his name, for your information, was Jason 
22 Smith. 
23 A Right. 
24 Q Do you know what day he died? 
25 A No. 
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Q Did you, in fact, mention to Mr. Hales or 
Mr. Warner that Ken Egbert would not be able to meet the 
time frame for the framing? And I'm in the third 
sentence now. 
A I don't remember. I must have. 
Q And do you know whether Hales & Warner were 
looking for other framers but couldn't find any? 
A Yes. 
Yes, you know they were looking for them? 
Yes. 
And yes, you know they couldn't find any? 
Yes. 
How do you know that? 
Cliff told me. 
You called him Cliff. Is he a friend of 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
yours? 
A 
Q 
Mr. Hales. 
You can call him Cliff if you like. I'm just 
wondering — you also mentioned "Dear Clifford." I'm 
wondering if y'all are friends or if it's just a 
familiar term. 
A Just a term. 
Q I'd like to ask you about the last sentence of 
the first paragraph. "I even got myself in hot water on 
another job in order to send some of my men there to 
Page 25 
1 Q It was August 13 of 1999. 
2 Do you know whether you were sending men to 
3 Hales & Warner's Highland 4 and 20 project before and 
4 afterAugustl3ofl999? 
5 A It was after that. 
6 Q Let me ask you about the second paragraph of 
7 Exhibit 37. It says, "From the very beginning, your 
8 superintendent interfered with the framing process." 
9 Who is the superintendent? 
10 A I don't know. 
11 Q Well, do you remember what he was doing, how 
12 he was interfering with the framing process? 
13 A Ken called me and told me that they wouldn't 
14 let him frame some of the walls the way he wanted to 
15 frame them, told him it wasn't effective framing the way 
16 they wanted them framed, and they wouldn't let him frame 
17 them in that manner. And I tried to help him out by 
18 calling down there and talking to ~ I don't remember if 
19 I called Cliff Hales or who I called. 
20 Q Do you know how Egbert wanted to frame? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q How did he want to frame? 
23 A Well, the walls we're talking about is ~ he 
24 wanted to frame them ~ they had a rake on them to 
25 follow the roof joist in one area, and he wanted to 
—————-—____________—,—___—_—, ——— —-
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1 frame them that way, and they didn't want him to until 
2 the roof joists were up so they could make sure the rake 
3 on the wall matched the joist. 
4 MR. DAVENPORT: Let me ask him, if you don't 
5 mind, did you say "rake"? 
6 THE WITNESS: Slope on the wall, the rake on 
7 the wall. 
8 Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) What is a "rake"? 
9 A Slope. 
10 Q Okay. That's the way Ken Egbert wanted to do 
11 it; correct? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q How did the superintendent want him to do it? 
14 A He wanted him to run the studs along and stand 
15 the wall, and when the joists were up, cut the studs off 
16 and put the top plates on. 
17 Q Okay. And how was that difference resolved? 
18 In other words, who won out, Ken Egbert or the 
19 superintendent? 
20 A The superintendent. He wanted it done his 
21 way, and I told Ken he had to do it his way if he 
22 couldn't resolve it. 
23 MR. MINNOCK: "Do it his way," you mean do it 
24 the superintendent's way? 
25 THE WITNESS: Do it the superintendent's way. 
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1 Q I've got you. 
2 In the second sentence of the second 
3 paragraph, it says, "This interference continued 
4 throughout the framing of the building." 
5 What did you mean by that? 
6 A I don't remember right now. 
7 Q Was there some aspect of framing that the 
8 superintendent didn't interfere with? 
9 A I don't know. 
10 Q This paragraph seems to say from the very 
11 beginning that the superintendent interfered, and then 
12 it goes on, and then it says the interference continued 
13 through the framing of the building. The way I 
14 interpreted it is that the superintendent was 
15 interfering from the beginning to the end of your 
16 framing process. 
17 MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object. You're 
18 asking him to speculate. As I understand his prior 
19 testimony, he wasn't even on the job site. I guess I 
20 just object to the lack of foundation. He doesn't have 
21 any personal knowledge as to what actually occurred. 
22 MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him to interpret 
23 his writing, if he's able to do so. 
24 MR. MINNOCK: Do you understand what his 
25 question was? He was asking you what you meant by that 
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1 Q (BY MR BADARUDDIN) Well, then the sentence 
2 continues, referencing, I think, the superintendent 
3 "telling them that they couldn't do it the way they were 
4 used to framing and caused the framer many problems, 
5 costing extra time and material." 
6 Is that what you've told me about or is there 
7 something else the superintendent was doing? 
8 A It just cost extra material to frame it that 
9 way, because you can use shorter boards and it costs 
10 more time to frame it with -- standing the wall and then 
11 cutting the studs off later. 
12 Q Was there some other aspect of the framing 
13 that the superintendent was interfering with? 
14 A They wanted to frame the outside walls an inch 
15 higher and not cut the studs off; the superintendent 
16 didn't want them to do that. 
17 Q And what did the plans or specifications call 
18 for, as far as one inch this way or that? 
19 A You have to meet the specified elevations. 
20 Q Sure. So Ken Egbert wanted to build it, say, 
21 one inch higher than the superintendent; correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q What did the plans say? 
24 A The plans said it was supposed to be one inch 
25 lower than Ken wanted to build it. 
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1 in terms of the duration the interference lasted. 
2 THE WITNESS: I don't remember other 
3 specifics. Those are the two specifics I remember. Ken 
4 told me that they weren't being able to frame like they 
5 wanted to, and so I put that in there to try and help 
6 Ken out. 
7 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. And what I'm 
8 really wondering is ~ tell me if this is correct. Did 
9 the superintendent interfere with the framing process 
10 from the very beginning? 
11 MR. DAVENPORT: Objection; lacks foundation. 
12 He's already testified he wasn't there. 
13 MR. MINNOCK: You can answer. 
14 THE WITNESS: Exterior walls are one of the 
15 first ones you frame, so that was the beginning of the 
16 project. 
17 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. Did his 
18 interference ever stop? 
19 A I don't know. 
20 MR. DAVENPORT: Same objection. 
21 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And then the last 
22 sentence of the second paragraph, "If it wasn't wanting 
23 something done out of sequence, it was putting other 
24 subs and/or material in the way so the framers could not 
25 do their job." 
R fPapes Ifs to 7Q} 
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1 Can you tell me what you meant by that 
2 sentence? 
3 A I know of one instance. This was after that, 
4 I went down ~ 
5 MR. DAVENPORT: Excuse me, after what? 
6 THE WITNESS: It was before the completion of 
7 the building. It was during the framing of the roof. I 
8 had to go down and give - I sent some other guys down 
9 on the job, and I - they needed a paycheck from me on 
10 work that they'd done for me, so I took a paycheck down 
11 to them, and they had stacked sheetrock in the way 
12 inside the cultural hall/chapel area of the building. 
13 And that's what I meant by putting material in the way 
14 so that they couldn't complete the project. 
15 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Was there any other thing 
16 you might have been referring to? 
17 A That's the only thing I have personal 
18 knowledge of. 
19 Q Okay. 
20 (Off-the-record discussion) 
21 MR. BADARUDDIN: Let me ask you about some 
22 other exhibits we've already marked. Let me ask you to 
23 look at Exhibit 29. That's the daily from August 4, 
24 1999. 
15 MR. DAVENPORT: What is it? 
Page 31 
1 MR. BADARUDDIN: The daily from August 4, 
2 1999. 
3 MR. DAVENPORT: What exhibit do you refer to 
4 it as? 
5 MR.MINNOCK: 29. 
6 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And let me ask you this. 
7 Do you know what Exhibit 29 is? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q What is Exhibit 29? 
0 A It's a daily report. 
1 Q Did you ever have an occasion to review daily 
2 reports for the Highland 4 and 20 project? 
3 A No. 
4 Q I guess basically there's three entries. Let 
5 me ask you about the bottom one that starts "Ken 
6 Egbert." If you could review that. Read it, is what I 
7 mean. 
8 MR.MINNOCK: Do you want him to read it into 
9 the record or read it himself? 
0 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Just read it to yourself. 
1 A Okay. 
2 Q Can you tell me what that entry means to you? 
3 For example, "Ken Egbert, framer, is concerned with the 
4 manner in which we want the building framed, leaving 
5 sheer wall studs long, to be cut after trusses are up 
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1 for a more accurate cut." j 
2 MR. DAVENPORT: Objection. You're asking him 
3 to comment on someone else's entry, which he has never 
4 previously seen and which he did not make himself. 
5 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I'm asking you what, if 
6 anything, does that mean to you? 
7 MR. DAVENPORT: Same objection. 
8 MR.MINNOCK: You can answer. 
9 THE WITNESS: It's an entry on the sheer walls 
10 like we've discussed previously. 
11 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Do you remember any issue 
12 with the sheer wall and leaving the studs long? 
13 A We've already talked about it. j 
14 Q Exactly. Okay. Would that be consistent with 
15 your earlier testimony about the rake and the stud walls 
16 being long and that sort of thing? j 
17 A Yes. 1 
18 Q Did you tell Ken Egbert he shouldn't do it 
19 that way because of the extra labor cost? 
20 A We discussed extra labor costs on it, extra 
p 
21 material costs. I told him that I had done it on other 
22 projects and it worked out well. 
23 Q Told who? 
24 A Told Ken. 
25 Q Okay. 
l 
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1 A And I think I called the superintendent and 
2 discussed it with him, and he said this is the way the 
3 architect wants it. So I told Ken he had to do it this 
4 way. j 
5 Q It says "Ken and I," but I'm wondering, did 
6 you to go a church with a similar ~ 
7 A I didn't go. 
8 Q And you don't know whether they went, "they" 
9 being Ken and whoever "I" is? 
10 A I don't know. 
11 Q And ultimately, did you tell Ken to do it one 
12 way or another? There's an indication that Ken was 
13 going to do it as we have requested until final decision 
14 from Brent Reynolds is given. Did you give any final 
15 decision to Ken Egbert? 
16 A I told him that he had to do what the 
17 superintendent wanted on the job. 
18 Q Okay. Let me ask you abou t -
19 MR.MINNOCK: You asked him about 29. What 
20 you've just referenced was from 30,1 believe. 
21 MR. BADARUDDIN: That's what I was confused 
22 about. 
23 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me ask you to look at 
24 Exhibit 30. 
25 I think all of my questions that I thought 
Q (Pave** ™ tn W 
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1 Q Could you understand the logic behind building 
2 it the way they did, even though you may have felt that 
3 another way would have been cheaper in cost? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Now, I think you explained before this 
6 sentence where it says, "From the very beginning, your 
7 superintendent interfered with the framing process," and 
8 I believe you indicated that that was referring to this 
9 initial wall that was one inch too high; correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Would you agree that there was nothing 
12 inappropriate with the superintendent asking Ken Egbert 
13 to comply with the plans and build it an inch lower as 
14 specified by the plans? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q Now, as I understand it, the references 
17 relating to this interference relate to those two 
18 issues, namely, number one, building the wall as 
19 specified by the plans, one inch lower than it had been 
20 built, and the other issue was relating to the sheer 
21 wall with the studs sticking out the top; correct? 
22 A Are you saying that's the only issues? 
23 Q Those were the two you were referring to as 
24 far as interference; right? That you had knowledge of? 
25 A No. There was another issue that I know of, 
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1 name BRC or Brent Reynolds Construction on it, I found 
2 in the file many invoices, for example, from lumber and 
3 whatnot, that were invoiced to you. For example, I 
4 believe one was from, if I'm not mistaken, Burton Lumber 
5 and whatnot. 
6 Do you remember seeing those types of 
7 documents? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Do those documents relate to your procurement 
10 of the materials? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Now, I also noted in the file checks written 
13 out by Hales & Warner to you and sometimes with the 
14 lumber or other suppliers' name on it also. But as I 
15 understand it, from reviewing the file, you are the one 
16 securing the materials and Hales & Warner would pay you 
17 as it relates to the procurement of those materials; 
18 correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And as it relates to the time periods over 
21 which these materials were secured, I have invoices that 
22 start, at the least, on July 29, 1999, from Burton 
23 Lumber, another one from Construction Specialties, Inc. 
24 for July 30, 1999, and they go through, at the very 
25 least, October 26, 1999. I have a statement from Burton 
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1 that I knew of. 
2 Q Okay, what was that? 
3 A When they put sheetrock in the chapel and the 
4 cultural area so they couldn't frame some door pockets. 
5 Q Other than those three, any other ones you 
6 were personally aware of? 
7 A No. 
8 Q So as I understand it, you have no personal 
9 knowledge of Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing 
.0 subcontractor or a framing subcontractor's employees as 
1 to the method in which they should raise a wall from the 
2 ground to an upright position; is that correct? 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q And you have no personal knowledge whether or 
5 not Hales & Warner ever gave any instructions as to any 
6 framing subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold 
7 a wall that has not yet been tied into place after it's 
8 been raised; is that correct? 
9 A Correct. 
0 Q And you have no personal knowledge as to 
1 whether Hales & Warner ever gave any framing 
2 subcontractor instructions as to how to put a wall onto 
3 the bolts after it's been raised; is that correct? 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q Now, as I've reviewed documents containing the 
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1 Lumber that has your name on it. 
2 Does that sound accurate? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q I'm going to show you the subcontract 
5 agreement, have you thumb through it, and I'm going to 
6 ask you after you have an opportunity to review it 
7 whether or not this is the subcontract you were 
8 referring to previously and whether or not that's your 
9 signature. 
10 (Off-the-record discussion) 
11 Q (BY MR. DAVENPORT) Is this a copy of the 
12 subcontract agreement entered into between Hales & 
13 Warner Construction, Inc. and BRC, Inc.? 
14 A It looks like it, yes. 
15 Q And that's dated May 10, 1999? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Is that your signature found on page 8? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q You signed it as president of BRC? 
20 A Yes. BRC, Inc. 
21 Q Now, let me ask you a couple of quick general 
22 questions. As we've gone through all of these 
23 documents, it appears to me that the manner in which 
24 this matter proceeded was that Hales & Warner would 
25 still deal directly with you as their subcontractor and 
11 fPflo^e A& in AQ\ 
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April 3, 2000 
Hales & Warner Construction Inc. 
1460 North Main, Unit 1 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Attn: Clifford Warner 
Re: Highland 4 & 20 Wards 
Dear Clifford, 
Before the framing on the project was started, I called you and told you I was having difficulty and could 
not frame your project. I told you that another framer was available and could frame the building. I told 
you that he had never done a chapel and would get it done far you but the time frame could not be met. 
You looked for other framers to do the work but could not find any, I told you that I would help him when 
I could and try to get it done for you. You said that you would work with us in getting the job done and we 
would all try to make the best of a bad situation. I told you I would get the material there and he would get 
started on the scheduled date. You told me to wait until after the first of the month because of billing 
purposes, but I said that it would not be a problem and sent material and men to do the job. I even got 
myself in hot water on another job in order to send some of my men there to supplement the work force 
there and try to get your project framed 
From the very beginning, your superintendent interfered with the framing process, telling them that they 
couldn't do it the way they were used to framing and caused the framer many problems, costing extra time 
and material. This interference continued through out the framing of the building. If it wasn't wanting 
something done out of sequence, it was putting other subs and/or material in the way so the framers could 
not do their job. 
I do not feel that the 4 XA weeks you want to charge me time on is fair considering all of the situations 
involved in the project. Even if you do charge for time, the $570.00 per day that you are charging is 
excessive, your own contract says $350.00 per day. 
There is no way that I feel that I owe you anywhere near that amount of money. 
Sincerely 
Brent Reynolds Construction 
Brent L. Reynolds 
Pres. 
37 
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1 Q From what? 
2 A From written notice to proceed. 
3 Q And when did you receive the written notice to 
4 proceed? 
5 A I don't know the date. 
6 Q Well, what would you have to look at to 
7 determine that? 
8 A They send me out a formal notice to proceed; 
9 I'd have to find that. 
10 Q Well, that's a document that pertains to the 
11 Highland project, setting time limits; isn't that 
12 correct? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q You received it at least prior to the May 17 
15 issuing of the permit as shown in Exhibit 22; isn't that 
16 correct? 
17 A I don't know that, sir. 
18 Q You don't? Well, who sets the time schedules 
19 for a project on behalf of Hales & Warner? 
20 A I generally write the schedule. 
21 Q Where is the schedule for the Highland 
22 project? 
23 A I'm assuming it's in my office somewhere. 
24 Q When you prepare this schedule, do you break 
25 it down as to various parts of the project, sir? 
Page 19 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Tell me what parts of the project you would 
3 set time limits on, and using as an example this 
4 Highland project. 
5 A I would set a time limit on forming and 
6 pouring footings, a time limit to excavate for the 
7 footings, a time limit to form and pour the foundation, 
8 time to prepare the slab, a time limit to pour the slab. 
9 Basically, every portion of that work has a time affixed 
10 to it. 
11 Q Why? 
12 A It's a matter of coordination between subs. 
13 Q Why is that important? 
14 A It keeps everyone informed. They know what to 
15 expect up front. It makes jobs go smoother. 
16 Q When you say it lets everyone know what to 
17 expect up front, what do you mean? 
18 A It means that we send out a schedule, either 
19 with their contract or shortly after. They can review 
20 it and plan for those time schedules. 
21 Q For example, Exhibit 14, what is that? 
22 A It's a subcontract from Hales & Warner 
23 Construction to BRC, Incorporated. 
24 Q Is the schedule attached to it? 
25 A No, sir. 
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1 Q Where is the schedule that was prepared for 
2 Exhibit 14, if you know? 
3 A I don't know where it is. 
4 Q In the normal course of business, there would 
5 have been a schedule -
6 A Yes. 
7 Q - for Exhibit 14; correct? 
8 A Yes. I 
9 Q And you would have prepared it; correct? 
10 A Most likely. 
11 Q And you would have prepared it for the reasons 
12 set forth in your testimony a few moments ago; correct? 1 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And that's so that BRC would know before they 
15 signed the subcontract, what your anticipated schedule 
16 was; isn't that correct? 
17 A They have a basic idea of when they'll be 
18 there, but the schedule, yes, it does. 
19 Q And if they had problems, for example, if they 
20 made arrangements, and you, Hales & Warner, had said 
21 okay to BRC, that you were going to send them a 
22 subcontract agreement, they would have had timely notice 
23 as to when they were expected to be on the job; correct? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And if there had been problems, you would have 
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1 anticipated that they would have told you of those 
2 problems before you signed the contract; correct? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q And the reason being is, if they weren't 
5 available, you would have got someone else in the 
6 framing business as a subcontractor; correct? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Somebody that you had worked with before; 
9 correct? 
10 A Preferably. 
11 Q And if for any reason you couldn't get someone 
12 that you had worked with before, whoever you got, you 
13 would have checked out their qualifications before 
14 signing the contract; correct? 
15 A Yes, sir. 
16 Q And the reason for that is so that you would 
17 have a good workmanlike job done on the site; correct? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
19 Q Because you were responsible for their work as I 
20 it pertained to delivering a good finished product to 
21 your customer, the LDS Church; correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And you prided yourself in doing it that way, 
24 did you not? 
25 A Yes. I 
. , . , : ••••".. . . . — 1 
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1 not going to be there, Hales & Warner can take proper 
2 steps to get a qualified replacement, if necessary; 
3 isn't that correct? 
4 A It's generally a last resort. 
5 Q I understand. But that's part of the reason 
6 why you have a two-week lead time; isn't that correct? 
7 A In that two-week lead time, if he would have 
8 said, I absolutely cannot be there, will not fulfill the 
9 contract, then, yes, we are forced into other 
10 alternatives. 
11 Q Yes, but you have some time to do that. 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q So that you can get a qualified sub to come in 
14 and replace him; correct? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q So then what happened when BRC was supposed to 
17 be on the j ob, this time period after they were 
18 originally set to be on the job? 
19 Do you understand what I mean? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Let's say day one was the day required by the 
22 schedule for BRC to be on the job; correct? 
23 A Okay. 
24 Q They weren't there on that day, were they? 
25 A No. 
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1 Q And as far as you know, no one from Hales & 
2 Warner knew who Ken Egbert Construction was; isn't that 
3 correct? 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q No one from Hales & Warner knew anything at 
6 all about Ken Egbert Construction when they showed up on 
7 the job on this hypothetical day two; isn't that 
8 correct? 
9 A I believe that's correct. 
10 Q How many men did Ken Egbert Construction bring 
11 with them on this hypothetical day two? 
12 A I don't know. 
13 Q It was not the number of men required by the 
14 contract; isn't that correct? 
15 A We didn't have a requirement on the number of 
16 men in the contract. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A It's not uncommon to start with three or four 
19 men, get your feet under you, get layout going, get some 
20 things going, so that you can bring in more men. 
21 Q Yes. Yes, exactly. 
22 And Ken Egbert Construction just had their 
23 reduced crew for the purpose of, using your words, 
24 getting their feet under them, as far as you know; isn't 
25 that correct? If you know, if you don't, that's okay, 
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1 Q Then there was some time, a delay, that they 
2 told you that they couldn't be there, but they then 
3 promised to be on the job during this delay period that 
4 you're not sure exactly what it was; correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Let's call that day two. 
7 A Okay. 
8 Q Now, on day two, did BRC show up? 
9 A Personally? 
10 Q Yes. 
11 A No. 
12 Q What explanation, if any, did they, BRC, give 
13 Hales & Warner for not showing up after this delay? For 
[ 4 not showing up on day two? 
5 A I don't recall all the circumstances that took 
6 place at that time, but I believe that BRC was trying to 
7 buy themselves some time to get a start on the job, and 
8 then be able to supplement that job with their own men. 
9 Q So what did they do? 
0 A You mean to start? 
1 Q Yes. On day two. 
2 A They made an arrangement with Ken Egbert to 
3 start that job. 
4 Q Who was Ken Egbert? 
5 A I don't know the man, or didn't know the man. 
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too. 
A I don't know what his intentions were. I 
don't know what his thinking was. It's just my 
experience. 
Q But there were daily logs for this project 
prepared by Maurice Egbert; correct? 
A Yes. 
Did you review those daily logs at any time? 
Yes. 
When was the last time you saw those daily 
Q 
A 
Q 
logs? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It's been a while. 
Yes. When was the last time, sir? 
I'm guessing. 
Please tell me. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Let him finish his answer. 
Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Probably 18 months ago. 
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) What was the purpose of 
the daily logs? 
A Refresh my memory. 
Q There were other purposes, other than just 
refreshing your memory; isn't that correct? 
A Such as? 
Q Well, were there any other purposes for the 
1
—-—-——— 
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1 A No, sir. 
2 MR. MORIARITY: Should we take a short break? 
3 (Recess) 
4 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Getting back to this 
5 hypothetical day two, when Egbert Construction showed up 
6 in place of BRC, how did you find out about that? 
7 A I don't recall. 
8 Q What did you do when you found that out? 
9 A I didn't do anything. 
10 Q Why? 
11 A I didn't feel I needed to do anything. 
12 Q Why? 
13 A As far as I knew, BRC was attempting to 
14 fulfill his contract. 
15 Q As far as you knew, BRC was attempting to 
16 fulfill the contract; is that correct? 
17 A Yes, sir. 
18 Q How were they doing that? 
19 A He had made an arrangement with Egbert. The 
20 extent of that arrangement, I didn't know the full 
21 extent. 
22 Q And as the general contractor, Hales & Warner, 
23 did anyone make any inquiry as to what was going on as 
24 it related to the framing? 
25 A I'm sure there were discussions back and 
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1 Q Let me ask you, what were the first 
2 impressions that you made of Ken Egbert? 
3 A That he was hard working and honest. 
4 Q Describe Ken Egbert. 
5 A Physically? 
6 Q Yes. 
7 A Probably about my height. 
8 Q How high is that? 
9 A Five eight. A little stockier. 
10 Q Any other description? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Age? 
13 A I would guess in his 30s. 
14 Q Anything else? 
15 A Not that comes to mind. 
16 Q Okay. Now, this discussion that you had with 
17 Ken Egbert, tell me about it. 
18 A It was kind of a mini preconstruction meeting. 
19 It was just reiterating plans and specs, encouraging him 
20 to get into the plans and review them. 
21 Q Had he been into the plans and reviewed them 
22 before you encouraged him to do so? 
23 A I don't remember. 
24 Q Was it your observation that he didn't seem 
25 very educated about the plans, about those specific 
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1 forth. I don't remember exactly what took place. 
2 Q Discussions between whom? 
3 A Like I said, I'm sure there were discussions. 
4 It would have had to have been between BRC and Hales & 
5 Warner. 
6 Q Yes. And what information about these 
7 discussions was given to you, Joel Warner? 
8 A I don't remember the exact content. 
9 Q It was a problem, was it not? 
10 A It was. 
11 Q And you were one of the problem solvers; 
12 correct? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q What, if anything, did you do to solve this 
15 problem? 
16 A I did meet with Ken Egbert on site, either the 
17 first or second day, spoke with him. 
18 Q The first or second day that he was on the 
19 project, on the site? 
20 A That's true. 
21 Q Right? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q Describe Ken Egbert. 
24 A He seemed like a hard working, honest 
25 individual when I met with him. First impression. 
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1 plans? 
2 A Not - 1 didn't get that assumption. 
3 Q Why did you encourage him to get into the 
4 plans and review them? 
5 A These particular plans have a lot of details. 
6 It's just - it's nothing new to him. He had done 
7 custom homes, apartment complexes. Everything I was 
8 telling him wasn't new to him. 
9 Q How do you know that? 
10 A Just a general feeling I had. 
11 Q How many commercial projects had Ken Egbert 
12 worked on prior to the Highland project? 
13 A I don't know. 
14 Q Did you ask him? 
15 A I asked him about some of his prior projects. 
16 Q Yes. And he told you that he'd worked on some 
17 custom homes and some apartments; correct? 
18 A I believe that's what he told me. 
19 Q My question is, do you know if he had worked 
20 on any commercial projects? 
21 A I don't know. 
22 Q Did you ask him anything about his crew? 
23 A I'm sure that was a topic of discussion. 
24 Q What did he tell you? 
25 A I don't remember. 
1 1 m ^»o j.- A<»\ 
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1 Q Did you ask him the number of framers he 
2 intended to have on the project? 
3 A Like I said, I'm sure that was a topic of 
4 discussion. I have these meetings all the time with 
5 subcontractors, and that's the topic. I don't remember 
6 the exact content of it. 
7 Q Let me ask you, how many men have been killed 
8 on projects that you have been involved in? 
9 A Just this one. 
10 Q So would you agree that this project, the 
11 Highland project, was a little bit different than any 
12 other project that you had been involved with since 
13 1978, because of the fact that a young man had been 
14 killed? 
15 MR. DAVENPORT: I'll have to object to the 
16 vagueness of the question. I don't understand it. 
17 You can go ahead and answer it if you can. 
18 THE WITNESS: Of course it was unique in that 
19 regard. 
20 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Because of it being 
21 unique, do you have any better recollection of your 
22 conversations with the subcontractor for whom this young 
23 man that got killed had been employed? 
24 A No, sir. 
25 Q No reason to, in your mind; is that correct? 
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1 A This is a first for me, sir. I had nothing to 
2 hide at the time. Of course, it was a tragedy, but I 
3 didn't take any other precautions. 
4 Q Thank you. 
5 Now, did you ask Ken Egbert if he had a 
6 contract with BRC? 
7 A No, sir. 
8 Q You were informed that he was a separate 
9 construction company than BRC; isn't that correct? 
10 A I knew that. 
11 Q Yes, you knew that. How did you know that? 
[2 A I'm not sure. 
[ 3 Q You knew he had never worked on any LDS 
4 churches before; correct? 
5 A I think that's correct. 
6 Q And yet you have no recollection of having 
7 asked Ken Egbert if he had a contract with BRC; isn't 
8 that true? 
9 A Say that again. 
0 Q And yet you have no recollection of having 
1 asked Ken Egbert if his construction company had a 
2 separate contract with BRC; isn't that true? 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q Did you ask him if he had even seen 
5 Exhibit 14, the subcontract with BRC? 
, _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , . . . _ i 
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1 A I didn't ask him. 
2 Q Was Ken Egbert Construction approved by the 
3 LDS Church, your client, to be a subcontractor on the 
4 Highland project? 
5 A In saying "approved," you're assuming that 
6 there was a list out there of approved subcontractors? 
7 Q My question is very simple. Was Ken Egbert 
8 approved to be a framer on the Highland project by the 1 
9 LDS Church, your client? 
10 A He was neither approved nor disapproved. 
11 Q Well, did the LDS Church, your client, know 
12 that Ken Egbert was doing the framing on the Highland 1 
13 project as distinguished from BRC doing the framing? 1 
14 A I don't know when they knew. It wasn't 
15 something that we tried to hide. I'm sure the architect 
16 was privy to it, who is a representative of the owner. 
17 Q Well, Hales & Warner was a representative of 
18 the owner in reference to the subcontractors, weren't 
19 they? 
20 MR. DAVENPORT: I object to the extent you're 1 
21 asking for a legal conclusion. 
22 You can go ahead and answer to the extent you 
23 can. Go ahead. 
24 THE WITNESS: I didn't understand your 
25 question. j 
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1 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Yes. Hales & Warner was a 
2 representative of their client, the LDS Church, in 
3 relation to dealing with the subcontractors; isn't that 
4 correct? 
i 
5 A No, sir. 
6 Q You were not? 1 
7 A (Witness indicating in the negative.) 
8 MR. MORIARITY: Please mark the record. 
9 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Now, you say that the 
10 architect was aware that Ken Egbert Construction, rather 
11 than BRC, was doing the framing; correct? 
12 A I said Tm sure they were privy to it. It's 
13 nothing that we tried to hide. As far as we were 
14 concerned, BRC retained the contract, and, in fact, 
15 supplied material for the framing for that job. 
16 Q My question was, your testimony is that the 
17 architect knew that Ken Egbert Construction was doing 
18 the framing instead of BRC; is that true? 
19 A I believe I've answered it. 
20 Q Would you please answer it. 
21 A I said that he was privy to it. I did not 
22 personally go to him and tell him. I don't know how it 
23 come about. 
24 Q Is there a reason why you're hollering at me? 
25 A No, I'm--
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 46 
1 MR. DAVENPORT: Let me let the record reflect 
2 that my client is not hollering. 
3 THE WITNESS: I'm just telling you I think 
4 I've answered the question. 
5 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Did you ever have any 
6 discussions of any nature whatsoever about the role of 
7 Ken Egbert Construction on the Highland project? 
8 A No, not that I remember. 
9 Q Who was the architect? 
10 A Butler & Evans. 
11 Q Yes, but who was the actual person? 
12 A Paul Evans. 
13 Q How often would you meet with him? 
14 A I wasn't on site. He met with Maurice on a 
15 weekly basis. 
16 Q How do you know that the architect was privy 
17 to the fact that Ken Egbert was doing the framing? 
18 A Just from the mere fact that Paul Evans was on 
19 site on a weekly basis. I'm sure he would have looked 
20 at the framing, would have talked to Ken. 
21 Q You're just assuming all of those things; 
22 correct? 
23 A Yes, sir. 
24 Q You did not observe the architect talking to 
25 Ken, did you? 
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1 A No, sir. 
2 Q You did not have conversations that you recall 
3 with the architect about the role of Ken Egbert 
4 Construction, did you? 
5 A No. 
6 Q What materials did BRC furnish to Ken Egbert 
7 Construction, if you know? 
8 A He didn't supply them to Ken Egbert. He 
9 supplied them to the Highland project, as per his 
10 contract. 
[ 1 Q What materials did he supply prior to the 
[2 death of Jason Smith, "he" being BRC Construction? 
3 A Lumber package. 
4 Q How do you know that? 
5 A Because we joint checked. 
6 Q Joint checked what? 
7 A With BRC and the lumber supplier. 
8 Q In other words, your name and his was on the 
9 check? Is that what you're saying? 
0 A Say that again. 
1 Q What do you mean by "joint checked"? 
2 A We write out a check to BRC Construction and 
3 the lumber supplier. I don't recall the lumber 
4 supplier. It goes to BRC Construction, he endorses it, 
5 sends it to the lumber supplier. 
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1 Q Yes. Now, who actually ordered the lumber 
2 from the lumber supplier; do you know? 
3 A All I know is, it was in BRC's name. j 
4 Q How do you know that? 
5 A Because that's who we wrote the joint checks 
6 to. 
7 Q You know that the method of payment to the 
8 lumber supplier was by a joint check, payable and to be 
9 endorsed by BRC and Hales & Warner Construction; 
10 correct? 
11 A Yes, sir. 
12 Q But you don't know who ordered the lumber, do 
13 you? 
14 A No, sir. 
15 Q Did you see the bill? 
16 A No, sir. 
17 Q Did you check to find out who had actually 
18 ordered the lumber? 
19 A No, sir. 
20 Q Did you check the grade of the lumber? 
21 A Personally? 
22 Q Hales & Warner, did they check the grade of 
23 the lumber? 
24 A I can't answer for Maurice. He would have 
25 been the one to check it. 
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1 Q Now, the first wall that Ken Egbert 1 
2 Construction built was too tall, wasn't it? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q How did you know that? 
5 A How did I personally know? 
6 Q Yes. 
7 A Maurice called me. 
8 Q Where did he call you at? 
9 A On my cell phone. 
10 Q What did he say? 
11 A He told me the problem. 
12 Q This is another problem that the problem 
13 solver would take care of; correct? 
14 A Jointly, yes. I 
15 Q Jointly with whom? 
16 A Maurice. 
17 MR. DAVENPORT: Canwegoofftherecordfora 
18 minute. 
19 (Off-the-record discussion) 
20 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Was Maurice Egbert an 
21 officer of Hales & Warner's partnership? 
22 A It's a corporation and, no, he was not. 
23 Q Was he a director? 
24 A No. 
25 Q He was an employee; correct? [ 
1 
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1 MR. DAVENPORT: Let me let the record reflect 
2 that my client is not hollering. 
3 THE WITNESS: I'm just telling you I think 
4 I've answered the question. 
5 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Did you ever have any 
6 discussions of any nature whatsoever about the role of 
7 Ken Egbert Construction on the Highland project? 
8 A No, not that I remember. 
9 Q Who was the architect? 
10 A Butler & Evans. 
11 Q Yes, but who was the actual person? 
12 A Paul Evans. 
13 Q How often would you meet with him? 
14 A I wasn't on site. He met with Maurice on a 
15 weekly basis. 
16 Q How do you know that the architect was privy 
17 to the fact that Ken Egbert was doing the framing? 
18 A Just from the mere fact that Paul Evans was on 
19 site on a weekly basis. I'm sure he would have looked 
20 at the framing, would have talked to Ken. 
21 Q You're just assuming all of those things; 
22 correct? 
23 A Yes, sir. 
24 Q You did not observe the architect talking to 
25 Ken, did you? 
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1 A No, sir. 
2 Q You did not have conversations that you recall 
3 with the architect about the role of Ken Egbert 
4 Construction, did you? 
5 A No. 
6 Q What materials did BRC furnish to Ken Egbert 
7 Construction, if you know? 
8 A He didn't supply them to Ken Egbert. He 
9 supplied them to the Highland project, as per his 
10 contract. 
11 Q What materials did he supply prior to the 
12 death of Jason Smith, "he" being BRC Construction? 
13 A Lumber package. 
14 Q How do you know that? 
15 A Because we joint checked. 
16 Q Joint checked what? 
17 A With BRC and the lumber supplier. 
[8 Q In other words, your name and his was on the 
[ 9 check? Is that what you're saying? 
10 A Say that again. 
\\ Q What do you mean by "joint checked"? 
12 A We write out a check to BRC Construction and 
13 the lumber supplier. I don't recall the lumber 
'4 supplier. It goes to BRC Construction, he endorses it, 
5 sends it to the lumber supplier. 
— — ,,: . , — — — — — -J 
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1 Q Yes. Now, who actually ordered the lumber 
2 from the lumber supplier; do you know? 
3 A All I know is, it was in BRC's name. 
4 Q How do you know that? 
5 A Because that's who we wrote the joint checks 
6 to. 
7 Q You know that the method of payment to the 
8 lumber supplier was by a joint check, payable and to be 
9 endorsed by BRC and Hales & Warner Construction; 
10 correct? 
11 A Yes, sir. 
12 Q But you don't know who ordered the lumber, do 
13 you? 
14 A No, sir. 
15 Q Did you see the bill? 
16 A No, sir. 
17 Q Did you check to find out who had actually 
18 ordered the lumber? 
19 A No, sir. 
20 Q Did you check the grade of the lumber? 
21 A Personally? I 
22 Q Hales & Warner, did they check the grade of 
23 the lumber? 
24 A I can't answer for Maurice. He would have 
25 been the one to check it. 
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1 Q Now, the first wall that Ken Egbert 
2 Construction built was too tall, wasn't it? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q How did you know that? 1 
5 A How did I personally know? 
6 Q Yes. 
7 A Maurice called me. 
8 Q Where did he call you at? 
9 A On my cell phone. 
10 Q Whatdidhesay? 
11 A He told me the problem. 6 
12 Q This is another problem that the problem 
13 solver would take care of; correct? 
14 A Jointly, yes. 
15 Q Jointly with whom? fc 
16 A Maurice. 
17 MR. DAVENPORT: Canwegoofftherecordfora j 
18 minute. 
19 (Off-the-record discussion) 
20 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Was Maurice Egbert an 1 
21 officer of Hales & Warner's partnership? 
22 A It's a corporation and, no, he was not. 
23 Q Was he a director? 
24 A No. 
25 Q He was an employee; correct? 
1 •"> / T \ 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Now, when he called you on your cell phone and 
3 told you that Egbert Construction had constructed a wall 
4 that was too tall, what, if anything, did you do about 
5 solving that problem? 
6 A First of all, I asked him why, what their 
7 thinking was. Oftentimes, subcontractors come up with 
8 what they think is a better idea. 
9 Q And what was Maurice's information that he 
10 gave you in response to your inquiry? 
11 A It was so that they could use precut studs. 
12 Q So what did you then do? 
13 A I remember telling Maurice I'd get back to 
14 him. I mulled it over in my own mind, called him back, 
15 and told him to have them do it the way - according to 
16 plans and specs. 
17 Q This was the first wall that Egbert 
18 Construction had constructed; correct? 
19 A I believe so. 
20 Q And isn't it true that Maurice told you that 
21 when he had asked Ken Egbert why he was doing it that 
22 way, that Mr. Ken Egbert told Mr. Maurice Egbert that 
23 the reason was because BRC, specifically Mr. Reynolds, 
24 had told him to do it that way; is that correct? 
25 A That was my understanding. 
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1 Q Yes. And, the reason was twofold. They could 
2 use precut studs and it was faster; correct? 
3 A It would have been faster. 
4 Q Why did you mull it over in your mind? 
5 A Because I wanted to see what, if any, ill 
6 effects that it would have on the project. 
7 Q The fact is, if it would have been faster and 
8 didn't have any ill effects on the project, you probably 
9 would have approved it; correct? 
10 A On my own volition, probably not. I would 
11 have conferred with the architect. 
12 Q Did you confer with the architect on that 
13 problem? 
[4 A No, sir. 
15 Q Because you recognized that no matter how much 
[ 6 faster it may have been, having a wall an inch higher 
7 than what the plans called for would affect the whole 
8 project; correct? 
9 A I don't know to what extent, but it would have 
\0 affected the proj ect. 
\\ Q Yes. You can't have walls that are planned to 
2 be "X" number of feet be an inch taller and everything 
3 else in the project fit in; correct? 
4 A It wouldn't have been that big of a calamity, 
5 but there were some different ramifications. 
: • — • : , : : . . , • ., • , • : . , , — — ' — , . . . . „ . . ; , , , , . ; , ; , , , . . , 
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1 Q Such as? 1 
2 A Those walls are designed as a sheer wall with 
3 sheeting from bottom plate to top plate. 
4 Q And who installed the sheeting? 
5 A I don't believe it was installed at that time. 
6 Q No, sir, but whose job was it to install the 
7 sheeting? 1 
8 A Theframers'. § 
9 Q What do you mean by it was designed to be a 
10 sheer wall? 1 
11 A It's a structural wall. 
12 Q Yes. 1 
m 
13 A That prevents it from moving horizontally, 
14 diagonally. 
15 Q Now, how long after Ken Egbert Construction 
16 had been on the Highland project was it that this 
17 problem with the wall being one inch higher took place? 1 
18 (Off-the-record discussion) 
19 Q (BYMR.MORIARITY) I'm sorry, go ahead and 1 
20 answer. 
21 A I don't know the exact time frame. It would 
22 have been shortly after he started. 
23 Q Yes. What reaction, if any, did you have to 
24 the fact that Ken Egbert Construction, now doing the 
25 framing on the Highland project, disregarded the plans 
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1 and specs and was building at least the first wall, not 
2 to specs, but rather to precut stud specifications? 
3 A It was as per BRC Construction, so I didn't 
4 have any negativity towards Egbert, nor BRC. 
5 Q Did you call and talk to anyone at BRC and ask 1 
6 them why they were telling Egbert to do something 
7 different than was in the plans? 
8 A Brent called me. h 
9 Q What did he say? 
10 A He pled his case, why he wanted to use them. 
11 Q So Brent Reynolds from BRC called you and 
12 tried to make a case for using the precut studs. 
13 A Yes, sir. 
14 Q And part of his case, a big part of his case, 
15 was that it was going to be faster; isn't that correct? 
16 A No. The biggest part of his case is that he 
17 said he had done it on previous church jobs. 
18 Q Had he done it with approval on the previous 
19 church jobs? 
20 A I don't know. 
21 Q Well, did you ask him? 
22 A I don't know if he asked for approval. That's 
23 what I gathered, because he didn't ask us for approval. 
24 Q Okay. So Ken Egbert didn't ask for approval 
25 to build the wall one inch higher, did he? 
i ^ . ^ f e V ? <••>..:-.• •: -• •" ! ... - -X '. ~ — — — — — — • ' 
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to the site? 
A No. 
Q Where was Mr. Hales? 
A He was off that day. 
Q You called him from the office and told him 
about it; correct? 
A I don't know. He was involved in a wedding. 
I don't know when I told him. 
Q You made a deliberate decision in your own 
mind that it wasn't necessary for you to go to the site; 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you speak with any of the investigating 
officers? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you speak with anyone from OSHA? 
A I did not. 
Q There wasn't anything that would have 
prevented you from going to the site, was there? 
A No, sir. 
Q Did you call the Church, your client, and tell 
them that there had been a fatality on the site? 
A I don't know when that took place. 
Q Well, did you talk to them about it? 
A I did not. 
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Q Do you know if anyone did from Hales & Warner? 
A I don't know. 
Q Now, Exhibit 16, refers to a seven-week 
framing schedule. 
A Yes. 
Q Correct? 
A Yes. 
Q From what we know, the framers had been on the 
job for approximately two weeks; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And we know that they were late getting there 
by approximately a week or sometime in that general 
area; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And it says here, You need to immediately 
increase the number of framers and provide proper 
supervision. 
What does "proper supervision" mean? 
A Experienced men. 
Q Had there been a problem with there not being 
proper supervision that led, at least in part, to the 
writing of Exhibit 16 on August 11, 1999? 
A I don't remember any discussions that they 
were improperly supervised. 
Q Well, why would Hales & Warner write and tell 
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them to provide proper supervision if that had not been 
a problem? 
A We didn't want just bodies. When you increase 
crew size, you expect a certain amount of them to be 
experienced. 
Q Yes. Providing bodies may, in fact, lead to 
dead bodies; correct? 
A Well, I don't know. 
Q It did, in fact, didn't it? 
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection. You're asking him 
to make ~ 
THE WITNESS: Yes. You're asking m e -
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) You don't know? 
A You're asking me to state that that's the 
cause, and I don't know that. 
Q Based upon Exhibit 16, what Hales & Warner 
wanted were experienced framers on the job to get the 
job done in a timely manner; correct? 
A Yes, I think we said supervision, adequate 
supervision. 
Q Yes. And you wanted experienced framers; 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, there were three individuals involved in 
the raising of the wall that fell and killed Jason 
1 
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Smith. Are you aware of that? 
A Just through these proceedings. 
Q "These proceedings" being the depositions here 
Friday and today? 
A Yeah. That's when I've known for sure that 
there were three men. 
Q Prior to that, did you have any knowledge as 
to how many men were being involved in the attempted 
raising of the wall that killed Jason Smith? 
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm just going to instruct you 
not to speculate. You can testify on your personal 
knowledge, but if this is just something that someone 
has told you - | 
MR. MORIARITY: I would really be interested 
in the Hornbook citation to the objection you just made 
as it being a legal objection. Is there one? 
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm not here to answer your 
questions. I just want him to understand that he's 
supposed to testify on his personal knowledge, not to 
speculate. 
MR. MORIARITY: Please read the question. 
(Record read) 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I knew. 
r 
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) You knew there were three; 25 correct? 
1 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Did you know what their qualifications or 
3 experience was? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Now, let me ask you a question. As a general 
6 contractor, do you check the permits of the 
7 subcontractors, does Hales & Warner check the permits of 
8 the subcontractors? 
9 A Permits? I'm confused. 
10 Q The license, the permits. 
11 A Contractor's license? 
1 12 Q Yes. 
13 A We ask for a number. 
14 Q That's all? 
15 A That's all. 
16 Q And the number would permit you to call up the 
17 Department of Commerce and get a copy of their permit, 
18 their license, if you so desired; correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Now, when you buy supplies, you issue checks 
21 with the subcontractor's signature and Hales & Warner's 
22 signature being required for it to be cashed; correct? 
23 A When we buy supplies? 
24 Q Supplies for the job. Materials. 
25 A We don't buy supplies through our subs. I 
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1 don't know ~ I'm confused on that matter. 
2 Q Well, let's take, for example, what we talked 
3 about earlier, the materials for the framing. 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q When you were paying the supplier, you pay it 
6 with a check signed by the subcontractor and by Hales & 
7 Warner; correct? 
8 A No. The check is made out to the 
9 subcontractor and the materials supplier. 
10 Q So it requires signature by the material 
11 supplier. 
12 A Well, we send it to the person we have a 
13 contract with. He, then - I'm not sure, I'm assuming 
14 he endorses it and sends it on. 
15 Q How about your payroll? How is that handled? 
16 A The payroll? 
17 Q Do you do a similar situation? 
18 A It's a direct check to our employees. 
19 Q Well, how about the payroll of, for example, 
20 BRC? What safeguards, if any, do you take to make sure 
21 that you're not going to have a labor lien? 
22 A We don't take any safeguards, per se. 
23 Q The reason that you issue the check to the 
24 supplier in the manner you just described is to prevent 
25 any material men's liens; isn't that correct? 
___________—___—________—___—__________—,—,—___________—.,.,.,—____._ 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Do you check or does anyone on behalf of 
3 Hales & Warner check green cards? 
4 A For subcontractors? 
5 Q Yes. 
6 A No, sir. j 
7 Q You know what a green card is? 
8 A I have an idea. 
9 Q What? 
10 A It's a documentation that says people are in 
11 this country legally. 1 
12 Q Yes. What steps, if any, are taken to check 
13 to find out if the people working on the site are, in 
14 fact, in this country legally? 
15 A I don't know. 
16 Q Now, we were talking about criteria regarding 
17 the raising of walls. Do you remember that? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q What criteria, if any, is there regarding 
20 having unobstructed paths for the raising of the wall? 
21 A When we have preconstruction meetings with our 
22 subcontractors, we emphasize the need for a clean site. 
23 Q Okay. And why is the clean site so important? 
24 A One, you would say that's the overall 
25 appearance of the site. 
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1 Q Is that the only reason, appearance? 
2 A Safety issues. 
3 Q Yes. How is a clean site a safety issue? 
4 A From many standpoints. We don't want - spent 1 
5 boards with nails in it could cause injury. We don't 
6 want a lot of clutter on the site. 
7 Q Why not? 
8 A You can twist an ankle, you can trip. 
9 Q Why don't you want to trip? 
10 A I guess you could hurt yourself. 
11 Q Yes. Getting back to the criteria to safely 
12 raise a wall, should the individuals who are raising the I 
13 wall have a clean path for raising the wall? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Why? 
16 A To prevent tripping. 
17 Q Now, as I understand it, Hales & Warner 
18 emphasizes at these preconstruction meetings with the 
19 subs how important a clean site is; correct? 
20 A We emphasize we want a clean site. 
21 Q Yes. Was he, Brent Reynolds, at the 
22 preconstruction meeting? 
23 A He was at the initial preconstruction meeting. 
24 Q Well, was that the prebidding or was that the 
25 preconstruction? 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ .. •
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1 A Not to my knowledge. 
2 Q Prior to the time that the Smith boy was 
3 killed, was the framing on schedule? 
4 A No. 
5 Q How far was it behind schedule? 
6 A Probably a couple of weeks, maybe three weeks. 
7 Q Why was it behind schedule? 
8 A That would be based on the work of Egbert 
9 Construction. 
10 Q Yes, but why was it behind schedule, if you 
11 know? 
12 A I would say because of their not having done 
13 churches before. I had found problems that had to be 
14 corrected in their framing, such as heights of walls. 
15 We had to tear apart one whole side, back section of a 
16 wall, that they had made an inch too tall, and we had to 
17 tear that apart and rebuild it. Just Egbert 
18 Construction not being able to watch what was going on, 
19 I guess. 
20 Q Why weren't they able to watch what was going 
21 on? 
22 A Actually, with that situation, with the wall, 
23 BRC had actually instructed them to build it that way to 
24 save time in cutting studs. And the plan had called for 
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1 the plans. 
2 Q Who is BRC? 
3 A Brent Reynolds Construction. 
4 Q What role did they play in this project? 
5 A They were the contracted framers. 
6 Q Wait a minute. I thought you said Egbert 
7 Construction was doing the framing. 
8 A Brent Reynolds Construction had verbally 
9 agreed with Egbert Construction to come in and take over 
10 the project, because Brent Reynolds was unable to man 
11 the project at the time. 
12 Q How did you find that out? 
13 A In speaking with Ken Egbert. 
14 Q How did you first meet Ken Egbert? 
15 A The day he came on the job site. 
16 Q What day was that? 
17 A That would be the first day that framing 
18 began. He was waiting for and unloading materials. Ifm 
19 not sure exactly what date that was. 
20 Q I want to make sure Ifm understanding. 
21 Had you had previous work at all of any nature 
22 whatsoever with BRC? 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
65 
1 if you heard the — base your testimony on what you 
2 heard. 
3 TEE WITNESS: I -talked to Ken Egbert. Ken 
4 Egbert told me that he was told by somebody in Brent 
5 Reynolds1 company to make the wall that high. 
6 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) And the height, was it 
7 higher or shorter? 
8 A One inch higher than what the plans called 
9 for. 
10 Q The reason it was one inch higher was to save 
11 studs and not have to cut them; correct? 
12 A Yes. The height that they would make them 
13 would be a standard height of a stud. 
14 Q And so they could then just buy standard 
15 studs, put them in, get the job done faster; correct? 
16 A That would be my assumption. 
17 Q How did you find out that the walls were one 
18 inch higher? 
19 A I measured them. 
20 Q And when you measured them and found that out, 
21 what, if anything, did you do? 
22 A I talked to Ken. 
23 . Q And what did Ken tell you? 
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25 talked to him or not, but the next day the wall was 
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1 fixed. 
2 Q But was it during the course of that 
3 conversation or conversations with Ken that he told you 
4 that the reason the walls were as high as they were is 
5 because someone from BRC had told them to do it that 
6 way? 
7 A I would assume it would be in that 
8 conversation. 
9 Q And did you show him the plans? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And point out the fact that no matter what BRC 
12 or anybody else said, the walls were to be this height, 
13 and it had to be torn down and made that height, which 
14 was one inch shorter; correct? 
15 A It is in their contract to follow the plans 
16 and specs of the job. 
17 Q In whose contract? 
18 A Brent Reynolds1. 
19 Q And what did Mr. Egbert say to you when you 
20 told him that? 
21 . A He was hesitant, and I think he went and 
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23 again over the problem. 
24 Q And what was said during that second visit, or 
25 that visit, whatever number it was. 
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1 A They corrected the problem. 
2 Q Yes, sir, I understand, but I'm talking about 
3 at the time when you made the conclusion in your mind 
4 that Ken Egbert was frustrated. 
5 A No. 
6 Q Okay. Did Ken Egbert ask you to speak to 
7 Brent Reynolds or anyone at that company? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Did he ask that the architect be called in so 
10 he could show him the work? 
11 A No. 
12 Q But the bottom line is that Egbert 
13 Construction had constructed a wall and they had to redo 
14 the entire wall and make it one inch shorter; correct? 
15 A That is correct. 
16 Q And that was based upon your direction; 
17 correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q How long did it take for them to dismantle 
20 that wall; do you know? 
21 A I believe they had it finished the next day. 
22 Q But they, "they" being Egbert Construction, 
23 were- approximately two weeks behind the schedule; 
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25 A Not a t t h a t t i m e . 
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1 Q Sometime shortly thereafter, were they? 
2 A Sometime into the framing. 
3 Q Yes. How long into the framing were they two 
4 weeks behind schedule? 
5 A I'd say approximately the time of the death. 
6 That's as close as I could say. 
7 Q What was causing them to be two weeks behind 
8 schedule? 
9 MR. DAVENPORT: Again, if you know, you can 
10 tell them, but if you don't, I don't want you 
11 speculating. 
12 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
13 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Based on your 
14 observations, what was causing them to be two weeks 
15 behind schedule? 
16 A There were several other items that they had 
17 to redo. 
18 Q Such as? 
19 A I don't recall what they are. 
20 Q But items that you told them they had to redo? 
21 A But items that I had showed them on the plan 
22 that we needed to rectify. 
23 . Q Such as? 
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24 A I don't recall. 
25 Q But there were several items that you made 
71 
1 them redo? 
2 A There were several items. 
3 Q Anything else? 
4 A Not enough manpower. 
5 Q Yes. Tell me about that. 
6 A Egbert Construction is a small company, and 
7 hires on, as we do, as needed, new employees, and he was 
8 building his crew, but it wasn't coming very fast. 
9 MR. DAVENPORT: If you know this personally, 
10 that's fine, but if you're speculating on someone else's 
11 statement to you, you need to tell him it's based on 
12 someone else's statement. 
13 THE WITNESS: I had discussed this with Ken. 
14 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Yes. And this was the 
15 explanation given to you by Ken Egbert; correct? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Did he, Ken Egbert, tell you whether or not 
18 his framers were experienced? 
19 A I did not go into the qualifications of his 
20 employees. 
21 Q Well, isn't it one of your roles as the 
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22 superintendent to make sure that the work is done in a 
23 workmanlike manner? 
24 A Could you repeat that, please? 
25 Q Yes. Isnft it one of your roles as the 
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1 project superintendent to make sure that the work of the 
2 subcontractors is done in a workmanlike manner? 
3 A I am to see that the work is done in a quality 
4 manner. Is that what you're asking? 
5 Q No, Ifm asking in a workmanlike manner. 
6 Workmanlike manner is a term of art in the construction 
7 trade, is it not? 
8 A Workman? 
9 . Q Yes. Workmanlike manner. 
10 A Never heard that presented to me. 
11 Q Never did, okay. 
12 So do you know if it was your job to make sure 
13 that the work done by the subcontractor and their 
14 employees was done in a workmanlike manner? Do you know 
15 that? 
16 MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object to the 
17 extent that you're asking for some kind of a legal 
18 conclusion. You can word it as you understand it. 
19 . Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Just answer my question as 
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20 I asked it. 
21 A I don't understand what you mean by 
22 "workmanlike manner." 
23 Q You don't? 
24 A Are you talking quality of work? Are you 
25 talking craftsmanship? 
73 
1 Q Has anyone ever talked to you, anyone from 
2 Hales & Warner, as to what workmanlike manner means? 
3 A No. 
4 Q Never heard it before today; correct? 
5 A Never heard of the term. 
6 Q Never seen it in writing before today? 
7 A Never seen it in writing. 
8 Q Never seen it in that big, thick book that you 
9 have at home? 
10 A Never seen it in that big book. 
11 Q Never seen it in the three construction books 
12 that you've read? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Okay. Then what did you see your role as the 
15 project superintendent to be in reference to make sure 
16 that the subs were doing quality construction? 
17 .. A I look over the plans and see to it that they 
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18 are following the plans. I read through their section 
19 of the specs in the spec book and see to it that they 
20 are following the spec book. If they are doing that, 
21 and using the correct lumber, correct nailing, the 
22 quality of workmanship will be there. 
23 Q Well, if a subcontractor came in with three or 
24 four 13-year-old boys that were doing all of the things 
25 that you just said, would you permit that as the project 
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1 superintendent? 
2 A If I knew their age, I would not permit it. 
3 Q Why not? 
4 A They're underage for working. 
5 Q I see. Now, you had been a framer. You 
6 testified to that earlier here today, had you not? 
7 A I've had some experience in framing, yes. 
8 Q And you said to be an experienced framer, you 
9 should have at least a year's experience, or words to 
10 that effect, did you not? 
11 A Yes. One year's experience is what I felt was 
12 minimum. 
13 Q How many of the framers that Egbert 
14 Construction was using on the Highland project had a 
15 year or more experience, if you know, as framers? 
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16 A I do not know. 
17 Q What you did know is that Egbert Construction 
18 was falling behind the required time schedule; correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And you were discussing this with Mr. Egbert; 
21 correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Did you discuss it with anyone else? 
24 A I discussed it with Joel and Cliff. 
25 Q And when did you discuss it with Mr. Hales and 
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1 Mr. Warner? 
2 A Exact time, I do not know, but when I felt 
3 that they were falling behind, I approached Joel or 
4 Cliff. 
5 Q And what did you do? 
6 A And told them we needed to get a letter to 
7 Brent Reynolds or to Ken Egbert and see if we couldn't 
8 rectify that problem. 
9 Q Did you make the decision as to who the letter 
10 should go to? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Did you have just one conversation with 
13 Mr. -Hales and Mr. Warner or did you have a series of 
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14 conversations on the subject matter of Egbert 
15 Construction falling behind? 
16 A I would say more than one. 
17 Q Yes. How many more than one? 
18 A I do not know. 
19 Q Approximately? 
20 A It would probably be a conversation — a topic 
21 of conversation almost every time we talked. 
22 Q For what period of time? 
23 A Probably -- probably throughout the job. 
24 Q Yes. How would you, as project 
25 superintendent, communicate with your bosses, Mr. Hales 
16 
1 and Mr. Warner? 
2 A I would talk to them on the phone. 
3 Q It was all verbal? 
4 A Or — yes -- or if Joel would come to the 
5 site, I would talk to him there in person. 
6 Q But all of the communication was verbal. 
7 A Correct. That is correct. 
8 Q And from the very first when Egbert 
9 Construction came on site, you had some problems or 
10 reservations about them, didn't you? 
11 MR. DAVENPORT: Ifm going to object. That 
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12 mischaracterizes the prior testimony. 
13 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Go ahead and answer. 
14 MR. DAVENPORT: You can go ahead and answer. 
15 THE WITNESS: From the very start of when they 
16 came on the job site, I had — I did not have 
17 reservations. 
18 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Okay. 
19 A When Ken and I first talked, I felt like it 
20 was a new company. I had never worked with them before. 
21 You know, proceed as you would any other new 
22 subcontractor, watching their work. 
23 Q And when they1re new, do you watch them a 
24 little bit closer than you watch somebody that you had 
25 worked with year after year? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Did Mr. Ken Egbert tell you, Mr. Maurice 
3 Egbert, that he had had previous experience working on 
4 LDS churches? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Did he tell you that he hadnft? 
7 A I don't recall. 
8 Q Did you know how much experience, if any, 
9 Egbert Construction had working previously on LDS 
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10 churches? 
11 A On LDS churches, I do not know how much 
12 experience he had. 
13 Q Okay. When was it that you first had a 
14 communication, verbal communication, with either of your 
15 supervisors as it related to Egbert Construction and the 
16 framing? How soon after Egbert came on the job did you 
17 first have that communication? 
18 A It would probably be when they built the wall 
19 wrong. 
20 Q Their first wall? 
21 A Their first wall. 
22 Q And time-wise, how soon was that prior to the 
23 time that the young Smith boy was killed? 
24 A There again, it!s probably a month, month and 
25 a half. I can't remember the exact dates when they 
1 arrived on site. 
2 Q And during this month, month and a half, did 
3 you say that in almost every conversation you had with 
4 Mr. Hales and Mr. Warner, either when they were on site 
5 . or by phone, that Egbert Construction was one of the 
6 subject matters of the communication? 
7 . A I!m sorry, repeat that. 
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8 Q Yes. Did you testify a few moments ago that 
9 in all of your communications, after you first started 
10 seeing these problems with Egbert Construction, that 
11 they were the subject matter, at least in part, of all 
12 of your communications with Mr. Hales and Mr. Warner? 
13 A Ifd say thatTs a fair — yes. 
14 Q And did Mr. Hales or Mr. Warner ever come down 
15 to the job site there at Highland and discuss these 
16 . problems that you were discussing with them about Egbert 
17 Construction? 
18 A Did they come and discuss it with me? 
19 Q Personally, yes, sir. 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q How often? 
22 A I don't recall. 
23 Q Several occasions? 
24 A I'm sure. 
25 Q And was it both Mr. Hales and Mr. Warner or 
79 
1 was it just Mr. Hales or Mr. Warner that came on site 
2 and discussed these problems with you? 
3 A More than likely it would be Joel most of the 
4 time. 
5 -> Q And Joel's last name? 
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6 A Joel Warner. 
7 Q Thank you very much. 
8 And did Joel Warner give you some advice as to 
9 how to deal with Egbert Construction and the problems 
10 that you were discussing with him? 
11 A He told me to keep watching, check their work, 
12 like we do on every job. 
13 Q Anything else? 
14 A I do not recall. 
15 Q Did you trust Egbert Construction? 
16 MR. DAVENPORT: Object to the vagueness of 
17 the question, but if you can understand how to answer 
18 it, go ahead. 
19 THE WITNESS: I felt with my overseeing of 
20 the -- following the plans and specs, that I could trust 
21 them, because they did correct all the problems that I 
22 found. 
23 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) But corrected it after 
24 exhibiting some frustration; correct? 
25 A On the first one, yes. 
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1 MR. DAVENPORT: Well, that's not personal 
2 knowledge, but your knowledge is through Ken. 
3 THE WITNESS: Okay, what Ken told me. 
4 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) And when did he tell you 
5 that? 
6 A Shortly after the accident. 
7 Q Tell me the circumstances of that 
8 conversation. 
9 A I don't recall. All I know is we had --
10 Q Well, you're having a conversation with the 
11 guy who was the boss of Egbert Construction, or at least 
12 who the construction company was named after; isn't that 
13 true? 
14 A Yes, I was talking to Ken Egbert. 
15 Q And he advised you that this kid who had been 
16 killed, who was 18 years of age, that was only his 
17 second day on the job; isn't that true? 
18 MR. DAVENPORT: Are you testifying that he was 
19 18 years of age? 
20 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Let me ask you, do you 
21 know how old he was? 
22 A I did not know. I knew he was young. 
23 -. Q Well, remember when we were talking about a 
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24 bunch of 13-year-olds coming on, that you'd inquire. 
25 Did you make any inquiry as to how old this kid was when 
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1 he came on your project to work? 
2 A I did not inquire as to his age. 
3 Q Did you at any time learn of his age? 
4 A I believe in the conversation with Ken -- in 
5 fact, I know in the conversation with Ken, his age was 
6 discussed. 
7 Q And how old was he? 
8 A I do not recall, but I know he was preparing 
9 for a mission, so he was under 19, because he wasn't old 
10 enough at the time. 
11 Q And what else do you recall about that 
12 conversation with Ken Egbert? 
13 A Just that Ken had been told that he was 
14 preparing for a mission. 
15 Q Anything else? 
16 A I don't recall anything else. 
17 Q It was a tragedy, wasn't it? 
18 A Yes, it was. 
19 Q Terrible waste of a human life; correct? 
20 Is that correct, sir? 
21 - A Are you asking for my religious views? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 Q No, that's not a religious view. 
23 A Yes, it is. 
24 Q Well, what is your answer in response to my 
25 question? 
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1 A A religious view. 
2 MR. DAVENPORT: You can go ahead and say what 
3 it is. I don't care. 
4 THE WITNESS: God has given him a mission. 
5 Whether it be served here on earth or in heaven, it is 
6 being served, and, yes, I believe that to be true. 
7 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) So you believe that this 
8 was destined to happen, no matter what? 
9 MR. DAVENPORT: I object. You're 
10 mischaracterizing his testimony. 
11 MR. MORIARITY: I'm asking. 
12 THE WITNESS: I believe God has a purpose. 
13 Whether there is a time, I will not testify to, but God 
14 has a purpose for every individual on this earth. 
15 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) As a result of the tragic 
16 death of Jason Smith, are you going to be a better 
17 project supervisor? 
18 A Every experience that I have, whether it's on 
19 the.job, through education, through life, makes me a 
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20 better man, a better employee, a better superintendent. 
21 Q And can you answer the question that I asked 
22 you? 
23 A This is an experience of my life. It will 
24 never be erased. These pictures I have seen before 
25 without a camera. 
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1 MR. MARIGER: Application process to the 
2 LDS Church? 
3 MR. BADARUDDIN: Sure. 
4 THE WITNESS: No. 
5 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Did you have to provide 
6 them any referrals or something of that nature? 
7 A No. 
8 Q How did they come to choose you the very first 
9 time, if you know? When I say "y°u>M I mean your firm. 
10 MR. MARIGER: So now are we talking about 
11 before 1997? 
12 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Well, when was the first 
13 time you did anything for the LDS Church? 
14 A My partner has worked for them since 1971. 
15 Q Okay. So are you aware of the circumstances 
16 under which your partner was able to start working with 
17 theLDSChurch? 
18 A No. 
19 Q When were you born? 
20 A 1969. 
21 Q Okay. He didn't fill you in, I guess. 
22 Well, let's talk about the Highland 4 and 20 
23 project. How did you come to be the project -- is it 
24 project architect? 
25 A Yes. 
Page 22 
1 Q How did you come to be the project architect 
2 on the Highland 4 and 20 project? 
3 A Our firm had projects in a geographical area 
4 that spread from Idaho to Nephi, and within our 
5 organization of the office, we, my partner and I, 
6 decided that it didn't make sense for us to be crossing 
7 paths all the time, so I tried to take the majority of 
8 the projects in the south area. 
9 Q Okay. Did Mr. Schick call y'all and say -
10 y'all is a word that we use where I'm from — did 
11 Mr. Schick call your firm and say, Well, we've got a 
12 project that we'd like your help with? 
13 A I think he called my partner and said that. 
14 Q And you didn't bid it or anything, they just 
15 chose you? 
16 A Correct. 
17 Q And were you paid a retainer? Was there a 
18 contract or did you just send them bills and they paid 
19 them? What was the payment arrangement? 
20 A We have a contract. 
21 Q Did you? Okay. And the contract, was that 
22 for a set rate or an hourly, or how did that work? 
23 A A fixed fee. 
24 Q Well, what were your duties and obligations to 
25 the LDS Church with regard to the Highland 4 and 20 
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project? 
A That could be a long list of things. Would 
you like them all? 
Q If you can list them, yes. 
MR. MARIGER: Do you have the contract? 
MR BADARUDDIN: I do, but I got this this 
morning, and I haven't been able to go through this 
thoroughly. 
MR MARIGER It seems to me that me contract 
would be the best evidence of that. You're asking him 
all of his duties? Is that what I understand the 
question to be? 
MR BADARUDDIN: Well, I'm not asking him his 1 
legal duties. Let me rephrase that. 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) What did you do for the 
LDS Church on the Highland 4 and 20 project? Let me 
start you off. 
Did you have to design or draft the plans for 
the structure? 1 
A No. 
Q Where did they come from? 
A The church has a standard set of plans that 
they use for their buildings. 
Q What's the name of the building? Is it a 
chapel, a sanctuary? 
I 
Page 24 
A They refer to it as the Heritage plan. 
Q So they sent you drawings, drafts? 
A They sent us CAD files in a hard copy. This 
project - there are five styles that the local church 
leaders choose from, and this was called the New England j 
Style. 
Q Okay 
A So they sent those plans to us as hard copy, 
and also on CAD. 
Q Okay. And CAD is a software of some sort? 
A Yes. 
Q And all you had to do was put your stamp on 
them? 
A No. 
Q What did you have to do to these plans to make 
it so they could build the thing? 
A The site had to be designed and the drawings 
created for the site grading and utilities. Then the 
standard plans, we review those to determine, in our 
minds, if code has been met. 
Q Code being? 
A Uniform Building Code at the time. 
Q The State of Utah imposes certain restrictions 
or requirements on buildings. 
A Correct. 
1 
7 fPaaps 71 in 1A\ 
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1 go back to y'all. 
2 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Is there a circumstance 
3 where you and the LDS representative jointly decide to 
4 instruct the general contractor not to use a particular 
5 subcontractor? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Okay. And under those circumstances, does the 
8 general contractor accept your instruction or reject it? 
9 A In past cases, they've accepted it. 
10 Q Have you ever told a general contractor in an 
11 LDS project, Use this subcontractor, for whatever 
12 purpose? 
13 A No. 
14 Q And has the LDS Church, to your knowledge, 
15 ever provided you with a list of, let's say, approved or 
16 preferred subcontractors? 
17 A No. 
18 Q Do you have an idea in your head from working 
19 with the LDS Church as to what subcontractors they 
20 prefer or approve? 
21 A I think that everybody that works on LDS 
22 projects, whether they're architects or general 
23 contractors or the project managers, know that some 
24 contractors perform better than others. 
25 Q And that's from your experience in the 
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1 construction field or from your experience with the 
2 LDS Church? 
3 A Can you rephrase that? 
4 Q Well, you've done quite a bit of construction; 
5 correct? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And you've had some good subcontractors and 
8 some bad ones. 
9 A Yes. 
0 Q And while maybe you can't list them off the 
1 top of your head, the good ones and the bad ones, if you 
2 were looking at a list of subcontractors for a 
3 particular project, you would recall whether or not any 
4 of the really bad ones were on that list; is that fair 
5 to say? 
6 A If I had an association or past experience 
7 with a bad subcontractor, I would typically remember, 
3 but there may be one that's bad that I have had no 
? experience with that would not be apparent to me. 
) Q So your criteria for judging a subcontractor 
I as, let's say, bad or substandard or unacceptable would 
I basically be your prior experience with that 
! subcontractor was not very good? 
\ A Correct. And that could be based on more than 
1 just quality. It could have to do with schedule, who 
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1 their foreman might be, a number of different things. 
2 MR. WALLACE: I heard you say "schedule," and I 
3 I couldn't hear after that. 
4 MR.MARIGER: Who their foreman might be. 
5 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) So it's not like the 
6 representative from the LDS Church ever said to you, 
7 Paul, here are a couple of people I like, here are a 
8 couple of people I don't? 
9 A No. 
10 Q It's just your prior experience in various 
11 construction projects? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q All right. Well, let me get back to the 
14 Highland 4 and 20 project. 
15 There were the master plans and the - was it 
16 the New England style of ~ what was the name of the 
17 structure? 1 
18 A New England Style Heritage. 
19 Q Who decided how big it was going to be? If we 
20 were to go out and measure the perimeter, who decided 
21 those measurements? I 
22 A I don't know. 
i 
23 Q Was it your firm? 
24 A No. 
25 Q What about, let's say, for example, the width 1 
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1 
1 of the doorways and the height of the doorways. Some 1 
2 churches, especially in Rome — in fact, in this 
3 building, the doors go way up. Other times, like in 
4 your house, they're going to be a good bit shorter. Who 
5 determined the size of the doorways? 
6 A I don't know. 
7 Q That wasn't your firm? 
8 A No. 
9 Q And what about the size of the walls and the 
10 ceiling height, who determined all of that? 
11 A I don't know. 
12 Q It wasn't your firm? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Now, what exactly did your firm do? 
15 MR. MARIGER: I'm going to object. He gave a I 
16 very long list of what they did with the Church's 
17 standard designs and drawings. If you want him to 
18 repeat all of that... 
19 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I don't want you to 1 
20 repeat it. If I understand correctly, and I wanted to 
21 make sure I did, the church basically designed the 
22 New England Style Heritage. 
23 A Correct. 
24 Q You just make sure their design conforms with 
25 the requirements of law, and I guess physics, because we ; 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q And there's no 34, is there? 
3 A Not that I'm aware of. 
4 Q 33 would be your last weekly report for the 
5 Highland 4 and 20 project? 
6 A I believe so. 
7 Q Did I say 34? I meant 33. I don't know what 
8 I said, but the last numbered report is 33. And that 
9 would be your last weekly report for the Highland 4 and 
10 20 project; correct? 
11 A When you say "your," you're speaking of 
12 Butler & Evans? 
13 Q Yes. 
14 A Correct. 
15 Q And of course, report number one would be your 
16 first report for the Highland 4 and 20 project. 
17 A Weekly construction field report. 
18 Q Okay. Who designed this form that you used 
19 for the weekly reports? 
20 A Someone within my office. 
21 Q The purpose of this form is, I guess, to have 
22 a form to give all the information to your client in an 
23 easy, readable manner? Well, let me ask you this. 
24 What is the purpose of the form? 
25 A To give the project manager a list of what is 
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1 current status of the project. What sort of information 
2 would you put in that category? 
3 A What is currently occurring at the project, 
4 where they are in the progress of construction. 
5 Q And then in resolved items, what sort of 
6 information would you put there? 
7 A Those items that came from-if there is an 
8 item that needs attention, whether it be a question or a 
9 discrepancy in the plans or noncompliance with the 
10 construction documents, it is listed under new items. 
11 When those new items are corrected, they move to 
12 resolved items. If they are not corrected the first 
13 week, they move to unresolved items until they become a 
14 resolved item. 
15 Q So new items would only be new items once on 
16 one weekly report; is that correct? 
17 A Typically. 
18 Q And then they would move to either resolved or 
19 unresolved. 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q It appears also that you use codes of some 
22 sort, like for example, you've got 1-1 under new items, 
23 a sewer manhole. 
24 Do you see where I'm reading from? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 occurring at the project, what the progress of the 
2 project is. 
3 Q The project manager in this case being Dean 
4 Schick? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q Okay. What sort of information do you put 
7 into the report? 
8 A What the progress is of different components 
9 of the project, items that do not comply with the 
10 construction documents, questions that may be raised. 
11 (Off-the-record discussion) 
12 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Well, for example, 
13 there's some information regarding the project manager, 
14 the architect, the contractor. That's just 
15 identification information? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q I mean, that's not really going to help 
18 anybody determine how the project is coming along. 
19 A No. 
20 Q But I guess the first big item there is 
21 current status of the project. 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q I'm looking at report No. 1. It's the same on 
24 every report. You can look at whatever report you want. 
25 Let's talk about report 1, Exhibit 27, the 
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1 Q What does that mean, 1-1? 
2 A Item 1 of report 1. 
3 Q And so if we were to turn to any report, this 
4 item would be numbered 1 -1 ? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Well, if we go to report No. 16, Exhibit 27. 
7 A Oh, I misunderstood your question. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A It always stays as one - an item, once it's 
10 listed, so it always stays at 1-1. I thought you were 
11 inferring that on all reports the first new item is 
12 always 1.1, and it's not. It's the report number, dash 
13 one. 
14 Q All right. And that way you can follow along 
15 with its progress, know how long it's been a problem; is 
16 that fair to say? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q So the first number would be the report 
19 number. The second number would just be numbering it in 
20 that report. 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q Now, how often would you visit the Highland 4 
23 and 20 project? 
24 A Weekly. 
25 Q Just once a week? 
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1 A Unless requested to come more often. 
2 Q And did you, in fact, visit more often than 
3 once a week on the Highland 4 and 20 project? 
4 A Possibly. 
5 Q In the Highland 4 and 20 project, was there a 
6 schedule for completing the various items that are 
7 required to build the building? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Who designed that schedule? 
10 A Contractor. 
11 Q Did you have any input as to the timing? 
12 A No. We establish the overall total days of 
13 the contract. 
14 Q Okay. And this in case, I think it was 
15 approximately 300 days? 
16 A Possibly. That sounds appropriate. 
17 Q Well, that number would have been established 
18 by your firm? 
19 A It's established by the LDS Church. 
20 Q And then as to what element of the project is 
21 completed the first week, the second week, that would be 
22 up to the general contractor? 
23 A Correct. 
24 Q And what, if any, input would you have into 
25 that? 
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1 A None. 
2 Q I wanted to ask you about report No. 7 of 
3 Exhibit 27. 
4 Under "current status of the project," you 
5 indicate that the framing should start on Friday. It's 
6 the last sentence of the only paragraph in "current 
7 status of the project." 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And why did you note that? 
10 A I was told by the superintendent when the 
11 framing would start. 
12 Q Why is it important when the framing is going 
13 to start? 
14 A Just a mark in time. 
15 Q And what is framing? What does that mean? 
16 A That is putting together the dimensional 
17 lumber, that's the bearing and non-bearing walls, the 
18 roof system. Can be a floor system in some instances. 
19 Q Okay. Well, who would determine how wide and 
10 how tall to make these walls? 
\\ A Whoever designed the standard plans. 
\2 Q And who designed the standard plans on the 
3 Highland 4 and 20 project? 
14 A I don't know. 
15 Q But you reviewed those plans. 
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1 A Yes. 1 
2 Q And do you know whether or not they indicated 
3 the height and width of the walls? 
4 A The plans? 
5 Q Yes. 
6 A Yes, they do. 
7 Q Do you know what height was prescribed by the 
8 plans? 
9 A It's different in different places. 
10 Q Well, on the Highland 4 and 20 project. 
11 A They're different walls of different heights. 
12 Q Okay. But you could look to the plans, is it, 
13 and determine what, if any -- what height any given wall 
14 should be? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And is there a name for the plans 
17 specifically, where I could go and look at these 
18 documents and see what the height is supposed to be, the 1 
19 walls? 
20 A A specific sheet? 
21 Q Well, if I wanted to know how tall the wall 
22 should be in a particular place at the Highland 4 and 20 
23 project, what document would I look at? 
24 A The Highland 4 and 20,1 don't know what 
25 they're labeled, but it's the project name building 
1 
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1 plans. fc 
2 Q Okay. Well, let me ask you about report No. 8 
3 of Exhibit 27. Under "current status," you make some 
4 description of the framing progress. It says, "The 
5 framers have started the exterior walls. They stood the 
6 north wall along the east side and the east wall along 
7 the north side, and everything appears to be in 
8 conformance with the construction documents, except as 1 
9 noted below." fe 
10 Is that what it says? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And the date of this observation was August 5, 
13 1999; is that correct? 
14 A Yes. I 
15 Q What is noted below? It says, "Everything 
16 appears to be in conformance except as noted below." 
17 What is not in conformance? 
18 A 8.1. I 
19 Q And I can read 8.1, but tell me what it means. 
20 A I don't recall specifically which two beams 
21 are being discussed. It was an item that was discussed 
22 between the superintendent and the structural engineer. 
23 Q Okay. What is a beam? 
24 A A beam is a horizontal member that holds 
25 something above it. 
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1 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) The superintendent's name 
2 being? 
3 A Maurice Egbert. 
4 Q What did he tell you happened? 
5 A That three workers were standing a wall, and 
6 that one of them went from one side of the wall to the 
7 other side, and tripped and fell, and that the wall fell 
8 at the same time and landed on his head. 
9 Q Okay. Do you have any experience with 
10 framing? 
11 A Define "experience." 
12 Q Have you ever built a wall? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Have you ever lifted a wall into place? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And how did you manage to lift the wall you 
17 lifted into place? 
18 A Tip it. 
19 Q Tip it? What does that mean? 
20 A It means you lay the base plate adjacent to 
21 its final spot, you build the wall laying on the ground, 
22 and then you tip it or raise it into the spot. 
23 Q How do you raise it into the spot? 
24 A It can be done a couple of ways. 
25 Q Tell me the ways that you're familiar with 
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1 raising a wall into the spot it goes in. 
2 A You can use a crane and pick it up. You can 
3 pull it with a rope. You can push it with a board from 
4 one side. You can have — depending on the size, there 
5 are different ways, but small walls can be lifted just 
6 with a man, a couple of men, five men. 
7 Q This wall that fell on this individual, was 
8 that a small wall, a medium-sized wall, a large wall? 
9 A Relatively speaking, small wall for the 
0 project. 
1 Q Do you think three men were adequate to lift 
2 it? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q You don't think they needed a crane or a 
5 forklift or anything of that nature? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Do you know how much experience these 
8 individuals had? 
9 A No. 
3 Q Do you know how much experience one should 
I have in order to lift a wall of that size? 
1 A No. 
5 Q Do you know whether this wall that fell on 
I this individual had anything to do with item 8.1? When 
j I say 8.1, it's really 8-1, but the beam issue. 
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1 A No. 
2 Q It had nothing to do or you don't know? 
3 A It had nothing to do. 1 
4 Q I had some questions about some reports. 
5 Do you know whether or not Hales & Warner kept 1 
6 a daily report of events at the Highland 4 and 20 
7 project? 1 
8 A Yes. 1 
9 Q Did you ever review those reports? 
10 A Yes. 1 
11 Q In what capacity would you review them? 
12 A They were submitted to us biweekly, so they 
13 would give us a copy of them. 
14 Q Okay. And what purpose did you have in mind 1 
15 when you reviewed those reports? 
16 A General progress of the project and if there 
17 were problems. 
18 Q So not only would you visit every week, but 
19 you would review these daily reports just to see how 
20 things are going; correct? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q And then you could make a report to 
23 Mr. Schick, or whoever might be in his position, as to 
24 the progress on, in this case, the Highland 4 and 20 
25 project. 
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1 A Yes. 1 
2 (Exhibit No. 29 is marked for identification.) 
3 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) If you could review 
4 Exhibit 29. 
5 My question is, is that the daily report for 
6 August 5, 1999? 1 
7 A No. It's August 4. ft 
8 Q Right. August 4, 1999. 1 
9 Do you know whether you reviewed that while 
10 you were working on the Highland 4 and 20 project? 
11 A I don't recall. 
12 Q Well, let me ask you about the last 
13 handwritten entry. It starts, "At Joel's request." 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Can you read that paragraph. 1 
16 A Sure. "At Joel's request, I have told the I 
17 framers we want all sheer walls and end walls to be" -
18 and I can't read that word, "with studs long, no top 
19 plate, then to cut them when the trusses and TGIs are 
20 available for exact heights. This is how we had done it 
21 on our other jobs. In early discussions about the 
22 framers" - "about this, the framers did" - "didn't 
23 want to do it. They are proceeding as we have 
24 requested." 
25 Q Can you tell me what that means, if you know. 
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1 A On the east wall of the building, it's a tall 
2 gable wall, very tall, very long. And in order to get 
3 the slope of that wall to match the trusses, he's asking 
4 them to let the studs extend vertically until the 
5 trusses are in place and then mark the slope of that 
6 wall, based on what the slope of the set trusses and 
7 TGIs are. 
8 Q Do you know how the framers wanted to do it? 
9 A No. 
10 Q But however they wanted to do it, the general 
11 contractor gave them some instruction as to how they 
12 must do it? 
13 MR. DAVENPORT: Objection to the extent you're 
14 asking him to speculate. If he was present and heard 
15 these instructions, that's one thing to testify to his 
16 personal knowledge. It's another thing to speculate as 
17 it relates to reading someone else's writing as to what 
18 occurred. 
19 I'm going to object to your question because 
20 it calls for speculation and lacks foundation. 
21 MR. MARIGER: I'll join the objection. 
22 Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) Subject to that 
23 objection, do you know whether or not the general 
24 contractor gave some instruction to the framers as to 
25 how they were to proceed with this thing that's 
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1 described on Exhibit 29? 
2 MR. DAVENPORT: Are you asking for his 
3 personal knowledge? 
4 MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm always asking for his 
5 personal knowledge. 
6 MR. MARIGER: He has no personal knowledge of 
7 this. His knowledge is based just upon the document you 
8 just gave him. 
9 MR. DAVENPORT: You're asking him to read 
10 something and then you're asking him questions. 
11 MR. MARIGER: Do you know for a fact that this 
12 occurred? 
13 THE WITNESS: No. 
14 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me ask you about your 
15 weekly report that would coincide with this date, which 
16 I believe would be No. 8. 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Does report No. 8 or possibly 9 reflect 
19 anything relevant to what's going on on Exhibit 29 with 
£0 regard to the framing? 
11 A Well, it is an exterior wall, so potentially 
12 the first sentence refers to it. 
13 Q Okay. 
!4 A The north wall along the east side is 
:5 consistent with what they're - with the wall that 
— — — — • : ,. . . . . , . . .. • • • 1 — . . . . . . , . . , , . ••:. ! . ; . , . • • • . ; ; . , - : : . , ' • : ! : / , , : • • . . . . : 
Page 67 1 
1 they're talking about in the report. 
2 MR. MARIGER: In the contractor's report. 
3 THE WITNESS: In the contractor's report. 
4 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And that would be 
5 Exhibit 29. 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q So the description of your current status of 
8 project in field report No. 8 indicates that the framing 
9 is proceeding as indicated in Exhibit 29? 
10 A I don't understand the question. 
11 MR. MARIGER: That's ambiguous. 
12 MR. DAVENPORT: Join. 
13 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) There's some framing 
14 described in Exhibit 29; correct? 
15 A Yes. 
16 MR. MARIGER: There's a framing and a method 
17 for framing in Exhibit 29, and you need to differentiate 
18 between those two. 1 
19 MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm getting there. 
20 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN There's framing described 
21 in Exhibit 29; correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And there's one method described by the author 
24 of Exhibit 29. 
25 A Yes. 
1 
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1 Q And there's an indication that the author of 
2 Exhibit 29 wants the framing done according to the 
3 manner described in Exhibit 29; is that fair to say? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Now, in your report No. 8 -
6 MR. DAVENPORT: Let me make sure I'm clear. 
7 Which is Exhibit 29? 
8 MR. BADARUDDIN: The daily report. 
9 MR. DAVENPORT: I'm just going to indicate 
10 that, again, I object to lack of foundation. He doesn't 
11 know, have any personal knowledge as to Exhibit 29. He 
12 did not prepare it, and he's already testified that he 
13 doesn't know. He hasn't any personal knowledge as to 
14 its content. 1 
15 MR BADARUDDIN: Okay. 
16 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Field report No. 8, does I 
17 that indicate that the framing is proceeding on the 
18 Highland 4 and 20 project in the manner described in 
19 Exhibit 29? 
20 A No. 1 
21 Q What does it indicate? 
22 A It indicates that the walls are in the right 
23 location. I 
24 Q Okay. Does it indicate anything more? 
25 A No. 1 
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1 Q All right. 
2 (Exhibit No. 30 is marked for identification.) 
3 MR. BADARUDDIN: It's August 5. 
4 I don't know, Erik, if you have all of these 
5 documents, it's the daily log for August 5. 
6 MR. DAVENPORT: I've got it. I'll refer to 
7 them. 
8 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Exhibit 30 is another 
9 daily report; correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q For August 5,1999. 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And in your work on this Highland 4 and 20 
14 project, would you have reviewed this daily report? 
15 A I should have. 
16 Q And do you have any reason to suspect you did 
17 not? 
18 A No. 
19 Q And I want you to, if you can, read the last 
20 handwritten entry. It's the most lengthy one, starting 
21 with "Ken Egbert." 
22 A "Ken Egbert, framer, is concerned with the 
23 manner in which we want the building framed, leaving 
24 sheer wall studs long to be cut after trusses are up for 
25 a more accurate cut. 
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1 "Brent Reynolds, with whom our contract is 
2 with (framing), told Ken he shouldn't do it because of 
3 extra labor costs. At my request, Ken and Brady, 
4 (another framer who always does his church framing this 
5 way), met to discuss this method of framing. Ken and I 
6 also went up to a church with the same floor plan 
7 directly north of us to see the framing of it. Ken is 
8 proceeding as we have requested until final decision 
9 from Brent Reynolds is given." 
10 Q Can you tell me what is being discussed there? 
11 A It refers back to the same wall and the same 
12 method of erecting the east wall as in the previous 
13 daily report. It sounds as though two framers are 
14 discussing whether they should proceed in the manner in 
15 which they've been asked to by the superintendent. It 
16 sounds like they're consulting with another framer, and 
17 it appears that they went to a similar project to review 
18 how that was framed. And it ends with the fact that 
19 they're proceeding as asked until a final decision is 
20 given by the framer. 
21 Q Okay. 
22 MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object You're 
23 asking him to speculate or comment on what someone else 
24 has written ~ 
25 MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him --
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1 MR. DAVENPORT: - comments that are not based I 
2 upon his personal knowledge. 
3 MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him to interpret 
4 the document. I'm asking him for what information it 
5 conveys to him. 
6 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) But anyway, are there 
7 different ways that a framer could frame the walls as 
8 described in your field report No. 8 consistent with the 
9 plans? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And in Exhibit 30, how many different ways are 
12 described? 
13 A One. 
14 Q Isn't there some dispute as to at least two 
15 ways? The framer wants to do it one way and whoever 
16 wants to do it another way? 
17 MR. DAVENPORT: You're talking about the 
18 particular wall at issue here, referring to this sheer 
19 wall? 
20 MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking about Exhibit 30. 
21 Whatever wall is described there. 
22 MR. MARIGER: Objection; foundation. 
23 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me ask you this. 
24 Does Exhibit 30 describe a particular wall? 
25 A Describe "particular." 
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1 Q Does it refer to a particular wall, meaning --
2 MR. MARIGER: In the writing itself? 
3 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) The writing itself, 
4 Exhibit 30, is it referencing a particular wall? 
5 MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object to the 
6 extent the writing speaks for itself. It says "sheer 
7 walls." We all can read what it says. 
8 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Exhibit 30 doesn't 
9 reference a particular wall, does it? 
10 A No. 
11 Q It talks about how to frame the building. 
12 MR. DAVENPORT: Objection. Exhibit 30 speaks 
13 for itself. 
14 THE WITNESS: Am I to answer? 
15 MR. MARIGER: Yes. 
16 THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question? 
17 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Sure. Exhibit 30 refers 
18 to no particular wall; correct? 
19 A No. 
20 Q No, it does refer to a particular wall? 
21 A Sorry, it does not refer to a particular wall. 
22 Q All right. And your report No. 8 would be the 
23 relevant report for August 5, 1999, and before; correct? 
24 MR. MARIGER: Relevant report for what? 
25 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Well, suppose Exhibit 30 I 
I 
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Hales & Warner Construction Inc. 
1460 North Main,, Unit 1, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801) 798-7318 • FAX 798-7320 
August .11, 1999 
BRC, Inc. 
328 South 725 East 
Layton,UT 84037 
RE: Highland 4 & 20 Wards 
Brent; 
You have now been framing on the Highland 4 & 20 Wards building for 2 weeks. 
You promised to have 12 men on the job. This has not happened. If you continue with 
the same number of framers, you will not meet the 7 week framing schedule. We feel 
you need to immediately increase the number of framers and provide proper supervision 
so as to meet the 7 week framing schedule. 
Please provide us a written framing schedule outlining manpower and target dates 
such as wall framing, roof framing, completion, etc. 
If you have any questions, please call. 
Sincerely. 
Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. 
Clifford Hales 
President 
CH/jd 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hales & Warner Construction Inc. 
1460 North Main, Unit 1, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (601) 798-7316 » FAX 798-7320 
August 25, 1999 
BRCInc. 
328 South 725 East 
Layton,UT 84041 
RE; Highland 4 & 20 Wards 
Gentlemen: 
This is a follow up to the letter dated August 11, 1999. You still have not had 12 men 
on the job as promised, and the job is getting further behind. Therefore, you are hereby 
notified that you are in breech of paragraph 2 of said construction subcontract. 
Specifically, you have failed to employ sufficient competent help to complete the work in 
a reasonable time. You are hereby given 48 hours written notice in accordance with said 
paragraph to employ help to complete the work. If you fail to employ and have at the job 
site within 48 hours after this written notice sufficient competent help to complete the 
work, we, as general contractors, will engage additional help to complete the work and 
charge the same to your account, and charge you any penalties due to your failure to 
complete the work as contracted. 
You should be advised that if costs of completing said work exceeds the contract 
price, you have agreed to reimburse the contractor for any sums over and above the 
contract price. If the cost of completing the work does not exceed the contract price, an\ 
excess will be paid to you. If the contractor is assessed liquidated damages by the owner 
for failure to complete the work on time, and if delay has been caused by you, which wc 
maintain has been the case, you will be required to pay us the portion of the liquidated 
damages caused by or attributed to your failure to complete your work on time and in 
accordance with the working schedule. 
Please comply with the above stipulations and have sufficient men on the job site (12 
or more men) by August 27, 1999, and continue to have sufficient men on the job each 
day thereafter, If you are not on the job with a sufficient crew by August 27, 1999, you 
will not be notified again. Hales & Warner Construction will simply have, another 
suhcor.:ractor at the job site on August 30. 1999. 
Sincerely, 
Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. 
(/J#U 
Clifford Hales 
President 
pc: Ken Egbert Construction 
sr 
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LEXSEE 979 P2D 322 
Trevor Thompson, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Connie Jess, aka Connie Stroup, dba 
Motel 9/Rio Damian Motel, and Does 1 through 10, Defendants and Appellee. 
No. 980127 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
1999 UT22; 979 P.2d 322; 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 64; 1999 Utah LEXIS 25 
March 12,1999, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] 
As Corrected November 1, 1999. Released for 
Publication June 24, 1999. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Eighth District, Duchesne County. 
The Honorable John R. Anderson. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant workman, an 
employee of an independent contractor, sought review of 
an order of the Eighth District, Duchesne County (Utah), 
granting summary judgment to appellee motel owner in 
appellant's action for damages sustained while appellant 
worked on the property. 
OVERVIEW: Appellee motel owner asked that a pipe 
be delivered to her motel property. When appellant 
workman, an employee of an independent contractor, 
arrived, appellee asked him to install the pipe. Appellant 
said that he did not have the preferred tools, but agreed 
to attempt installation. The pipe fell during installation 
and caused appellant's leg to be amputated. Appellant 
sued, claming that appellee was negligent in her control 
of the situation and in failing to take special precautions. 
The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary 
judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed. Appellee had 
no duty under the "retained control" doctrine because she 
did not actively participate in the performance of the 
work; she did not impose means or methods of achieving 
the work, but merely stated her desired result: the pipe's 
installation. The "peculiar risk" and "inherently 
dangerous work" doctrines did not provide theories of 
relief for appellant, as they only applied to innocent third 
parties injured as a result of the independent contractor's 
negligence. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment; appellee was not liable under the "retained 
control" doctrine because she did not actively participate 
in the work, and the "peculiar risk" and "inherently 
dangerous work" doctrines were inapplicable to 
appellant, as he was an employee of the independent 
contractor. 
CORE TERMS: pipe, contractor, independent 
contractor, retained control, precautions, install, workers' 
compensation, physical harm, inherently dangerous, duty 
of care, plywood, backhoe, stub, contracted, peculiar 
risk, subject to liability, subcontractor, hired, owed, duty, 
motel, performing, summary judgment, third parties, 
installed, chain, general contractor, beams, hires, 
agreeing 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary 
Judgment Standard 
[HN1] Summary judgment is proper only when there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De 
Novo Review 
[HN2] The appellate court reviews the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no 
deference to the court's legal conclusions. 
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1999UT22,*;979P.2d322,**; 
364 Utah Adv. Rep. 64; 1999 Utah LEXIS 25, *** 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN3] Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable 
for physical harm caused to another by an act or 
omission of the contractor or his servants. This general 
rule recognizes that one who hires an independent 
contractor and does not participate in or control the 
manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes 
no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or 
method of performance implemented. The most 
commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the 
principal employer does not control the means of 
accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor is the 
proper party to be charged with the responsibility for 
preventing the risk arising out of the work, and 
administering and distributing it. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN4] The retained control doctrine is a narrow theory 
of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where 
an employer of an independent contractor exercises 
enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a 
limited duty of care, but not enough to become an 
employer or a master of those over whom the control is 
asserted. The duty in such situations is one of reasonable 
care under the circumstances and is confined in scope to 
the control asserted. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN5] Under the retained control doctrine, one who 
entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who 
retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to 
liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the 
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which 
is caused by his failure to exercise his control with 
reasonable care. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN6] A principal employer is not subject to liability for 
injuries arising out of its contractor's work unless the 
employer actively participates in the performance of the 
work. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN7] Under the "active participation" standard, a 
principal employer is subject to liability for injuries 
arising out of its independent contractor's work if the 
employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, 
the manner of performance of the contracted work. Such 
an assertion of control occurs, for example, when the 
principal employer directs that the contracted work be 
done by use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes 
with the means and methods by which the work is to be 
accomplished. It is not enough that he has merely a 
general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to 
inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not 
necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and 
deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to 
employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is 
controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative 
detail. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN8] To have "actively participated" in the contracted 
work, a principal employer must have exercised 
affirmative control over the method or operative detail of 
that work. The degree of control necessary for the 
creation of a legal duty must involve either the direct 
management of the means and methods of the 
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the 
specific equipment that caused the injury. Although the 
requisite level of control over the contractor's manner or 
method of work does not rise to the level of creating a 
master-servant relationship, the principal employer must 
exert such control over the means utilized that the 
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of 
the work in his or her own way. A typical instance in 
which such an exertion of control might occur is when a 
principal contractor entrusts a part of the work to 
subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman 
superintends the entire job. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN9] Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 
(1965), one who employs an independent contractor to 
do work which the employer should recognize as likely 
to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions 
are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to them by the absence of such precautions if the 
employer fails to provide in the contract that the 
contractor shall take such precautions, or fails to exercise 
reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the 
taking of such precautions. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN10] Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 
(1965), one who employs an independent contractor to 
do work which the employer should recognize as likely 
to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical 
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harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by 
the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to 
take such precautions, even though the employer has 
provided for such precautions in the contract or 
otherwise. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN11] Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 
(1965), one who employs an independent contractor to 
do work involving a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in 
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has 
reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such 
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable 
precautions against such danger. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent Contractors 
[HN12] The purpose of the "peculiar risk" doctrine and 
the "inherently dangerous work" doctrine, under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 413, 416, and 427 
(1965), is to ensure that innocent third parties injured by 
the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a 
landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land 
would not have to depend on the contractor's solvency in 
order to receive compensation for the injuries. This 
purpose is not advanced when these exceptions are 
applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are 
covered by workers' compensation. Thus, the doctrines 
have no application when the injured person is an 
employee of the independent contractor undertaking the 
allegedly dangerous work. 
COUNSEL: John Paul Kennedy, Salt Lake City, and 
David J. Bennion, San Jose, Cal., for plaintiff. 
Stephen G. Morgan, Joseph E. Minnock, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant. 
JUDGES: RUSSON, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, 
Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and 
Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's opinion. 
OPINIONBY: RUSSON 
OPINION: [**323] RUSSON, Justice: 
[*P1] Trevor Thompson appeals from the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Connie 
Jess, owner of four motels in Duchesne, Utah. The 
district court ruled, as a matter of law, that Thompson 
could not recover from Jess for injuries sustained while 
erecting a steel pipe for use as a sign post at one of Jess's 
motels. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] On or about March 9, 1995, Jess phoned 
AmeriKan Sanitation to arrange for the purchase and 
delivery of a used steel pipe. Jess requested a hollow 
pipe approximately 20 feet in length with an 8-inch 
diameter, one that would fit vertically over an [**324] 
existing pipe stub secured to the ground in front of one of 
her motels, [***2] which stub would support the larger 
pipe for use as a sign post. After agreeing upon a price, 
Jess requested that the pipe be delivered to her motel. 
Two employees of AmeriKan Sanitation, Dennis Jensen 
and Trevor Thompson, delivered the pipe. When Jensen 
inquired where to place the pipe, Jess told him she 
wanted it installed over the existing pipe stub. Jensen 
responded that he had been instructed only to deliver the 
pipe and that he was not equipped to erect it in the best 
manner. Jess then asked Jensen if he would install the 
pipe, and he agreed to do so, believing he could 
improvise by hoisting the pipe with the winch truck and 
tools he had with him. 
[*P4] At that point, Jess's involvement in erecting 
the pipe ceased, and she went inside the motel. Jensen, 
who had hoisted similar pipes more than a hundred times 
before, determined on his own the manner and method of 
lifting and installing the pipe. For leverage, Jensen set up 
stabilizing poles in an A-frame formation. He then 
attached to the pipe a "system-seven" chain and a hook 
using a "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch"-a method of 
fastening pipe, which Jensen had used many times prior, 
whereby the weight of the pipe [***3] pulls the chain 
tight. Jensen connected the chain to a winch cable that 
was strung over the A-frame and proceeded to hoist the 
pipe with the winch attached to his truck. Thompson 
stood near the back of the truck and attempted to guide 
the elevated pipe onto the pipe stub protruding from the 
ground. 
[*P5] After lifting the pipe as high as this method 
would allow, Jensen and Thompson discovered they 
were approximately two inches short of being able to 
raise the pipe over the top of the pipe stub. They decided 
to lower the pipe to the ground and obtain different 
equipment that would lift the pipe the requisite height. In 
the process of lowering the pipe, however, slack 
developed in the chain, and the pipe slipped out, 
bouncing on the ground and striking Thompson in the 
leg. As a result of the injuries sustained from this 
incident, Thompson's leg was amputated below the knee, 
nl 
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nl Shortly after the accident, Thompson 
applied for and began receiving workers' 
compensation benefits through his employer, 
Amerikan Sanitation. 
r***4i 
[*P6] The day following the accident, Jensen 
returned to the site with a backhoe and erected the pipe 
without problem using the same chain-hitch method. 
Both Jensen and Thompson, as well as their employer, 
AmeriKan Sanitation, testified after the accident that had 
they known in advance they would be asked to raise and 
install the pipe, they would have arrived prepared with a 
backhoe or crane in the first instance. However, after 
agreeing to install the pipe for Jess, neither Jensen nor 
Thompson informed her that a backhoe or crane was 
necessary to do the job. Rather, as reflected by the 
record, Jensen simply told Jess that although he lacked 
the best equipment, he would nonetheless erect the pipe. 
Jensen devised his own technique for the task, and 
Thompson helped him in the attempt. 
[*P7] In April 1997, Thompson filed suit against 
Jess, alleging that she was negligent in the control she 
exercised over installation of the pipe and in failing to 
take or require special precautions in the performance of 
the job. After the parties conducted discovery, Jess 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) she did 
not direct or otherwise control the manner or method of 
installing the pipe, and therefore [***5] owed no duty of 
care to Thompson or Jensen to insure they raised the pipe 
safely, and (2) she cannot be held vicariously liable for 
the negligent acts of the independent contractor she 
hired, regardless of whether the work involved peculiar 
risks or was inherently dangerous, because the injuries 
were suffered by an employee of that independent 
contractor. The district court granted Jess's motion for 
summary judgment, ruling that under Dayton v. Free, 46 
Utah 277, 284-85, 148 P. 408, 411 (1914), Jess owed 
Thompson no duty of protection or warning concerning 
performance of the task because she did not exercise 
control over the manner or method utilized to install the 
pipe. 
[*P8] On appeal, Thompson contends that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment. 
Thompson argues that by requesting [**325] that he 
and Jensen erect the pipe when they were not obligated 
to do so, and by directing them to install the pipe over 
the existing pipe stub, Jess asserted control over the work 
and thereby assumed a duty of care to him under the 
"retained control" doctrine set forth in section 414 of the 
Restatement. n2 Thompson also submits that, under 
section 413 of the Restatement, the work Jess [***6] 
requested posed "a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical 
harm to others" and that, consequently, Jess had a duty to 
take appropriate safety precautions. By not taking 
measures to ensure the safety of the work, asserts 
Thompson, Jess breached her duties of care under these 
provisions. Thompson argues that Jess knew or should 
have known from erecting sign posts at her other motels 
that a crane or backhoe was required to install the pole 
safely. 
n2 All Restatement references herein are to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). 
[*P9] As an alternative theory of liability, 
Thompson posits that even if Jess was not directly 
negligent herself, she nonetheless should be held 
vicariously liable for the contractor's negligence—in this 
case, the negligence of Thompson's co-worker, Jensen-
because Jess knew the work she requested involved a 
peculiar risk of physical harm to others. On this point, 
Thompson urges this court to adopt and apply in his 
favor sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement. Section 
416 imposes vicarious [***7] liability on the principal 
employer for the contractor's negligence if the employer 
knows or should know that the work involves "a peculiar 
risk of physical harm to others." Section 427 imposes the 
same liability for work involving "a special danger to 
others . . . inherent in or normal to the work." 
[*P10] In response, Jess counters that the trial 
court did not err in granting summary judgment because 
(1) she did not control the manner or method in which 
Thompson and Jensen attempted to lift and install the 
pole, and therefore owed them no duty of care under the 
"retained control" doctrine; and (2) sections 413, 416, 
and 427 of the Restatement provide causes of action to 
"others"-meaning innocent third parties-not to 
employees of the independent contractor hired to 
perform the allegedly dangerous work. 
[*P11] Thus, the principal issues before us are (1) 
whether Jess owed Thompson a duty of care under the 
"retained control" doctrine, and (2) whether the "peculiar 
risk" and "inherently dangerous work" doctrines under 
sections 413, 426, and 427 of the Restatement provide 
causes of action in favor of employees of the contractor 
hired to perform the work at issue. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P12] [HN1] [***8] Summary judgment is 
proper only when "there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 
P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). [HN2] We review the 
district court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the court's legal 
conclusions. See id. 
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ANALYSIS 
[HN3] [*P13] Utah adheres to the general 
common law rule that "the employer of an independent 
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to 
another by an act or omission of the contractor or his 
servants." Restatement § 409; see Gleason v. Salt Lake 
City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting 
applicability of said general rule and certain exceptions 
to it). This general rule recognizes that one who hires an 
independent contractor and does not participate in or 
control the manner in which the contractor's work is 
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of 
the manner or method of performance implemented. See 
W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 
1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule 
is that, where the principal employer does not control the 
means of accomplishing [***9] the contracted work, the 
contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the 
responsibility for preventing the risk [arising out of the 
work], and administering and distributing it." Id. 
[*P14] In the case at bar, Thompson does not 
contend that by agreeing to install the pipe over the 
existing pipe stub, he and Jensen [**326] became Jess's 
employees. Rather, Thompson relies entirely on certain 
exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an 
employer of an independent contractor: namely, the 
"retained control" doctrine, and the "peculiar risk" or 
"inherently dangerous work" doctrine. We address each 
in turn. 
A. "Retained Control" Doctrine 
[*P15] Thompson charges that Jess should be 
subject to liability because, by requesting that the pipe be 
erected and instructing that it be installed over the 
existing pipe stub, she controlled and directed the work 
that caused his injuries. [HN4] In so arguing, Thompson 
relies on the retained control doctrine, which, as set forth 
more fully below, is a narrow theory of liability 
applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer 
of an independent contractor exercises enough control 
over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of 
care, [***10] but not enough to become an employer or 
a master of those over whom the control is asserted. The 
duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under 
the circumstances and is confined in scope to the control 
asserted. 
[*P16] 
In 1965, the American Law Institute promulgated 
the retained control doctrine as section 414 of the 
Restatement, which states: 
§ 414. Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by 
Employer 
[HN5] 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but 
who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject 
to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety 
the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, 
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with 
reasonable care. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). This 
doctrine has not been adopted formally in Utah, although 
similar principles were discussed in this court's early 
decision of Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 
411-12 (Utah 1914). 
[*P17] In Dayton, this court addressed whether a 
company that employed an independent contractor was 
liable for injuries sustained by an employee of that 
contractor during the blasting of an underground tunnel. 
See [***11] 148 P. at 411-12. Citing a number of 
authorities from other states, the injured employee 
claimed that because the company, by contract, reserved 
to itself certain rights pertaining to overall management 
of the contract work, "the relation between the company 
and the contractors was not that of independent, but 
nonindependent, contractors." 148 P. at 411. As a result, 
argued the injured employee, he should be allowed to 
recover against the company. The court disagreed, 
stating: 
[The cited authorities] relate to instances and cases 
where the proprietor or employer reserved or exercised 
the right to superintend, direct or control the work, not 
only with respect to results, but also with reference to 
methods of procedure or means by which the result was 
to be accomplished, where the will and discretion of the 
contractor as to the time and manner of doing the work 
or the means and methods of accomplishing the results 
were subordinate and subject to that of the owner or 
proprietor. We do not find anything in the contract or the 
evidence [identified by the plaintiff] which brings this 
case within such a rule. 
Id. The court concluded that the injury had been caused 
by the manner [***12] in which the work was 
performed rather than by the nature of the work itself. 
See 148 P. at 412. Because the company exercised no 
control over the contractor's manner of work, it owed the 
plaintiff no duty to warn or guard him "against dangers 
incident to or created by the prosecution of the work, and 
certainly not to guard or protect him against the 
negligence of those who had employed him or with 
whom he labored." Id. 
[*P18] This court has not had opportunity to 
determine the precedential value of Dayton with respect 
to the retained control doctrine. Several federal courts 
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applying Utah law, however, have been called upon to do 
so. [HN6] Those courts uniformly have determined that 
under Dayton, a principal employer is not subject to 
liability for injuries arising out of its contractor's work 
unless the employer "actively participates" in the 
performance of the work. For instance, in Simon v. Deery 
Oil, 699 F. Supp. 257, 258 [**327] (D. Utah 1988), the 
court cited Dayton for the proposition that a principal 
employer "retaining an independent contractor to render 
services has no duty to warn or train employees of the 
contractor, nor must the principal protect the contractor's 
[***13] employees from the contractor's own 
negligence, unless the principal has 'actively participated' 
in the project." See also Sew ell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
606 F2d 274, 276 (10th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 
U.S. 1080, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 100 S Ct. 1031 (1980); 
Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 
1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 
Tex. App. LEXIS 6685, *8 (addressing Utah law on 
issue). We believe the standard relied upon in these cases 
is correct, and we formally adopt the same. Elaboration 
on the contours of the standard is needed, however. 
[HN7] [*P19] Under the "active participation" 
standard, a principal employer is subject to liability for 
injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if 
the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control 
over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. 
See Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973) 
(holding that under "active participation" standard, 
principal employer must directly influence manner in 
which work is performed; no duty arises from "passive 
nonparticipation"). Such an assertion of control occurs, 
for example, when the principal employer directs that 
[***14] the contracted work be done by use of a certain 
mode or otherwise interferes with the means and 
methods by which the work is to be accomplished. See, 
e.g., Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 
825 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing liability where 
subcontractor's employee was injured as result of new, 
less safe method of work required by general contractor); 
Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 
1985) (imposing liability where subcontractor was 
ordered to operate backhoe dangerously close to 
plaintiff). 
[*P20] The comments to section 414 of the 
Restatement provide guidance as to the "active 
participation" requirement: 
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the 
employer must have retained at least some degree of 
control over the manner in which the work is done. It is 
not enough that he has merely a general right to order the 
work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to 
receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations 
which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe 
alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually 
reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the 
contractor is controlled [***15] as to his methods of 
work, or as to operative detail. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965) 
(emphasis added). [HN8] In other words, to have 
"actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal 
employer must have exercised affirmative control over 
the method or operative detail of that work. See Grahn v. 
Tosco Corp., 58 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1997 Cal. App. 
LEXIS 897, *37-38, rev. denied, 1998 Cal LEXIS 494. 
"The degree of control necessary for the creation of a 
legal duty must involve either the direct management of 
the means and methods of the independent contractor's 
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that 
caused the injury." Id. 
[*P21] Although the requisite level of control over 
the contractor's manner or method of work does not rise 
to the level of creating a master-servant relationship, cf. 
Restatement § 414 cmt. a, the principal employer must 
exert such control over the means utilized that the 
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of 
the work in his or her own way. Cf. id. cmt. c. A typical 
instance in which such an exertion of control might occur 
is "when a principal contractor entrusts a part of the 
[***16] work to subcontractors, but himself or through a 
foreman superintends the entire job." Id. cmt. b. 
[*P22] The requisite level of control over the 
contractor's work is well illustrated in Lewis, 825 P. 2d at 
7-8. There, the general contractor, Riebe, hired the 
subcontractor, Garges, to install a pitched roof 
constructed of beams and sheets of plywood nailed to the 
beams. After Garges had already put the plywood in 
place, Riebe's on-site superintendent told Garges the roof 
was improperly installed and ordered it redone, 
specifying the use of H-clips to secure the plywood. 
Pursuant to this [**328] instruction, Garges employees 
began removing the nails from each row of plywood, 
installing H-clips, and then renailing the plywood to the 
beams. Soon thereafter, however, Riebe's superintendent 
instructed the Garges employees to use a different, faster 
method of dislodging the plywood by banging it from 
underneath. Because this method resulted in plywood 
being dislodged faster than H-clips could be installed, 
numerous sheets of plywood were left lying loose on top 
of the beams. A Garges employee stepped on the loose 
plywood and fell through the roof, incurring serious 
injuries. See id. 
[*P23] [***17] Thus, in Lewis, the general 
contractor interfered with the subcontractor's method of 
performing the work and instructed that a quicker but 
less safe method be implemented. A worker was injured 
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as a direct result of the dangerous condition created by 
the general contractor's method. The court concluded, on 
the basis of these facts, that the general contractor 
exercised sufficient control over the means used in 
performing the contracted work to subject it to retained 
control liability. See 825 P. 2d at 14-15. 
[*P24] Applying these standards to the case at 
hand, we conclude that Jess did not actively participate 
in the manner in which Thompson and Jensen attempted 
to lift and install the steel pipe. After agreeing to erect 
the pipe, Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for 
bringing about the desired result. Jensen decided to 
proceed with the equipment he had with him, and by 
Jensen's own design, he and Thompson set up the A-
frame for use as leverage, fastened the chain to the pipe 
using the "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch" technique, 
and hoisted the pipe with the winch on Jensen's truck. 
When this method was unsuccessful, Jensen and 
Thompson attempted to lower the pipe to the [***18] 
ground and, in the course of doing so, lost control of the 
pipe. Thompson's injury was caused by the manner of 
performance, implemented by Jensen, over which Jess 
exercised no direction, control, or supervision. The only 
control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be 
installed over the pipe stub. This amounted merely to 
control over the desired result, which is insufficient to 
come within the retained control doctrine. 
[*P25] Particularly revealing is the fact that Jensen 
returned to the site with a backhoe the day after the 
accident and erected the pipe without incident using the 
same chain-hitch method. Nothing precluded Jensen 
from retrieving the backhoe before attempting to hoist 
the pipe in the first instance. The backhoe was stored 
only two to three miles away at the time, and nothing 
suggests that Jess required Jensen to install the pipe at 
the moment of delivery. Jensen alone chose to attempt 
installation of the pipe without a backhoe. 
[*P26] Thus, because Jess did not actively 
participate in or otherwise exercise affirmative control 
over the manner or method of performance utilized by 
Jensen and Thompson, she owed Thompson no duty of 
care under the retained control doctrine. [***19] n3 The 
trial court was correct in so ruling. 
n3 We note that the term "retained control" 
doctrine is somewhat of a misnomer. Under the 
standards announced herein, a duty of care is 
imposed if the principal employer asserts 
affirmative control over or actually participates 
actively in the manner of performing the 
contracted work. "Retained," to the extent the 
word implies passivity or nonaction, is inapt. 
The term "retained control" may have a more 
syntactically correct application to sophisticated 
parties who, by contract, stipulate which party 
will control the manner or method of work or the 
safety measures to be taken-such as in contracts 
between general contractors and subcontractors 
involved in construction projects. See Dayton, 
148 P. at 411 (noting that under terms of 
contract, principal employer did not reserve right 
to direct or control prosecution of work or any of 
contractor's workers). The issue, however, of 
whether a duty of care may be imposed solely as 
a result of a such a contractual reservation is not 
before us. 
[***20] 
B. "Peculiar Risk" or "Inherently Dangerous Work" 
Doctrine 
[*P27] Thompson also relies on sections 413, 416, 
and 427 of the Restatement and urges this court to adopt 
those sections in his favor as exceptions to the general 
rule that one who employs an independent contractor is 
not liable for injuries arising out of the contract work. 
These sections are similar in wording and are commonly 
referred to as the "peculiar risk" doctrine, see, e.g., 
Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cat. 4th 689, [**329] 854 
P.2d 721, 725 (Cal 1993) (en banc), or the "inherently 
dangerous work" exception, see, e.g., Wagner v. 
ContinentalCas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d379, 421 N.W.2d835, 
840 (Wis. 1988). 
[*P28] Section 413 is premised on direct liability 
for a principal employer's negligence in failing to insure 
that special precautions are taken in the contractor's 
work. That section provides: 
§ 413. Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions 
Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to 
Contractor 
[HN9] 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to create, 
during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to others unless special [***21] 
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions 
if the employer 
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor 
shall take such precautions, or 
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some 
other manner for the taking of such precautions. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965). 
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[*P29] Sections 416 and 427 impose vicarious 
liability on the principal employer for the contractor's 
negligence, even if the employer reasonably provides for 
precautions in the contract work. Those sections state: 
§ 416. Work Dangerous in Absence of Special 
Precautions 
[HN10] 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work 
which the employer should recognize as likely to create 
during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to 
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to 
liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure 
of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such 
precautions, even though the employer has provided for 
such precautions in the contract or otherwise. 
§ 427. Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work 
[HN11] 
One who employs [***22] an independent contractor to 
do work involving a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in 
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has 
reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such 
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable 
precautions against such danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 416, 427 (1965). 
[HN12] The purpose of these sections is "to ensure that 
innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an 
independent contractor hired by a landowner to do 
inherently dangerous work on the land would not have to 
depend on the contractor's solvency in order to receive 
compensation for the injuries." Privette, 854 P.2d at 725. 
Privette held that this purpose is not advanced when 
these exceptions are applied in favor of a contractor's 
employees who are covered by workers' compensation. 
See id. at 726-30; see also Wagner, 421 N W.2d at 840-
44 (detailing reasons for not adopting sections 413, 416, 
and 427 in favor of employees of independent 
contractors). 
[*P30] We agree with Privette and Wagner and 
decline to apply section 413, 416, [***23] or 427 of the 
Restatement in the manner Thompson proposes. Whether 
based on direct negligence under section 413 or vicarious 
liability under sections 416 and 427, these provisions 
have no application when the injured person is an 
employee of the independent contractor undertaking the 
allegedly dangerous work. The majority of jurisdictions 
that have examined this issue have decided likewise. n4 
n4 See Morris v. City ofSoldotna, 553 P. 2d 
474, 481-82 (Alaska 1976); Welker v. Kennecott 
Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330, 337-
39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Jackson v. Petit Jean 
Elec. Coop., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 69 
(Ark. 1980); Privette, 854 P.2d at 726-31; Ray v. 
Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 548A.2d461, 466 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Peone v. Regulus Stud 
Mills, 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102, 105-06 
(Idaho 1987); Johns v. New York Blower Co., 
442 N.E.2d 382, 386-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); 
Dillardv. Strecker, 255 Kan. 704, 877 P.2d 371, 
385 (Kan. 1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. 
Coop. Corp., 502SW.2d659, 661-63 (Ky. 1973); 
Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md. App. 
590, 547 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1988); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165, 
466 N.E.2d 500, 502-03 (Mass. 1984); Zueck v. 
Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 
384, 390 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); Sierra Pacific 
Power Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557, 665 P.2d 
270, 273-74 (Nev. 1983); Donch v. Delta 
Inspection Services, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 567, 
398 A.2d 925, 927-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1979); New Mexico Electric Serv. Co. v. 
Montanez, 89 KM. 278, 551 P.2d 634, 637-38 
(N.M. 1976); Whitaker v. Norman, 75 NY.2d 
779, 551 NE.2d579, 580, 552 N.Y.S.2d86 (N.Y. 
1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 
NW.2d 445, 449-54 (N.D. 1994); Curless v. 
Lathrop Co., 65 Ohio App. 3d 377, 583 NE2d 
1367, 1376-78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Cooper v. 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson 
County, 628 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1981); Humphreys v. Texas Power & Light Co., 
427 S.W.2d 324, 330-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); 
Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 
Wash. 2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 428-31 (Wash. 
1981) (en banc); Wagner, 421 N W.2d at 839-44; 
Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 1029, 
1031-33 (Wyo. 1987). 
[***24] 
[**330] P31 Along with Privette and Wagner, 
Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 
384 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), is representative of those 
decisions. As expounded in Zueck, if employees of an 
independent contractor are allowed to avail themselves 
of the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous 
work exception, the principal employer is placed in an 
untenable position: he or she must anticipate activities 
that are "inherently dangerous" to the contractor's 
employees and, if the dangers inhere to the manner in 
which the work is done, protect against such dangers 
despite the fact that the employees are best able to 
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identify and address whatever hazards are involved in 
their own method of performance. Oftentimes, both the 
risks involved and the protections necessary to avoid the 
risks are beyond the principal employer's knowledge or 
capacity. Thus, to avoid the liability imposed by the 
peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work 
exception, the principal employer has an incentive to 
direct his or her own employees to do the work despite 
their lack of expertise. Such a choice would limit the 
principal employer's exposure to that under the Workers' 
Compensation [***25] Act but, at the same time, 
increase the risk of injury to the principal's employees 
and innocent third parties. Placing principal employers in 
such a position distorts the objectives of tort law, and for 
that reason, the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently 
dangerous work exception should not apply in favor of 
employees of the independent contractor performing the 
work. See Zueck, 809 S. W.2d at 387-88. 
[*P32] In addition, sections 413,416, and 427 each 
speak of liability for injury "to others," which implies 
third parties rather than employees of the independent 
contractor carrying out the contracted work. An early 
draft of the Restatement included a special note which, 
though ultimately not adopted, provided guidance on this 
point: 
Special Note. The rules stated in this Chapter are, in 
general, not applicable to make the defendant who hires 
an independent contractor liable to two classes of 
persons. 
One consists of the employees, or servants, of the 
defendant himself.... 
The other class of plaintiffs not included in this Chapter 
consists of employees of the independent contractor. . . . 
One reason why such responsibility has not developed 
has been that the [***26] workman's recovery is now, 
with relatively few exceptions, regulated by workmen's 
compensation acts. . . . While workmen's compensation 
acts do not infrequently provide for third-party liability, 
it has not been regarded as necessary to impose such 
liability upon one who hires the contractor, since it is 
expected that the cost of the workmen's compensation 
insurance will be included by the contractor in his 
contract price for the work, and so will in any case 
ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 7, Apr. 
16, 1962) ch. 15, special note at 17-18. The American 
Law Institute omitted this note due to lack of uniformity 
of the effect of the various state workers' compensation 
acts but indicated nonetheless that "certainly the 
prevailing point of view is that there is no liability on the 
part of the employer of the independent contractor." 39 
A.L.I. Proc. 244, 247 (1962); see also Monk v. Virgin 
Islands Water & Power Auth, 53 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 
(3d Cir.), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 914, 116 S Ct. 302, 133 
L. Ed. 2d 207 (1995) (referring to same language of 
tentative draft of Restatement). 
[*P33] The rationale set forth in the special note 
quoted above is [***27] persuasive and provides 
[**331] additional support for our holding that sections 
413,416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application 
to employees of independent contractors performing the 
work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections 
does not encompass such employees, but rather, innocent 
third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in 
Dayton and with Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton 
to this issue. See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 
636 (10th Cir. 1967) (concluding that phrase "to others" 
as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include 
employees of independent contractors); see also United 
States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965), cert, 
denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S Ct. 552, 15 L. Ed. 2d 470 
(1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject 
reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427). 
[*P34] Holding otherwise would create unfair and 
anomalous results under Utah's workers' compensation 
system: 
Courts and legal commentators have expressed concern 
that to allow an independent contractor's employees who 
incur work-related injuries compensable under the 
workers' compensation system to also seek damages 
under the doctrine of peculiar risk from the person who 
[***28] hired the contractor would give those 
employees an unwarranted windfall. As these authorities 
point out, to permit such recovery would give these 
employees something that is denied to other workers: the 
right to recover tort damages for industrial injuries 
caused by their employer's failure to provide a safe 
working environment. This, in effect, would exempt a 
single class of employees, those who work for 
independent contractors, from the statutorily mandated 
limits of workers' compensation. 
Privette, 854 P. 2d at 729. Furthermore, given that the 
exclusive remedy provision of the workers' 
compensation scheme limits the liability of independent 
contractors to coverage premiums, permitting an 
employee of the contractor to recover tort damages 
against the nonnegligent landowner who employed the 
contractor would allow for the inequitable result that a 
nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater 
than that of the person whose negligence actually caused 
the injury. n5 
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n5 We note that in Utah, this unfairness is 
exacerbated by the fact that an employee who 
recovers against a third party is obligated to 
reimburse the workers' compensation insurer for 
any amounts paid to or on behalf of the 
employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) 
(1997). Thus, if Thompson recovered from Jess 
for any negligence of Jensen in raising the pipe, 
he would be required to reimburse AmeriKan 
Sanitation's insurer for benefits received. Such a 
reallocation would result in Jess's being 
exclusively liable for Thompson's injuries. 
j***29] 
[*P35] In the present case, there is no question that 
Thompson was an employee of the independent 
contractor, AmeriKan Sanitation, at the time of his 
injury. He was involved in attempting to install the pipe 
and, indeed, has been receiving workers' compensation 
benefits through AmeriKan Sanitation since the accident. 
We have no reason to question the determination 
(already made as a prerequisite to Thompson's qualifying 
for such benefits) that Thompson was acting within the 
course of his employment when injured. See Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986) (noting 
that to qualify for workers' compensation benefits, injury 
must be "by accident" and must arise "in the course of 
employment"). Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
determined as a matter of law that Thompson's sole 
recourse is workers' compensation benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P36] In view of the foregoing analysis, summary 
judgment in favor of Jess was proper. 
Affirmed. 
[*P38] Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur 
in Justice Russon's opinion. 
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Eric K. Davenport, #5684 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
7351 So. Union Park Ave., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801)562-5555 
Attorneys for Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY SMITH and LISA NIELSEN, 
Individually and as Heirs of JASON 
KELLY-SMITH, Deceased, 
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HALES & WARNER CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah Corporation, 
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HALES & WARNER CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
BRC, INC. a.k.a. BRENT REYNOLDS 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF HALES & WARNER 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., AND THE 
CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
Civil No. 020401834 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Third-Party Defendant. 
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Defendant "Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Plaintiffs" and the "Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" came before this Court 
on August 20,2003. Shandor Badaruddin, Jeffrey D. Gooch and Justin T. Ashworth appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiffs; and the Plaintiffs also appeared at the hearing. Eric K. Davenport 
appeared on behalf of Hales & Warner Cof1S^^!!PAr?n^(H^remafter "Hales & Warner"); 
Clifford T. Hales of Hales & Warner was alsopFesent^Rofeert R: Wallace appeared on behalf 
of the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop offelw-Gfiwef^efitestfs Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(hereinafter the "CPB"). Steven G. Morgan appeared on behalf of BRC, Inc., aka Brent-
Reynolds Construction, inc., (hereinafter'BRC"). Oral argument was received on August 20, 
2003 from counsel for the parties. 
The Court will note that afterthe initial memoranda in "support and opposition to these 
motions had been filed, the Court held a hearing on November 19,2002, and signed an order 
on January 31,2003, which order provided that the parties "shall have until February 28,2003 
to conduct and complete additional fact discovery;" the order also referred to the filing of 
supplemental memoranda by the parties after the additional discovery referred to was 
completed. After additional discovery was conducted, Plaintiffs, Hales &Warnerand the CPB 
filed supplemental memoranda pertaining to the motions for summaryjudgment. Thereafter, 
supplemental oral argument on the motions for summaryjudgment was scheduled for August 
20, 2003, as referenced above. 
The Court, having reviewed the motions and memoranda submitted in support and in 
opposition to the motions, and having heard oral argument on the motions, hereby enters the 
? 
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following order for good cause shown: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that "Hales & Warner 
Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs" and the "Motion for 
Summary Judgment ofthe Defendant Corporation ofthe Presiding Bishop ofthe Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" are hereby granted. 
The Court finds that there are no material d i ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ W f i t c l i preclude summary 
judgment in favor of Hales & Warner or the CPB. T^^^HMS'fes-that Plaintiffs' counsel 
agreed during oral argument that there was no dispute-a-s^^tfee-material facts. 
On or about May 7,1999, the CPB entered an agreement with Hales & Warner for the 
construction of a church house for the Highland 4th and 20th Wards. On or about May 10, 
1999, Hales & Warner entered into a subcontract agreement with BRC, under which 
subcontract agreement BRC was to perform: "All of the Section 06100 Rough Carpentry 
complete, including all labor and materials, all material handling and crane time, except wood 
trusses to be supplied by others but installed by BRC, Inc." BRC entered into an oral contract 
with "Egbert Construction, Inc.," (hereinafter "Egbert Construction"), wherein BRC was to 
provide the materials, and Egbert. Construction was to provide all labor, as to the section 
06100 rough carpentry. 
Egbert Construction hired and trained Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis. 
On August 13, 1999, an Egbert Construction supervisor instructed Jason Smith, Michael 
Lewis, and Jose Louis to "put up" a wooden framed wall Egbert Construction had built. On 
August 13, 1999, Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis raised the wooden framed 
wall, and were in the process of putting the wall onto bolt studs when the wall started to fall and 
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fell on Jason Smith, causing Jason Smith's death (hereinafter the "Accident"). 
The Court finds that it is undisputed that it was Egbert Construction who hired, trained 
and educated Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis as it relates to the work being 
performed at the time of the Accident. Hales & Warner and the CPB did not hire, train or 
educate Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis as to the work they were performing at 
the time of the Accident. rzzzz i " "^ : \ 
The Court finds that it is undisputed that P l l l ^ ^ a s S n : Smith was an employee of 
Egbert Construction prior to and at the time of the-Asc-i4e-nti=-Michael Lewis and JQse Louis 
were also employees of Egbert Construction prior to and at the time of the Accident. 
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis were under the 
direction, supervision, instruction and control of Egbert Construction at the time of the 
Accident. - ~ 
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were not under the 
direction, supervision, instruction or control of Hales & Warner orthe CPB priorto and atthe 
time of the Accident. The Court finds that there is no evidence that Jason Smith, Michael 
Lewis and Jose Louis were ever under the direction, supervision, instruction, or control of 
Hales & Warner or the CPB. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB instructed 
Egbert Construction or its employees (or BRC or its employees) to do the work being 
performed at the time of the Accident in a different manner or by way of a different method. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB exerted • 
control over the means utilized by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis, in doing the 
4 
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work Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were performing at the time of the Accident, 
or that Hales & Warner or the CPB interfered with that work. 
The Court finds that the employee of Hales & Warner on the site at the time of the 
Accident was in the construction trailer and had no involvement as to the work being 
performed, and the wail being put into place, by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis 
at the time of the Accident. *TZT~TI^7~~~ I 
The Court also finds that there was no erTp^i^arreprdsentative of the CPB on the 
site at the time of the Accident, and no emplo^^i^presBntative of the CPB had any 
involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at 
the time of the Accident. 
The Court finds that the evidence indicates that it was Egbert Construction who was 
controlling the means utilized and the manner of performance "of the work being performed by 
Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at the time of the Accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision Thompson v. Jeffs, 1999 Utah 22, 972 2d. 322, is 
applicable, authoritative, and supports the Court's granting of the motions for summary 
judgment as to both Hales & Warner and the CPB. In its analysis section, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Thompson first sets forth the general rule, stating: 
Utah adheres to the general common lawrule that "the employer of an 
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an 
act or omission of the contractor or his servants." . . . This general rule 
recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not 
participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed 
owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of 
performance implemented. 
id. at ft 13 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court went on to discuss therein "certain 
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exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an employer of an independent contractor," 
including the "retained control" doctrine exception. 
The Court notes that Plaintiffs'counsel stipulated on the record in oral argument that 
if the standard for the "retained control" exception (to the general rule) set forth in Thompson 
relates to the "injury-causing aspect of the work/' that Plaintiffs cannot meet the "retained 
control7' exception, and that Defendants HalesWWamefs and the CPB's motions for 
summary judgment should be granted. " ,r [ 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not metpSffiii^n^otmeet, the "retained control" 
exception to the general rule, pursuant to the contours of thatstandard outlined in Thompson. 
In discussing the contours of the "retained control" exception and the "active participation" 
requirement pertaining thereto, the Thompson Court states, among other things: 
• In-other words,to have "actively participated" in the contracted work", a principal 
employer must have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative 
detail of that work. "The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal 
duty must involve either the direct management of the means and method of the 
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the specific equipment 
that caused the injury." 
Thompson, 1999 UT22, ^20 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court also points outthat 
there must be exertion "of such control over the means utilized that the contractor cannot carry 
out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." ]d. at ft 21. 
Hales & Warner and the CPj^. did not exert affirmative control over the method or 
operative detail of the work and did not directly manage the means and methods of Egbert 
Construction's work nor provide the specific equipment used by Egbert Construction as to the 
work Jason Smith was performing at the time of the Accident. 
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As referenced in the above quote, the standard set forth in Thompson also indicates 
that the exertion of control over the means utilized must relate to the "injury-causing aspect of 
the work." Id, (underlining added). Hales & Warner and the CPB did not exert control over 
the means utilized as to the "injury-causing aspect of the work" of Jason Smith, (even 
assuming the means utilized caused his death); rather, Egbert Construction controlled the 
means utilized as to the work Jason Smith was peffpffW^atihe time of the Accident. The 
activities of Hales & Warner and the CPB to which Plaintiffs refer did not relate to, and were 
not an exertion of control over, the work Jason-Sm#Hves-fierforming at the time of the 
accident, and did not cause the accident and death of Jason Smith. 
The Court also finds thatHales & Warner and its employees were not employees'of 
the CPB; the Court finds that Hales & Warner was an independent contractor of the CPB. 
Further, the contracts and fheirprovisions do not preclude'summary judgment in favor of Hales" 
& Warner and the CPB. 
DATED this 7 H ^ day otSeptemteer, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: ^ if w*6/,. 
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LEXSEE 699 F.SUPP 257 
TED SIMON, Plaintiff, v. DEERY OIL, a Washington corporation, and 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendants 
Civil No. 87-C-0653A 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
699 F. Supp. 257; 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13026 
November 16,1988, Decided 
CORE TERMS: contractor, ponds, independent 
contractor, general rule, summary judgment, evaporation, 
construction project, matter of law, unsafe, train, actively 
participated, active participation, tank truck, construct, 
asphaltic, sealant, laborer, sealer, rubber, duty, 
vicariously liable, non-performance, intrinsically, 
superintended, owed, actively participate, right to 
control, failure to warn, work done, temporary 
COUNSEL: 
[**1] John L. Black, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
Plaintiff. 
H. James Clegg, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
Defendant. 
JUDGES: 
Aldon J. Anderson, United States District Senior 
Judge. 
OPINIONBY: 
ANDERSON 
OPINION: 
[*257] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ALDON J. ANDERSON, SENIOR UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 1987, plaintiff Ted Simon filed a 
complaint for personal injuries arising from a work 
accident occurring during the construction of evaporation 
ponds by Deery Oil for defendant Kennecott 
Corporation. Plaintiff was accidentally burned while 
filling a portable tank truck with hot asphaltic sealer. 
Plaintiffs complaint alleges three separate claims against 
defendant Kennecott: (1) failure to warn; (2) allowing an 
unsafe operation to be performed [*258] with unsafe 
equipment; and (3) failing to require proper training of 
personnel working on defendant's property, nl 
nl The original complaint contained a cause 
of action against Deery Oil for negligence in 
maintaining the equipment and failure to properly 
train the plaintiff. Deery moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that it was the statutory 
employer of the plaintiff under the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act, entitling it to judgment as a 
matter of law. Plaintiff did not oppose Deery's 
motion, and it was subsequently granted by this 
court. 
[**2] 
Defendant Kennecott has moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that it is not liable for injuries 
occurring to employees of independent contractors when 
it does not actively participate in the construction project. 
Kennecott asserts that plaintiff worked for Deery Oil, an 
independent contractor, and that Kennecott had no duty 
to conduct safety inspecticns of Deery's equipment, nor 
to train or warn Deery's employees with respect to such 
equipment. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that 
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summary judgment should not be granted because 
Kennecott had the right to control, and, in fact, did 
control Deery's construction of the evaporation ponds. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In April of 1987, Deery Oil and Kennecott entered 
into a contract wherein Deery agreed to line certain 
evaporation ponds for the Kennecott corporation. The 
contract recognized Deery as an independent contractor 
and called for it to supply the labor, equipment, and 
materials necessary to construct a rubber and asphalt 
lining for the evaporation ponds. The contract was a 
performance contract where Deery was to construct a 
lining in accordance with its own specifications as long 
as it would be able to contain copper leachate [**3] 
solution with a minimal amount of leakage. Therefore, 
Kennecott exercised no control over the construction and 
design of the ponds. 
The construction project required a large amount of 
unskilled labor to apply the rubber matting and sealant 
that constituted the liner, and Deery contracted with SOS 
Temporary Services to supply this labor. The plaintiff 
was employed by Deery through SOS Temporary 
Services as a temporary laborer. Deery supervised all the 
work done by plaintiff and the other laborers. 
On May 6, 1987 plaintiff was burned while filling a 
Deery-owned portable tank truck with hot asphaltic 
sealer. The nozzle being operated by plaintiff was 
connected to the tank truck by means of a flexible rubber 
hose. Plaintiff was injured when a clamp connecting the 
hose to the nozzle loosened, spraying him with the 
sealer. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff claims that Kennecott is liable for the 
injuries resulting from the accident because it had the 
right to control, and, in fact, did control the construction 
project. Plaintiff asserts that Kennecott's failure to warn 
plaintiff of the inherent danger of the work and to 
properly train him on the equipment in question, as well 
as permitting an unsafe [**4] operation to be performed 
with unsafe equipment on its property, was the cause of 
plaintiffs injuries. Defendant contends that it is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law because principals are not 
liable for injuries to employees of independent 
contractors unless they actively participate in the project. 
In Utah, it is clear that a company retaining an 
independent contractor to render services has no duty to 
warn or train employees of the contractor, nor must the 
principal protect the contractor's employees from the 
contractor's own negligence, unless the principal has 
"actively participated" in the project. Dayton v. Free, 46 
Utah 277, 148 P. 408 (1914); United States v. Page, 350 
F2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965); Sewell v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1979) cert. den. 
444 U.S. 1080, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 100 S. Ct. 1031 (1980). 
In Dayton v. Free, the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the common law rule that principals are not liable to 
third parties for work done by independent contractors 
where there is no evidence "to show that the company in 
fact directed, controlled, or superintended the 
prosecution of the work, or hired or discharged 
employees, or directed, [*259] controlled, or 
superintended [**5] them in or about the work . . . ." 
148 P. at 411. See also Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 
207 P.2d 809, 811 (1949). 
The rule of Dayton has also been used by federal 
courts applying Utah law. In the case of Sewell v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274, the plaintiff was 
employed by a contractor to install underground gasoline 
tanks for Phillips Petroleum Company. Plaintiff was 
injured while working in an excavated hole. The Court of 
Appeals vacated a plaintiffs jury verdict and affirmed a 
judgment for defendant on the grounds that the jury was 
not instructed concerning the "active participation" 
requirement needed to impose liability on principals 
under Utah law: 
Plaintiffs principal theory at trial was that 
defendant "retained and exercised control" 
over the contractor's work and was 
therefore liable for plaintiffs injuries. The 
relevant jury instruction failed to explain 
the necessity for "active participation" by 
the defendant as required by Utah law.. . . 
The record clearly shows a lack of 
evidence supporting the "retained control" 
theory. . . . Appellants contention has no 
merit because the record provides the 
evidence necessary for determining that 
defendant [**6] was not liable as a 
matter of law. 
Id. at275-76. 
This is not to say that a principal can never be liable 
for injuries sustained by an employee of an independent 
contractor. The three recognized exceptions to this rule 
in Utah are: (1) where the injury was the direct result of 
the stipulated work; (2) where the work was intrinsically 
dangerous, and the injury was the consequence of the 
failure of the contractor to take appropriate precautions; 
and (3) where the injury was caused by the non-
performance of a absolute (non-delegable) duty owed by 
the principal to the plaintiff, individually or to the class 
of person to which he belongs. Dayton v. Free, 148 P. at 
411 (citing 1 Labatt's Mast. & Serv. § 41). These 
exceptions, in one form or another, are recognized in 
most jurisdictions. See e.g. Wilson v. Good Humor 
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Corp., 244 U.S. App. B.C. 298, 757 F.2d 1293, 1303 
(D.C.Cir. 1985) (exception to general rule that 
employers are not vicariously liable for torts of their 
independent contractors exists when employer engages 
independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous 
work); Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 
1217 (8th Cir. 1979) cert. den. 444 U.S. 1033, 62 L. Ed. 
2d 669, 100 S. Ct. 704 (1980) (Under "nondelegable 
[**7] duties" exception to general rule that employers 
are not vicariously liable for torts of their independent 
contractors, a principal may be liable if the work to be 
performed is likely to create a peculiar unreasonable risk 
of physical harm or if a special danger is inherent or 
normal to the work). 
In the instant case, plaintiff argues that the fact 
Kennecott required a list of general safety rules to be 
incorporated into the contract shows that Kennecott 
retained tight control and, presumably, actively 
participated in the construction project. This 
requirement, however, does not rise to the level of active 
participation by Kennecott. Deery clearly had the right to 
construct the ponds as it saw fit, the only requirement 
being that the ponds retain the copper solution with 
minimal leakage. Deery supplied all the labor, equipment 
and materials for the project. In addition, Deery 
supervised and trained all of the temporary laborers. 
With this in mind, it cannot be seriously contended that 
Kennecott actively participated in the construction of the 
ponds. 
Moreover, there is no indication that plaintiff falls 
within any of the exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability. First, plaintiff [**8] was injured as a result of 
the manner the work was to be performed, by 
transferring asphaltic sealant from the truck to the ponds. 
Thus, the injury was not caused from the act of 
performance, but from the manner of performance, over 
which Deery had control. 
Second, transferring sealant from a truck is not an 
ultrahazardous or intrinsically dangerous activity. If the 
transfer is done in the proper manner with proper 
equipment, then the workers are in no danger of being 
injured. 
Third, the injury was not caused by the non-
performance of a duty that Kennecott [*260] owed the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff has made no showing that Kennecott 
failed to perform a duty that it owed to the plaintiff. In 
fact, the contract specifically places on Deery all 
responsibility for the supervision and construction of the 
ponds. 
In sum, plaintiff does not fit within any of the 
recognized exceptions to the general rule that principals 
are not liable for injuries to the employees of 
independent contractors. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law provides that companies are not liable for 
injuries to employees of independent contractors unless 
the company actively participates or controls the project 
to be done by the independent contractor. [**9] It has 
been clearly shown that Kennecott retained no control 
over the project to construct the evaporation ponds. 
Moreover, plaintiff does not fit within any of the 
recognized exceptions to this general rule of non-
liability. Therefore, this court holds that defendant 
Kennecott corporation is not liable as a matter of law and 
grants summary judgment in its favor. 
DATED this 16 day of November, 1988. 
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Appeal From The United States District Court For The 
District Of Utah Central Division (D.C. #C 74-40) 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant independent 
contractor filed an action against appellee landowner 
seeking damages for injuries sustained while working on 
the landowner's premises. The United States District 
Court for the District Of Utah Central Division entered a 
verdict in favor of the independent contractor, which the 
court reversed and remanded. On remand, judgment was 
entered in favor of the landowner. The independent 
contractor appealed. 
OVERVIEW: The independent contractor claimed that 
the landowner, who had contracted with the independent 
contractor's employer regarding the installation of 
gasoline tanks, was liable for the independent 
contractor's injuries because the landowner retained and 
exercised control over the work. The court reversed and 
remanded the initial verdict in favor of the independent 
contractor because the "retained control" jury instruction 
that was given at trial failed to explain the necessity for 
active participation by the landowner as required by Utah 
law and the evidence failed to support the independent 
contractor's alternative theories. On remand, the parties 
agreed to submit the liability issue to the trial judge on 
the basis of the trial record. The court held that (1) the 
independent contractor's arguments, which were raised 
previously, were not persuasive because no further 
evidence was produced on remand; (2) there was a lack 
of evidence supporting the "retained control" theory; and 
(3) the alternative business invitee theory had no merit 
because the danger, which arose from the work 
performed, was readily apparent and the landowner had 
no duty to guard against such an obvious danger. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment in favor 
of the landowner. 
CORE TERMS: independent contractor, duty, sloping, 
contractor, precautions, new trial, excavation, pit, 
safeguards, shoring, prior decision, gasoline, tank, prior 
appeal, misstatements, ordinance, earlier decision, 
excavated, punitive damages, cause of action, matter of 
law, perpendicular, non-delegable, disciplinary, injustice, 
drawing, cave-in, reopen, active participation, manifest 
injustice 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises 
LiabilityTorts > Negligence > Duty > Duty Generally 
[HN1] A landowner is under no duty to guard against an 
obvious danger under the business invitee theory of 
liability. 
COUNSEL: 
Samuel King, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant. 
Ray R. Christensen of Christensen, Gardiner, Jensen 
& Evans and Chris Wangsgard of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
appellee. 
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JUDGES: 
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and DOYLE and 
McKAY, Circuit Judges. 
OPINIONBY: 
SETH 
OPINION: 
[*275] 
We previously considered this case in Sewell v. 
Phillips Petroleum Company, Inc., Nos. 76-1030-31 
(10th Cir. March 21, 1977). We held there that the 
crucial "retained control" jury instruction for imputing 
liability to an owner for injuries caused by a negligent 
independent contractor was erroneous, and that the 
evidence clearly failed to support plaintiffs alternative 
theories for imposing liability on the defendant. We 
reversed the general verdict in favor of plaintiff and 
remanded for a new trial. The parties stipulated to the 
trial judge on remand that no issue remained to be 
determined and agreed to submit the liability issue to the 
trial judge on the basis of the trial record. They also 
agreed that if the trial judge found in favor of plaintiff on 
the [**2] liability issue, then the case would proceed to 
a jury for a determination of damages. Since there was 
no further evidence to be presented, the trial judge 
entered judgment for the defendant in light of our 
holding. 
Appellant complains here that he was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, and that our previous 
holding relied on misstatements of the facts in the 
defendant's brief. He also maintains entitlement to 
remand on the punitive damages issue which we 
considered and denied in our previous holding. 
We believe it unnecessary to reiterate the relevant 
facts because they are discussed in detail in our previous 
holding. The case involved a suit for damages for 
injuries sustained by plaintiff while working in an 
excavated eleven-foot hole. Plaintiff was employed by 
Harvey W. Eckman & Associates which had contracted 
with the defendant to install 10,000-gallon gasoline 
storage tanks at defendant's gasoline stations. Plaintiffs 
principal theory at trial was that defendant "retained and 
exercised control" over the contractor's work and was 
therefore liable for plaintiffs injuries. [*276] The 
relevant jury instruction failed to explain the necessity 
for "active participation" [**3] by the defendant as 
required by Utah law. United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 
28 (10th Cir.); Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408. 
We noted further that no evidence presented at trial 
indicated the defendant could be held liable under this 
theory or the alternative theories. 
Appellant raises here the same issues discussed 
previously. No further evidence was produced on 
remand. We see no purpose in repeating the basis for 
our previous holding. Appellant's arguments are simply 
unpersuasive. 
We do address, however, the contention that the 
previous holding relied on misstatements in the 
defendant's brief. The record clearly shows a lack of 
evidence supporting the "retained control" theory. 
Furthermore, on plaintiffs alternative business invitee 
theory, the danger arose from the work performed on the 
premises and was readily apparent to the plaintiff. 
[HN1] Defendant was under no duty to guard against 
such an obvious danger. Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 
237 (10th Cir.). Appellant's contention has no merit 
because the record provides the evidence necessary for 
determining that defendant was not liable as a matter of 
law. 
AFFIRMED. 
CONCURBY: 
McKAY 
CONCUR: 
McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring [**4] in the 
result: 
Although I believe that the dissenting opinion may 
correctly characterize the result which should have been 
reached in the prior appeal brought in this case, I believe 
the instant appeal is in substance only a much-belated 
petition for rehearing. Rightly or wrongly, the issues that 
divide the other panel members were decided in the 
earlier appeal, and the time for asking this court's 
reconsideration of its determination has long since 
expired. All purported defects in the earlier disposition 
would have been known to appellant during the period in 
which filing for rehearing would have been timely. I 
therefore agree with the decision to affirm. 
Nonetheless, I believe a troubling subsidiary matter 
should be addressed. There appears to be a substantial 
likelihood that disciplinary proceedings are in order. If 
counsel for appellant is correct, counsel for appellee 
deliberately misstated material facts to this court in the 
brief he filed in the prior appeal. If counsel for appellee 
is correct, counsel for appellant has leveled false charges 
of serious professional impropriety against a member of 
the bar. Both charges are extremely grave. If either is 
true, disciplinary [**5] sanctions are in order. 
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We have not investigated the charges and 
countercharges raised in this case, nor is such an 
undertaking the proper responsibility of this court in the 
first instance. I am, however, mailing a copy of this 
opinion to the Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, of 
which both attorneys are members, for their appropriate 
disposition. I will also direct the clerk of this court to 
supply the Commissioners with copies of the relevant 
materials. 
In a growing number of cases, adversarial rivalry 
has degenerated into accusations of unethical conduct. 
This court will not tolerate false charges of this variety. 
Neither will it abide the filing of dishonest statements by 
practitioners. We expect the highest standard of care by 
attorneys in correctly citing facts and cases. If necessary, 
when deliberate or grossly negligent miscitations occur, 
we will strike the briefs and leave the clients who are 
damaged thereby to malpractice remedies. We intend to 
apply an equal standard to false accusations of unethical 
conduct. 
When misstatements of the type discussed here do 
occur, opposing counsel should note the errors in a 
responsive brief. Misconduct should not be so 
characterized [**6] in the briefs on appeal, lest the 
argument shift to focusing on the integrity of 
practitioners rather than the substantive issues raised in 
the appeal. Where the misstatements suggest the 
likelihood of misconduct, opposing counsel should file a 
charge with the appropriate bar authorities. We will 
ourselves be alert to whether the challenged [*277] 
statements suggest the propriety of disciplinary 
proceedings and will, as in the instant case, initiate 
appropriate action when the opposing attorney has not 
already done so. 
Having outlined our views in this matter generally, 
we repeat that we express no view at this time 
concerning which attorney is correct in the instant 
dispute. We assume that the matter will be resolved in a 
more appropriate forum so that the rights of the litigants 
will not be further affected by this controversy. 
I am authorized to state that SETH, C. J., concurs in 
the views expressed in this opinion on the matter of 
professional misconduct on the part of attorneys who 
practice before us. 
DISSENTBY: 
DOYLE 
DISSENT: 
WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. 
This case was appealed on a previous occasion. It 
was reversed and remanded [**7] for a new trial. The 
panel, with the exception of Chief Judge Seth, was 
different on the prior appeal. 
The complaint was originally filed in this case on 
February 8, 1974. Plaintiff was injured as a result of the 
cave-in of an excavation wall in a pit in which he was 
working. This excavation was made on behalf of 
Phillips Petroleum Company, the defendant herein. The 
depth of this was 11'6 . The sides, however, were 
perpendicular and it is said that this is what caused it to 
cave. 
It is not disputed that both the Uniform Building 
Code which was in effect in Salt Lake City and also 
OSHA, the United States agency, which was concerned 
with employee safety, required sloping and shoring. See 
United States v. Dye Construction Company, 510 F.2d 
78 (10th Cir. 1975). 
In this instance the pit was excavated for the purpose 
of installing a gasoline storage tank at a retail service 
station. An independent contractor performed the work. 
However, he did not apply for a permit. Had he done so 
there would have been an inspection together with orders 
requiring the sloping in accordance with the city 
ordinance and OSHA regulations. 
The evidence established that the ^particular 
excavation was [**8] one of a large number in Salt Lake 
City by Phillips in order to store unleaded gasoline. 
Phillips was fully aware of the manner of excavating and 
was aware that it was illegal. There was evidence to 
show that proceeding without a permit and not sloping or 
shoring was the policy of Phillips. The evidence also 
showed that Phillips furnished the blueprint or plan for 
the excavation and installation of the tank. This called 
for a pit with perpendicular walls. 
Plaintiff made the mistake of appealing the trial 
court's denial of punitive damages. The defendant cross-
appealed the judgment on the merits. This court rejected 
plaintiffs appeal and adopted that of Phillips. The theory 
was that Phillips was shielded by the independent 
contractor concept. 
The source of this disagreement goes back to the 
first appeal following the original trial of the case. The 
trial had been to a jury in early October 1975. On that 
occasion special interrogatories were submitted to the 
jury, and as a consequence of the jury's responses a 
verdict in the amount of $ 25,000 was returned in favor 
of the plaintiff. In answering the interrogatories, the jury 
responded that the defendant Phillips Petroleum [**9] 
Company was the proximate cause of the injury to the 
degree of 100%. Judgment was entered accordingly. 
The appeal which is referred to above followed. 
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This court reversed in an opinion filed March 21, 
1977. It emphasized that Mr. Eckman had been 
employed by Phillips under an explicit contract which 
provided that he was an independent contractor. He was 
to dig an 11'6 pit in which the gasoline tank would be 
placed. In general, this court's opinion followed the 
proposition that in order to impose liability on the 
defendant, considering that Eckman was an independent 
contractor, it would have to appear that an exception 
existed to nonliability for torts of an independent 
contractor. The court went on to find that such exception 
was not present. 
[*278] The basis on which the verdict was 
rendered at the trial was that Phillips, in truth, controlled 
the project; that it was hazardous to fail to perform 
sloping and shoring in a pit this deep; that such sloping 
and shoring was required by the County of Salt Lake and 
also by OSHA, a federal agency. It was also brought out 
that Phillips was fully aware of the fact that these 
precautions which were required by law had not been 
[**10] taken. Indeed, Phillips prepared the drawings 
and specifications which called for a perpendicular pit 
and which did not provide for sloping or shoring. It was 
also shown that this particular contractor was regularly 
employed, had excavated a large number of these in 
accordance with Phillips' plans, and with the full 
knowledge of Phillips. These facts resulted in Phillips 
having independent responsibility for the injury. 
The opinion of this court remanded the case for a 
new trial. However, the trial judge concluded that he was 
unable to conduct a new trial in view of the decision. 
The court proceeded to enter an order of dismissal of the 
complaint with prejudice. In that order of dismissal it 
was pointed out that the contract provided that the 
contractor was to be an independent contractor, who 
would provide the necessary materials and labor, get the 
necessary licenses and observe all laws in excavating the 
premises and installing the tanks. The wording of the 
contract also provided that the contractor was to have 
complete control over the work. 
While plaintiff, the order continued, was working on 
the excavation, a cave-in occurred causing his injuries. 
"There had been no [**11] sloping of the sides of the 
excavation as local law required. The plans for the work 
were provided by the defendant and contained no 
requirement of sloping." A representative of defendant 
had visited the project occasionally and the company, 
from past experience, could expect bidders would follow 
the plan provided. No Phillips' representative was 
present when it happened. 
The trial court wrote that it had first granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis 
that defendant was insulated from responsibility, but 
upon reconsideration it became persuaded that it was a 
case that presented a jury question considering that the 
defendant company had vast experience in excavation 
and installation work, had an engineering department 
trained in this kind of work, and "in this very community 
had previously contracted for many such jobs and been 
familiar with the local law requiring sloping, 
notwithstanding that the company drew plans leaving out 
sloping, an expensive addition, and put it out to bid." The 
court said that since the company had gained an 
economic benefit from putting out a job for bid with a 
drawing for the work without sloping, the issue of 
whether this was [**12] negligence should be presented 
to the jury on the theory that such may be an exercise of 
control that would deprive the company of the protection 
of the contract which placed responsibility with the 
independent contractor. The court then went on to say: 
The case was presented to the jury 
and plaintiff was awarded a verdict of $ 
25,000. Plaintiff appealed the court's 
dismissal of the claim of punitive 
damages and defendant cross-appealed, 
contending there were no issues of fact for 
the jury and that, as a matter of law, 
judgment should be entered in favor of 
defendant no cause of action on plaintiffs 
complaint. The case was argued to the 
Court of Appeals in November, 1976, and 
on March 21, 1977, the Court handed 
down its decision reversing the judgment 
and remanding the case for a new trial. 
Thereafter the trial court met with 
counsel for the parties to hold a pretrial in 
preparation for a retrial. It was stipulated 
that all of the evidence had been presented 
at the first trial and that the matter should 
be presented to the trial court, based on 
the records and brief of counsel, for its 
decision. 
The court has carefully reviewed the 
facts in the record, the [**13] ruling of 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, the briefs of counsel and, 
deeming itself folly advised, enters the 
following as its ruling and verdict in the 
matter. 
[*279] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that defendant be granted a verdict of no 
cause of action on plaintiffs complaint. 
The court believes that under the 
facts and the law provided by the Circuit 
this is the only verdict that could be 
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entered. On page 3 of the opinion of the 
Appellate Court the Court ruled: 
There is no question that Eckman was 
an independent contractor. 
To impose liability on the defendant 
there must be shown an exception to the 
general rule of non-liability for torts of an 
independent contractor either through the 
exercise by the defendant of control over 
a delegable duty, or by showing a non-
delegable duty. 
The opinion then proceeds to 
demonstrate that neither of the two 
alternatives is present in this case. It 
follows, therefore, that plaintiff can 
establish no basis for liability. 
In holding that the defendant retained 
no control of the work (over a delegable 
duty), the Court said: 
There was shown no active 
participation [**14] in the work by 
defendant's inspections of the job site. 
The defendant never exercised control of 
the work and Eckman was under a 
contractual duty to comply with proper 
procedures. 
(a)lthough the drawings and 
specifications did not specify sloping, 
they in themselves did not show control in 
the absence of some affirmative act. 
The defendant, on this record, did not 
retain control of the work. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Since the parties have no more 
evidence to present, this ruling is 
determinative in this alternative. 
As to the possibility of its being a 
situation of a non-delegable duty, the 
Appellate Court said: 
As for nondelegable duties which are 
described as being "inherently dangerous" 
. . . this Circuit has expressed "serious 
doubts as to whether the doctrine of non-
delegable duty as here involved applies to 
injuries of employees of the independent 
contractor." 
In concluding the opinion, the Court added: 
In any event, the defendant owed no 
duty to Plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) 
With the parties stipulating there is 
no more evidence to present, under the 
opinion of the Circuit there is nothing left 
to try. 
Judgment, [**15] therefore, should 
be, and is, entered for defendant, no cause 
of action on plaintiffs complaint. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 
1977. 
I have quoted and shown the trial court's opinion on 
remand in detail for the reason that it shows, in my 
opinion, that the trial court was somewhat startled to 
receive this court's opinion, and I must confess that I had 
similar feelings when I first heard the case on the present 
appeal. My first exposure to the case was the occasion 
of oral arguments on the second appeal. 
Being of the opinion that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice, it is my conclusion that the 
judgment of the district court should be at this time 
reinstated in the interest of justice. Such action has been 
taken on past occasions. 
The reason for my dissent is my conviction that the 
concept of independent contractor is capable of 
shrouding a great many sins; that it will not succeed 
where, as here, a statute or ordinance imposes a duty to 
provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety 
of others. This is expressed in the Restatement (Second), 
of Torts § 424, which provides: 
Precautions Required by Statute or Regulation 
One who by statute or [**16] by 
administrative regulation is under a duty 
to provide specified safeguards or 
precautions for the safety of others is 
subject to liability to the others for whose 
protection the duty is imposed for harm 
caused by the failure of a contractor 
employed by him to provide such 
safeguards or precautions. 
[*280] So, under this principle, the owner will not 
be heard to say that it was the duty of the contractor to 
fulfill the duties imposed by statute. This is because the 
duty is on the owner to comply with the law and he 
cannot pass the buck. If he could, avoidance would be 
quite simple. The owner could avoid the law by entering 
an airtight contract with an "independent contractor." 
The guiding principles are set forth in somewhat 
more detail and clarity in an annotation reported in 41 
Am Jur.2d Independent Contractors §37 (1968), at 799-
800: 
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Generally speaking there are many 
situations in which a person cannot 
absolve himself from liability by 
delegating his duties to an independent 
contractor. An employer has a 
nondelegable duty with respect to the 
taking of precautions during work which 
is dangerous in the absence of such 
precautions, which is inherently or 
intrinsically [**17] dangerous, or which 
from its nature is likely to render the 
premises dangerous to invitees, and also 
has a nondelegable duty with respect to 
the conduct of ultrahazardous work. 
Where a person, either by contract or by 
law, owes an obligation to another, he 
cannot escape liability for negligence in 
performance of such obligation by 
delegating the duty to an independent 
contractor. Thus, if a statute or ordinance 
requires a person to take certain 
precautions when work is being done, and 
such precautions are not taken, it is no 
defense that an independent contractor 
was employed to do the work and that the 
failure to take the precautions was due to 
the contractor's negligence. Likewise, one 
who, by a specific agreement, undertakes 
to do some particular thing, or to do it in a 
certain manner, cannot, by employing an 
independent contractor, avoid 
responsibility for an injury resulting from 
the nonperformance of any duty or duties 
which, under the express terms of the 
agreement or by implication of law, are 
assumed by the undertaker. An exception 
to the general rule of nonliability of an 
employer for the negligence of an 
independent contractor or the latter's 
servants exists where the [**18] 
employer has assumed a contractual 
obligation to perform the work. 
At bar we have an activity which is inherently 
hazardous. The hazard is recognized by statute and 
ordinance. In addition, we have an owner who provides 
plans which do not attempt to adopt safeguards. In fact, it 
knowingly encourages the doing of the work without 
taking safeguards. Phillips would be liable for the failure 
of the contractor to follow its orders. It is certainly liable 
where the contractor follows its orders and thereby 
creates the risk. 
One recent example is that which occurred in Pierce 
v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975). In Pierce 
v. Cook & Co., the action was for wrongful death in an 
automobile collision. The truck driver had been hauling 
wheat for the defendant-appellee in the case, Cook & 
Co., Inc. The trial court entered summary judgment. 
This was appealed and affirmed by this court. The 
judgment became final in 1971. The accident had 
actually happened in 1968. Relief was sought in the 
federal court based upon a change of law in the 
Oklahoma state court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
had overruled the prior decision which had strictly 
applied the independent contractor rule [**19] and had 
concluded that where there is a foreseeable risk of harm 
to others unless precautions are taken, one who is 
regularly engaged in a commercial enterprise as an 
integral part of the business is responsible for failure to 
exercise care in selecting a competent carrier. Failure to 
do so rendered him liable. 
When this change of law was announced, a motion 
for relief was filed by the aggrieved party under Rule 
60(b). Notwithstanding that this court's prior decision 
had become final in 1971, relief was granted following 
presentation of the case to this court en banc. The cause 
had been removed to federal court, and after the state 
court rule was changed, we held in an opinion by Judge 
Breitenstein that in this extraordinary condition, the 
plaintiff was the victim of an injustice, and although we 
did not reverse [*281] the decision of the trial court, we 
commended the Rule 60(b) motion to it. 
While an appellate court will generally refuse to 
reopen a final judgment entered in a prior appeal, it will 
do so when substantial justice warrants. See 9 Moore's 
Federal Practice P 110.25(2), at 274-75 (2d ed. 1975). 
The law of the case doctrine bars a second review of 
established [**20] law unless compelling circumstances 
warrant the action. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that an 
appellate court may review its earlier decision in a case 
and reopen that case when circumstances warrant it. See 
Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 32 S. Ct. 739, 56 
L. Ed. 1152 (1912). 
Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1363 (10th Cir. 
1977), Cert, denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S Ct. 1458, 55 L. 
Ed. 2d 499 (1978), recognized that this court could 
depart from its own earlier decision in the identical case 
when circumstances warranted such departure. 
Other circuits have also recognized that where 
circumstances warrant reopening of an earlier appellate 
decision in the same case, such procedure may be 
pursued. 
The Eighth Circuit has said that the earlier judgment 
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous and 
manifestly unjust. See Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. 
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Saunders Archery Co., 578 F.2d 727, 730-31 (8th Cir. 
1978). 
The Fifth Circuit has said that a second review is 
permissible "if considerations of substantial justice 
warrant it." Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 
663 (5th Cir. 1974), Cert, denied, 420 U.S. 929, 95 S. Ct. 
1128, 43 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1975). Clearly a prior decision 
[**21] is not to be reopened and reversed except upon 
the basis of cogent reasons and to avoid manifest 
injustice. See Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' 
Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 19-20 (5th Cir.), Cert, dismissed, 
419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 246, 42 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1974). 
The Sixth Circuit has refused to review a prior 
decision unless a new statute or intervening Supreme 
Court decision raises questions as to the viability of the 
earlier decision. Hawkes v. Internal Revenue Service, 
507F.2d481, 482 n.l (6th Cir. 1974). 
In one instance the First Circuit refused to reopen a 
civil case, but recognized that it could be done in the 
case in which the previous error constituted a manifest 
injustice. White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312, 317 (1st Cir. 
1974). 
In the present case the mix-up occurred because of 
the fact that the contract between Phillips Petroleum 
Company and the independent contractor purported to 
place all of the responsibility on the independent 
contractor, but when the case was tried a far different 
condition was revealed. It was shown that Phillips in 
actuality had exercised a good deal of control over the 
project and that it was the author of the plans which took 
the less expensive [**22] way out, that of not taking 
steps to prevent cave-ins. Thus, where it had control of 
the condition and acted negligently, that is, where it 
could reasonably foresee that a workman was going to be 
injured from this practice, it should be held responsible 
to the workman for its own negligent conduct. That is 
what the trial court held and that is the correct approach 
to the case. It is an approach that is not at odds with 
Utah law. 
Here we have an activity that was contrary to law, 
both local and federal, which plainly created a hazard 
and thus the trial court was plainly correct in the first 
case in submitting the case to the jury. The jury's verdict 
was well founded both in law and in fact. A plain 
injustice occurred as a result of the reversal. The trial 
court was unable to carry out the mandate which ordered 
a new trial because the law of the case contained in this 
court's decision closed the door to a new trial. There was 
nothing for the trial court to do except vacate the 
judgment based upon the jury verdict and enter judgment 
for Phillips, which it did. 
In this case the injustice which the litigant has 
suffered is clear. There is not and was not any way 
which would allow [**23] Phillips to shift responsibility 
to the contractor. To allow it to do so constituted grave 
error which should be corrected. 
The case should be reopened in the interest of 
justice. 
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LEXSEE 396 F2D 237 
TEXACO, INC., Appellant, v. Jimmy N. PRUITT, Appellee 
No. 9595 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
396 F.2d237; 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6648 
June 6,1968 
DISPOSITION: [**1] 
Affirmed. 
CORE TERMS: horsehead, rod, walking beam, pump, 
bolt, servicing, bottom, beam, duty, polished, pumping, 
clamp, caught, safe place to work, guard, legal duty, 
cable, latent, diesel engine, elevator, carrier, derrick, 
surface, top, general contractor, contractor, concealed, 
insurance carrier, stuffing box, bumping 
JUDGES: 
Murrah, Chief Judge, Marvin Jones, * Judge Court 
of Claims, and Breitenstein, Circuit Judge. 
* Sitting by designation. 
OPINIONBY: 
MURRAH 
OPINION: 
[*239] MURRAH, Chief Judge. 
While Sayer's Well Servicing Company, Inc. was 
servicing a pump on a Utah oil well owned by defendant-
appellant Texaco, Inc., plaintiff-appellee Pruitt, an 
employee of Sayer's, was seriously injured when a piece 
of the pumping equipment known as a "horsehead" fell 
upon him. Having collected workmen's compensation as 
an employee of Sayer's, Pruitt brought this action against 
Texaco, alleging that Texaco negligently permitted the 
horsehead to fall, nl Texaco denied any negligence, 
asserting that Sayer's negligence caused the accident, and 
in any event, that Pruitt was contributorily negligent. 
Texaco appeals from a substantial judgment on a jury 
verdict. We affirm. 
nl The basis of this suit is § 35-1-62 of the 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, which 
provides that when an injury to an employee is 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
person not in the same employment, the injured 
employee may claim workmen's compensation 
and may also have an action for damages against 
the third person. 
[**2] 
The pumping unit involved in the accident consists 
of three main pieces - a horsehead, a walking beam and 
a tripod. The "horsehead" is a large metal object shaped 
roughly like the head of its namesake. It is attached to 
one end of the "walking beam" ~ a long horizontal metal 
beam similar to a girder. The center of the walking beam 
rests upon and is affixed to the tripod, which acts as its 
fulcrum. A pump jack is attached to the other end of the 
walking beam and, when actuated, creates a seesaw 
motion of the beam. 
Two steel cables called "bridles" hang down from 
the top of the horsehead. They are attached to a "polished 
rod" which extends through a "stuffing box" and is 
attached to rods which operate the pump at the bottom of 
the well. Propelled by the seesaw movement of the 
walking beam, the rods move up and down inside tubing, 
through which the oil is pumped to the surface. 
The evidence shows that the horsehead is about 13 
feet long and weighs approximately 2000 pounds. It has 
a groove on its back side which fits over a two-inch "lip" 
on the top of the walking beam. Near the bottom of the 
beam both the horsehead and beam have a two-inch slot 
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through which a bolt is inserted. [**3] An employee of 
the manufacturer of the pumping unit testified that this 
particular unit calls for a 3/4 inch bolt. He also explained 
that the purpose of the bolt is twofold: (1) to keep the 
horsehead on the beam in case a rod breaks in the well, 
and (2) to hold the horsehead in place after it is centered 
with two adjusting screws. 
Texaco maintained a production foreman and 
several employees in the field who made daily visits to 
the wells, and had the responsibility of maintaining and 
servicing the surface pumping units. Texaco had a 
contract with Sayer's and another well servicing 
company to service the pump at the bottom of each well. 
Two or three days prior to the date of the accident, 
the surface pumping unit on the well in question was 
operating but no oil was being produced. The other 
servicing company (Falco) was called in to "trip the sub-
surface pump", n2 but when its efforts proved 
unsuccessful, Sayer's was asked to "bump bottom and 
space the pump". To perform this operation, Sayer's shut 
down the pump and [*240] raised a 65 foot portable 
derrick directly over the well. Cables were then run from 
a diesel engine beside the derrick up through the top of 
the derrick [**4] and down to the polished rod. Three 
objects referred to as a block, hook and elevator were 
affixed to the end of the cable, and apparently were used 
to attach the cable to the polished rod. After the bridles 
were disengaged, the rods were lowered several feet 
further into the well so as to put pressure on the pump at 
the bottom. The purpose of the operation is to "seat" the 
pump more firmly at the bottom of the well and dislodge 
any foreign material that might be interfering with the 
pump's operation. The operator of the diesel engine was 
in the process of lifting the rods when the horsehead fell 
from the walking beam onto Pruitt, who was working at 
the stuffing box immediately under the horsehead. 
N2 This operation involves pulling the string 
of rods from the well and hanging them on the 
derrick, pulling the pump from the bottom of the 
well to the surface, checking the pump and then 
returning it to the bottom, and replacing all of the 
rods. 
The trial judge submitted the question of Texaco's 
negligence to the [**5] jury, but instructed as a matter of 
law that Pruitt was not contributorily negligent. The 
jury's verdict in favor of Pruitt was necessarily based 
upon a finding that Texaco's negligence caused the 
injury. 
Texaco's initial contention is that the trial judge 
should have directed a verdict in its favor for want of any 
evidence of actionable negligence on its part. But the 
sufficiency of the evidence must be adjudged in the light 
of the rule of law by which Texaco's legal liability is to 
be determined. We are brought, therefore, to a 
consideration of the nature of the legal duty owed by 
Texaco to Sayer's employees and the situations under 
which this duty becomes operative. 
It is the general rule, applicable in Utah, that an 
owner of premises or the general contractor of work 
being performed thereon, who has neither reserved nor 
exercised direction or control over the particular work 
being performed by a contractor or subcontractor, as the 
case may be, owes no legal duty to provide an employee 
of the contractor or subcontractor "a safe place to work * 
* * or to guard him against dangers incident to or created 
by the prosecution of the work, and certainly not to guard 
or protect him [**6] against the negligence of those who 
had employed him or with whom he labored." Dayton v. 
Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 412. See also Titan Steel 
Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542. Such an owner or general 
contractor is, however, under a legal duty to warn or 
guard against concealed or latent conditions of danger on 
the premises of which he has or ought to have knowledge 
and of which the employee has none. See Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753; Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 
supra. And see also United States Steel v. Warner, 378 
F.2d 995; Demarest v. T. C. Bateson Const. Co., 370 
F.2d281. 
Although the pretrial order defining the triable 
issues left in dispute Texaco's ownership and control of 
the pumping equipment, the case was apparently tried 
and submitted to the jury on the assumption that Texaco, 
as the owner and operator of the well, contracted to 
Sayer's the performance of the work which was being 
done at the time of the accident. There is no evidence to 
indicate that any Texaco employee was present or had 
anything to do with Sayer's servicing operation. In any 
event, there is nothing in the [**7] record to indicate 
that the issue of control was submitted to the jury. We 
think it is clear that Texaco exercised no direction or 
control over the particular work being performed, and 
therefore, had only the duty of warning or guarding 
Sayer's employees against concealed or latent conditions 
of danger on the premises. The issue then must be 
whether Texaco allowed the horsehead to be insecurely 
fastened to the walking beam so as to create a latent 
condition of danger, or whether, as Texaco contends, the 
horsehead was pulled off the beam by Sayer's servicing 
rig-
The evidence was conflicting, and mostly 
speculative, as to the cause of the accident. An employee 
of Falco testified that the horsehead was taken off when 
his company serviced the well two or three days prior to 
the accident, and he noticed that the bolt removed was 
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[*241] a 5/8 inch rather than the prescribed 3/4 inch 
bolt. He further testified that even though the bolt was 
"smaller than * * * normal", he directed another 
employee to put it back in the horsehead because "we 
don't change any bolts". Two witnesses for Texaco 
testified that a bolt removed from the walking beam the 
day after the accident was a 3/4 inch [**8] bolt. A 
Saver's employee testified that he recalled "seeing that 
the elevator caught the horsehead and raised it up." He 
admitted, however, that he was not "hundred per cent 
sure". Other witnesses testified that the elevator was 
above the horsehead during the "bumping" operation. 
The operator of the diesel engine testified that the 
engine's weight indicator gauge showed no sudden 
increase in weight while the rods were being lifted. He 
explained that if something on his cable had caught the 
horsehead, a "very fast" weight increase would have 
registered on the gauge. 
We have repeatedly held "that a verdict may not be 
directed unless the evidence points all one way and is 
susceptible of no reasonable inferences which sustain the 
position of the party against whom the motion is made." 
United States Steel v. Warner, supra, at p. 998. See also 
Christopherson v. Humphrey, 366 F.2d 323. It is too 
clear for argument that the evidence here is not all one 
way in favor of Texaco. The case was for the jury under 
the applicable rule of legal duty and liability. 
Texaco next complains that the trial judge 
prescribed an erroneous legal duty of care when he 
instructed [**9] the jury that Texaco had the 
"continuous duty * * to use reasonable care and prudence 
to furnish the employees of Sayer's * * with a reasonably 
safe place within which to perform their work." Texaco 
saved its record by specifically objecting to the use of the 
phrase "safe place to work" to describe Texaco's duty to 
Pruitt. The objection and the argument here is that 
although Texaco owed invitee Pruitt the duty to "use 
reasonable care", the duty to provide a safe place to work 
was owed by Pruitt's employer, Sayer's, not Texaco. 
The phrase "safe place to work" has been loosely 
used to characterize both the duties of an employer 
incident to the prosecution of the work being done, and 
the altogether different duty of an owner or contractor 
not in control of the work being done to warn or guard 
against concealed or latent dangers on the premises. As 
we have seen, these duties are separate and distinct, and 
confusion results when they are articulated by the same 
or similar words. It is accurate to say that an employer or 
person in control of the premises and the work being 
done must provide a safe place to work, but it is 
inaccurate and misleading to say that an owner or general 
contractor [**10] not exercising direction over the 
particular work being performed is under such an 
obligation. 
Although Judge Ritter did use the phrase "safe place 
within which to perform their work" to describe Texaco's 
legal obligation to the employees of Sayer's, he did not 
stop there but went on to explain the meaning of his 
words: "this duty required [Texaco] to use reasonable 
care to inspect the equipment, and particularly the horse's 
head and walking beam and other units of the pumping 
equipment, to repair the same when necessary, and to 
keep the horse's head securely fastened to the walking 
beam." We think his explanation sufficiently advised the 
jury that Texaco's legal duty was to guard against hidden 
dangers inherent in the premises rather than unsafe 
conditions incident to or created by the work being done, 
and enabled the jury to arrive at an intelligent verdict. 
Complaint is also made of the trial judge's refusal to 
allow counsel for Texaco to argue to the jury that the 
"polished rod clamp" caught on the horsehead and pulled 
it from the walking beam. The polished rod clamp is a 
"little box contraption" attached to the polished rod. The 
superintendent in charge of Sayer's servicing [**11] 
operation testified that the clamp had been removed 
during the "bumping operation". [*242] Another 
witness, the operator of the diesel engine, testified that 
the clamp had been "removed in order for me to touch 
bottom." Pruitt, when asked what caught on the 
horsehead, if anything, replied: "I was presuming in my 
mind that the polish rod clamp caught it. * * * But I 
didn't see it, and I don't know." 
We agree with the trial judge that the evidence was 
insufficient to allow Texaco "to take that clamp to the 
jury." It appears to be undisputed that the clamp was 
removed from the polished rod. Moreover, Texaco was 
not prevented from presenting its causal theory of the 
accident to the jury. It apparently was given wide latitude 
to argue that some other object, such as the block, hook, 
elevator or box (a coupling between two sections of rod), 
caught on the horsehead and pulled it from the walking 
beam. 
Texaco next asserts that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to submit to the jury the question of contributory 
negligence on the part of Pruitt. It is argued that Pruitt 
was negligent in that: (1) he walked out on the walking 
beam and should have seen whether or not the horsehead 
was [**12] properly attached, and (2) he placed himself 
under the horsehead when the servicing unit was lifting 
the rods. 
We agree with Judge Ritter that there was no 
evidence of contributory negligence. The walking beam 
was two to three feet in depth, and the slot for the bolt 
was located near the bottom of the beam. Certainly a 
man on top of the beam would be in no position to 
observe that a bolt underneath was not of the proper size. 
Nor was Pruitt negligent in placing himself under the 
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horsehead when the rods were being lifted. He was not at 
a place he should not have been; instead, he was 
stationed at his post of duty next to the stuffing box. 
Moreover, it was customary to leave the horsehead on 
the walking beam while performing this "bumping" type 
operation. The horsehead was not in motion, but had 
been stopped on the downstroke and a brake applied. In 
our opinion there was nothing to indicate that any danger 
would be involved in working beneath it. 
Finally, Texaco contends that the trial judge 
erroneously refused to reduce the amount of the 
judgment awarded Pruitt by $18,000-the amount of 
workmen's compensation benefits paid to Pruitt. The 
argument is that the trial judge should have [**13] held 
Sayer's negligent as a matter of law, or in any event, 
submitted that issue to the jury; and that because of its 
negligence, Sayer's and its insurance carrier, standing in 
its shoes, are precluded from recovering the amount of 
compensation benefits paid to Pruitt. 
Section 35-1-62 of the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act, which authorizes an injured and 
compensated employee to bring an action against a third 
party wrongdoer, also provides that "if any recovery is 
obtained against such third person * * * the person liable 
for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full 
for all payments made." It does not by its terms preclude 
a negligent employer or its insurance carrier from 
recovering the amount paid to the injured employee. 
There is, however, respectable authority denying 
reimbursement to such employer or carrier on the 
principle that "[one should not] profit from its own 
wrong." Witty. Jackson, 57 CaUd57, 17 CalRptr. 369, 
366 P.2d 641, 650 (1961). See also Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Adams, 91 Idaho 151, 417 P.2d 417 
(1966). Although admitting that the majority of 
jurisdictions have held that a third party tortfeasor cannot 
assert [**14] the concurrent negligence of the employer 
as a defense, whether the employer, the employer's 
carrier, or the employee has brought the action against 
him, n3 Texaco argues [*243] that Witt and and Adams, 
being California and Idaho decisions, would be highly 
persuasive on the Utah courts, which have not faced the 
problem. 
n3 Baker v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 199 
F.2d 289; Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112 F. Supp. 
526; Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 
GaApp. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384; Fidelity & Casualty 
Co. v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 
174N.W. 709; City ofShreveportv. Southwestern 
Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785; 
General Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co., 331 
Mo. 845, 55 SW.2d 442; Utley v. Taylor & 
Gaskin, 305Mich. 561, 9N.W.2d842; Graham v. 
City of Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305, 183 N.W. 569; 
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern California 
Petroleum Corp., 67N.M. 137, 353P.2d358. 
[**15] 
Judge Ritter refused to consider or submit the issue 
of Sayer's negligence to the jury, holding that it had no 
bearing on the carrier's right to reimbursement. He 
reasoned that "the legislature legislated in this area with 
some particularity * * *. They mention that the carrier is 
entitled to be reimbursed, and that is unqualified. If they 
had meant to impute the negligence of the employer to 
the insurance carrier, they very easily could have said so 
* * *." Where the state supreme court has not ruled upon 
the precise question before us, we will accept the Federal 
trial judge's interpretation of his state law unless 
convinced that he is clearly wrong. See Rooney v. 
Mason, 394 F.2d 250 (10 CA May 13, 1968); Adams v. 
Erickson, 394 F2d 171 (10 CA May 10, 1968); Smith v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 10 Cir., 382 F.2d 190. In this 
case we certainly cannot so say. 
Affirmed. 
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WESTERN PIPELINE COMPANY, Appellees 
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December 18,1997, Opinion Issued 
NOTICE: [*1] PURSUANT TO THE TEXAS 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHALL NOT BE CITED 
AS AUTHORITY BY COUNSEL OR BY A COURT. 
PRIOR HISTORY: On Appeal from the 165th District 
Court. Harris County, Texas. Trial Court Cause No. 92-
23124. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, contractors 
employee and his wife, sought review of a judgment 
from the 165th District Court, Harris County (Texas) 
entered on a directed verdict for appellee principal 
employer in appellants' claims for negligence and loss of 
consortium. 
OVERVIEW: Appellee principal employer was 
building a 900-mile pipeline. In Utah, appellant 
employee of appellee's contractor was severely injured 
when equipment failed and the contractor's foreman 
negligently decided to back a crane down a hill. 
Appellant sued appellee for negligence, and his wife 
sued for loss of consortium. Applying Utah substantive 
law and Texas procedural law, the trial court directed a 
verdict for appellee. On appeal, the court affirmed. 
Appellee was not liable because it did not actively 
participate in its contractor's work, it did not have a 
nondelegable duty or an assumed duty of care to 
appellant employee, and appellant wife could not 
maintain her spousal consortium claim under Utah law. 
Appellee did not direct, control, or superintend its 
contractor's work as contemplated by the Dayton line of 
cases. The court held Utah would not recognize an 
employer's liability to its independent contractor's 
employee injured during the course of inherently 
dangerous work. 
OUTCOME: The judgment for appellee in appellants' 
loss of consortium and negligence claims was affirmed. 
Utah law did not recognize loss of consortium for the 
spouse of a person injured by a third party, and appellee 
did not actively participate in its contractor's work, have 
a nondelegable duty of care, or an assumed duty of care 
to appellant employee. 
CORE TERMS: contractor, right-of-way, crane, 
inherently dangerous, pin, pipeline, duty, sideboom, 
accelerated, precautions, directed verdict, reserved, 
independent contractor, superintend, unsafe, active 
participation, work schedule, consortium, spread, boom, 
actively participated, inspector, overrule, hill, general 
rule, spousal, repair, dicta, vice president, rights-of-way 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law 
[HN1] A motion for directed verdict is proper when: (1) 
a defect in the opponent's pleading makes it insufficient 
to support a judgment, (2) the evidence conclusively 
proves facts establishing the movant's right to judgment, 
or negates the nonmovant's right to judgment, as a matter 
of law, or (3) the evidence is legally insufficient to raise 
a fact issue on a proposition necessary to entitle the 
nonmovant to judgment. 
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Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law 
[HN2] In reviewing a directed verdict, the court must 
determine whether there is any evidence of probative 
force to raise fact issues on the material questions 
presented. The court considers all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom the 
verdict was instructed and disregard all contrary 
evidence and inferences, giving the losing party the 
benefit of all inferences raised by the evidence. If there is 
any conflicting evidence of probative value on any 
theory of recovery, the instructed verdict was improper, 
and the court must reverse and remand for a jury 
determination of that issue. The court must affirm a 
directed verdict, even if the trial court's rationale for 
granting it was erroneous, if it can be supported on 
another basis. 
Torts > Damages > Consortium Damages 
[HN3] See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 (1995). 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort 
Liability > Independent ContractorsLabor & 
Employment Law > Employer Liability > Contract 
Liability > Third Party Liability 
[HN4] As a general rule under Utah law, a principal 
employer is not liable for injuries caused by its 
contractor's negligence, unless the principal actively 
participates in the work's performance. Utah law 
recognizes three exceptions to this rule: (1) the injury is 
the direct result of the stipulated work; (2) the work to be 
performed is inherently dangerous, and the injury is the 
consequence of the contractor's failure to take 
appropriate precautions; or (3) the injury was caused by 
the non-performance of an absolute, nondelegable, duty 
the principal employer owed the injured party, 
individually or to the class of persons to which he 
belongs. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties 
[HN5] To determine whether a principal employer 
actively participates in work's performance, the court 
examines whether the principal employer reserved the 
right to direct, control, or superintend the work. The 
court also examines whether the principal employer in 
fact directed or controlled the time and manner of doing 
the work, or the means and methods by which the results 
were to be accomplished. The injury must be caused by 
the act of performance, not merely the manner of 
performance over which the principal employer 
exercised neither direction, control, nor supervision. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties 
[HN6] A contractual clause giving a principal employer 
the right to retain 10 percent of any amounts invoiced by 
its contractor until the project's completion has been held 
to not justify a finding that the principal company 
reserved the right to direct, control, or superintend the 
contractor's work. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties 
[HN7] Requiring a contractor to fire any of its workers 
whom the principal employer, in its sole discretion, 
deems to be unsafe, unqualified, or the like has been 
held, when considered in the context of the entire 
contract, not to be a reservation of the right to direct, 
control, or superintend the independent contractor's 
work. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties 
[HN8] A clause requiring a contractor to remedy any 
imperfect or insufficient work, when pointed out by the 
principal employer's engineers, does not reserve the right 
to direct, control, or superintend the contractor's work. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties 
[HN9] A clause allowing the principal employer to 
terminate a contract at will if the contractor fails or 
refuses to do the amount of work agreed upon, does not 
reserve the right to direct, control, or superintend the 
contractor's work. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties 
[HN10] Utah law recognizes a principal will be liable for 
injury caused to others by its contractor when the work it 
hires the contractor to perform is inherently dangerous 
and appropriate precautions are not taken. Whether the 
principal is liable to its contractor's employees under this 
inherently dangerous exception is another matter. 
Jurisdictions split on whether a contractor's employees 
fall within the protected class under this doctrine. 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Duty GenerallyBusiness & 
Corporate Entities > Agency > Agents Distinguished > 
Independent Contractors, Masters & Servants 
[HN11] When a person employs a contractor to do work 
lawful in itself and involving no injurious consequences 
to others, and damage arises to another through the 
negligence of a contractor or his servants, the contractor, 
and not the employer, is liable. 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on 
Evidence 
[HN12] The exclusion of evidence is committed to the 
trial court's sound discretion. For the exclusion of 
evidence to constitute reversible error, an appellant must 
show: (1) the trial court committed error and (2) the error 
was reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did 
cause, rendition of an improper judgment. This standard 
usually requires the complaining party to show that the 
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judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded. 
Accordingly, the exclusion of cumulative evidence is not 
reversible error. The court reviews the entire record. 
JUDGES: Michael H. Schneider, Chief Justice. Justices 
Taft and Bass nlO also sitting. 
nlO The Honorable Sam H. Bass, retired 
Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas 
at Houston, sitting by assignment. 
OPINIONBY: Michael H. Schneider 
OPINION: OPINION 
This lawsuit arises from an injury that occurred 
during the construction of the Kern River Pipeline (the 
pipeline). The trial court granted appellees's motion for 
directed verdict after appellants (together, the Erwins) 
rested. We affirm. 
Standard of Review 
[HN1] A motion for directed verdict is proper when 
(1) a defect in the opponent's pleading makes it 
insufficient to support a judgment, (2) the evidence 
conclusively proves facts establishing the movant's right 
to judgment, or negates the nonmovant's right to 
judgment, as a matter of law, or (3) the evidence is 
legally insufficient to raise a fact issue on a proposition 
necessary to entitle the nonmovant to judgment. [*2] 
Neller v. Kirschke, 922 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.--
Houston [1st Dist] 1995, writ denied). 
[HN2] We must determine whether there is any 
evidence of probative force to raise fact issues on the 
material questions presented. Szczepanik v. First S. Trust 
Co., 883 S. W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1994); Jordan v. Jordan, 
938 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 
1997, no writ). We consider all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was 
instructed and disregard all contrary evidence and 
inferences, giving the losing party the benefit of all 
inferences raised by the evidence. Szczepanik, 883 
S W.2d at 649; Jordan, 938 S. W.2d at 179. If there is any 
conflicting evidence of probative value on any theory of 
recovery, the instructed verdict was improper, and we 
must reverse and remand for a jury determination of that 
issue. Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649; Jordan, 938 
S. W.2d at 179. We must affirm a directed verdict, even if 
the trial court's rationale for granting it was erroneous, if 
it can be supported on another basis. Kelly v. Diocese of 
Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. App.-Corpus 
Christi 1992, writ dism'd [*3] w.o.j.). 
Background 
The construction project to build the pipeline (the 
project) was a joint venture of the Williams Companies 
and Tenneco, and was carried out under the auspices of 
Kern River Gas Transmission Company. Kern River Gas 
Transmission Company is a general partnership, in 
which Kern River Corporation and Williams Western 
Pipeline Company are partners, nl 
The pipeline was to extend 900 miles, from Wyoming to 
California. 
nl We refer to appellees Kern River 
Transmission Company, Kern River Corporation, 
and Williams Western Pipeline Company 
collectively as "Kern River." 
Kern River contracted with Associated Pipeline 
Contractors, Inc. (APC) to assist in part of the pipeline's 
construction. Shane Erwin was APC's employee; Angela 
Erwin is his wife. The entire project was divided into 
eight sections, called "spreads." APC worked on spread 
two, which contained Utah's Wasatch mountains (the 
Wasatch area). Shane Erwin was injured in these 
mountains. 
Kern River wanted to have gas flowing through [*4] 
the entire pipeline in a year, originally setting the 
completion date for the Wasatch area at early October 
1991. Kern River wanted to finish before winter set in, 
which would preclude further work in the Wasatch area 
until late spring of 1992. However, the Wasatch area 
work was delayed for various reasons. Therefore, the 
work schedule was accelerated to meet the completion 
deadline. 
On the day of the accident, Pete Logan, APC's 
bending crew foreman, was pulling a truck, loaded with 
pipe, up a steep grade in the Wasatch area with a 
sideboom crane. A sideboom crane is not normally used 
for this. As Logan was driving the sideboom crane down 
the hill, one of its pivot pins fell out. This caused the 
crane's boom to cock sideways. Logan and Shane Erwin 
noticed the fallen pin. 
This was a dangerous situation, because the crane's 
boom could break and fall. Therefore, Logan stopped the 
crane, at which point he and the workers around him 
(including Shane Erwin) were temporarily safe. There 
was not enough room to fix the crane's pin, so Logan 
began backing the crane down the hill. Logan was 
responsible for clearing the area before doing this. Shane 
Erwin positioned himself in what he thought [*5] was a 
safe place, on the opposite side of the boom. However, 
the boom broke free, swung around the other side of the 
crane, and pinned Shane Erwin's right leg to the ground. 
His leg had to be amputated below the knee. No one 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 4 
1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6685, * 
from Kern River was present when the accident 
occurred. 
Shane Erwin sued Kern River for negligence in 
causing his injuries. Angela Erwin sued Kern River for 
loss of consortium and her husband's services. 
Directed Verdict 
In point of error one, the Erwins claim the trial court 
erred in granting Kern River's motion for directed verdict 
because, under Utah law, they had proved a prima facie 
case of liability against Kern River under three theories. 
n2 
These theories were that Kern River (1) negligently 
exercised control over the project, (2) breached a 
nondelegable duty of care to Shane Erwin, and (3) 
assumed a duty of care to him. 
n2 The accident occurred in Utah. Neither 
party contested, on appeal or below, the 
application of Utah substantive law. Texas law 
governs procedural and evidentiary matters, 
however. See Penny v. Powell, 162 Tex. 497, 347 
S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tex. 1961); Paine v. Moore, 
464 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 
1971, no writ). 
[*6] 
A. Angela Erwinfs Consortium Claims 
In a footnote to its brief, Kern River argues Angela 
Erwin is not a proper party to this appeal, because Utah 
does not recognize her loss-of-consortium claims. In an 
oral motion for directed verdict, Kern River argued 
Angela Erwin could not maintain a consortium claim 
under Utah law. n3 
Because the trial court's final judgment directed a verdict 
against Angela Erwin, she may appeal it. 
n3 In the oral motion, Kern River argued: (1) 
Angela Erwin could not maintain a consortium 
claim; (2) there was no evidence of Kern River's 
negligence, or that Kern River controlled or 
participated in the construction; (3) there was no 
proximate cause between Kern River's actions 
and Shane Erwin's injuries; (4) APC's employee's 
negligence was an unforeseeable, superseding 
cause of the injury; (5) no evidence supported a 
gross negligence instruction; (6) and the 
"inherently dangerous" exception, which the 
Erwins argued would create a duty on Kern 
River's part, did not apply. Kern River neither 
pleaded nor asserted the workers's compensation 
bar. See UTAH CODE ANN. § § 35-1-42, 35-1-
60 (1994). The trial court's final judgment recited 
the Erwins had proffered either no or insufficient 
evidence. 
[*7] 
We conclude a directed verdict was properly granted 
on Angela Erwin's claims. Utah law does not allow the 
spouse of a person injured by a third party to recover for 
loss of consortium. n4 
[HN3] 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1995); Cruz v. 
Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 869, 871 (Utah 1988); Hackford 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1287-88; 
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, 986 
(Utah 1972); Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 648 F. Supp. 
160, 163 (D. Utah 1986) (applying Utah law). While the 
Utah Legislature this year passed a statute allowing 
spousal consortium claims, the statute applies only to 
spouses of persons injured by a third party after May 4, 
1997 . See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11 (Supp. 1997). 
We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly directed a 
verdict against Angela Erwin's spousal consortium and 
service claims. 
n4 It appears Utah would consider a claim 
for loss of spousal services to be part of a spousal 
consortium claim. See Hackford v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah 1987) 
(Durham, J., dissenting, noting the definition of 
"consortium" includes company, society, 
cooperation, affection, and aid) (citing Black's 
Law Dictionary 280 (5th ed. 1979)); Ellis v. 
Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, 985, 
986 (Utah 1972) (treating wife's claims for loss 
of support, companionship, love, and affection as 
prohibited loss-of-consortium claims). 
[*8] 
B. Kern River's Liability 
[HN4] As a general rule under Utah law, a principal 
employer is not liable for injuries caused by its 
contractor's negligence, unless the principal actively 
participates in the work's performance. See Dayton v. 
Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 411, 412 (Utah 1914); 
Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F2d 274, 275-76 
(10th Cir. 1979) (applying Utah law); Texaco, Inc. v. 
Pruitt, 396 F2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying 
Utah law); Simon v. Deery Oil, 699 F. Supp. 257, 258 
(D. Utah 1988) (applying Utah law). Utah law 
recognizes three exceptions to this rule: (1) the injury is 
the direct result of the stipulated work; (2) the work to be 
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performed is inherently dangerous, and the injury is the 
consequence of the contractor's failure to take 
appropriate precautions; or (3) the injury was caused by 
the non-performance of an absolute (nondelegable) duty 
the principal employer owed the injured party, 
individually or to the class of persons to which he 
belongs. Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 
1225, 1232 (Utah 1937); Dayton, 148 P. at 411. 
1. Active Participation in Contractor's Work 
The Erwins first [*9] argue Kern River actively 
participated in the project. [HN5] To make this 
determination, we examine whether Kern River reserved 
the right to direct, control, or superintend APC's work. 
Dayton, 148 P. at 411; accord, see Callahan v. Salt Lake 
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863, 865 (Utah 1912); cf. 
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 227, 228 
(Utah 1977) (under workers's compensation statute); 
Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809, 811 
(Utah 1949) (distinguishing independent contractor from 
servant). We also examine whether Kern River in fact 
directed or controlled the time and manner of doing 
APC's work, or the means and methods by which the 
results were to be accomplished. Dayton, 148 P. at 411; 
see Gleason, 74 P. 2d at 1234; cf. Kippen v. Jewkes, 258 
F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1958) (applying Utah law and 
quoting Dowsett). The injury must be caused by the act 
of performance, not merely the manner of performance 
over which Kern River exercised neither direction, 
control, nor supervision. See Dayton, 148 P. at 412; 
accord Simon, 699 F. Supp. at 259. 
The Contract's Terms 
The Erwins initially argue the contract reserved 
[*10] to Kern River the right to participate actively in 
the project. We disagree. 
First, the Erwins point to [HN6] the contractual 
clause giving Kern River the right to retain ten percent of 
any amounts invoiced by APC until the project's 
completion. The Erwins argue this clause provided Kern 
River economic leverage over APC. In Dayton, however, 
the Utah Supreme Court held an almost identical 
provision did not justify a finding that the principal 
company reserved the right to direct, control, or 
superintend the contractor's work. Dayton, 148 P. at 
410, 411. 
Second, the Erwins point to paragraph 11.4, which 
[HN7] requires APC to fire any of its workers whom 
Kern River, in its sole discretion, deems to be unsafe, 
unqualified, or the like. The Dayton court found a similar 
clause, when considered in the context of the entire 
contract, not to be a reservation of the right to direct, 
control, or superintend the independent contractor's 
work. Dayton, 148 P. at 410, 411. Similarly, the 
Callahan court found an almost identical clause not to 
reserve such rights. Callahan, 125 P. at 863, 865. 
Third, the Erwins focus on paragraph 19.5, which 
allows Kern River's inspectors to stop [*11] APC's work 
if, among other things, it is not being performed strictly 
according to the contract's terms; APC's work is risking, 
threatening, or damaging any property; or the work is not 
being done safely. Such a provision has been found 
insufficient to make the principal liable. See United 
States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 30, 31 (10th Cir. 1965) 
(under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)); Thompson v. 
Timpanogos Metals, 762 F. Supp. 927, 929 (D. Utah 
1991) (FTCA). The Dayton court found [HN8] a clause 
requiring the contractor to remedy any imperfect or 
insufficient work, when pointed out by the principal 
employer's engineers, did not reserve the right to direct, 
control, or superintend the contractor's work. Dayton, 
148 P. at 411; see Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 
634, 635 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding right to prescribe and 
impose safety regulations created no liability under 
FTCA); Page, 350 F.2d at 31 (same); Thompson, 762 F. 
Supp. at 929 (holding no liability even though principal 
had right to inspect, and inspectors visited site weekly 
and directed contractor to comply with safety 
requirements); cf. Intermountain Speedways, Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, [*12] 101 Utah 573, 126 P.2d 22, 
24 (Utah 1942); Angel v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 
105, 228 P. 509, 512 (Utah 1924) (finding no "control" 
under workers's compensation law when supervision was 
to ensure work was being performed in workmanlike 
manner). If, as in Dayton, no such right is reserved when 
the contract allows the principal to dictate repairs, then 
no such right is reserved when the principal, as here, has 
the authority to stop work upon detection of safety or 
other problems. 
Finally, the Erwins argue [HN9] a clause allowing 
Kern River to terminate the contract at will granted Kern 
River ultimate control over the project. The Dayton court 
rejected the argument that a clause allowing the principal 
employer to terminate the contract, if the contractor 
failed or refused to do the amount of work agreed upon, 
reserved the right to direct, control, or superintend the 
contractor's work. Dayton, 148 P. at 410, 411; cf. 
Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 
136, 140 (Utah 1946) (finding unilateral right to 
discharge not controlling factor under workers's 
compensation law); Gogoff v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 
Utah 355, 296 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1931) (finding [*13] 
independent contractor relationship under workers's 
compensation law when either party could terminate with 
three-days's notice). In light of Dayton, we hold this 
termination clause does not reserve to Kern River those 
active participation rights. 
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We also note that paragraph 24.1 of the contract 
specifically stated APC was an independent contractor, 
and that it alone was to select the means, manner of 
performance, and methods for its work. See Gogoff, 296 
P. at 230. The contract also left to APC the job of 
procuring and servicing materials, equipment, and labor. 
See Callahan, 125 P. at 863. Considering the contract as 
a whole, we find the contract did not reserve to Kern 
River the right to direct, control, or superintend APC's 
work. 
Actual Control 
Alternatively, the Erwins argue Kern River actually 
participated in the project, regardless of the contract's 
terms. The Erwins's theory is three-fold: (1) Kern River 
exercised economic pressure over APC, causing APC to 
rush work and compromise safety; (2) Kern River's 
acceleration of the work schedule set the stage for APC's 
unsafe work practices, which led to the accident; and (3) 
Kern River directly exercised [*14] control by directing 
the construction of the Wasatch area right-of-way, the 
negligent design of which the Erwins say was a cause of 
the accident. We set out the applicable evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the Erwins, below. 
The contract required Kern River to provide APC 
with a right-of-way and access to it. For various reasons, 
Kern River could not provide all the right-of-way and 
access in spread two Kern River had originally promised. 
Kern River and APC discussed these rights-of-way and 
access problems. At some point, Kern River asked APC 
to identify areas in spread two where additional rights-
of-way were needed. APC did not always ask for 
additional space, and it apparently did not ask for 
additional space at what was later the accident site. 
The Erwins rely on the testimony of Earl Harrison, 
APC's foreman over the project's right-of-way. Harrison 
and Shane Erwin testified the right-of-way bordering the 
accident site was too narrow and insufficiently leveled. 
Harrison testified Kern River's inspector and 
construction supervisors would not let him build the 
right-of-way in the manner he wanted, and that he had to 
build it on Kern River's accelerated time schedule. [*15] 
n5 
He said Kern River's construction superintendent told 
him the right-of-way should be built just to look like a 
right-of-way from a forest ranger's helicopter. Harrison 
also stated the same individual agreed the working 
conditions were dangerous, that a right-of-way was not 
being built, and that someone would probably get killed 
on the job. Other than with respect to this right-of-way, 
there is no evidence Kern River ever directed the 
specifics of APC's day-to-day activities on the project. 
n5 For example, Harrison testified Kern 
River's superintendent told him he had to build a 
12-mile right-of-way in under two weeks, or 
about 1,000 feet a day with each bulldozer, or 
Kern River would shut the job down. Harrison 
told Kern River's superintendent it was 
impossible to cut the right-of-way in that time. 
Because the right-of-way was too steep and its dirt 
was too loose, even a 4-wheel drive truck could not drive 
on it. Trucks could not, therefore, climb the hill to reach 
equipment needing service. The record [*16] discloses 
that, on construction jobs like this, equipment 
breakdowns are foreseeable, and it is important to have 
trucks available to reach the equipment for repairs. 
When a sideboom crane's pin comes out, the proper 
procedure is to lay the boom down, bring up another 
crane, and repair the pin. n6 
However, this procedure could not be followed, because 
two cranes could not drive at the same time on the right-
of-way. The Erwins's safety expert said having sufficient 
work space in the Wasatch area was critical to safety, 
and the right-of-way was not wide enough for safety 
purposes. Therefore, the expert concluded Kern River's 
involvement in the right-of-way's construction affected 
the work's safety. APC's former vice president admitted 
the right-of-way's terrain bore on safety. 
n6 If a sideboom crane's pivot pin is not 
lubricated, it seizes up, putting the pin in a 
position where it can break and fall out. It was 
not uncommon for these pins to fall out, 
especially in terrain like that in the Wasatch area. 
It was undisputed that APC, not Kern River, was 
responsible for greasing these pins and 
maintaining the sideboom crane and its 
equipment. Prior to the accident, APC did not 
know these pins required lubrication. 
[*17] 
Kern River either requested or ordered APC to 
accelerate the Wasatch work schedule, and APC agreed. 
To meet the accelerated schedule, APC concentrated its 
workers and equipment in the Wasatch mountain area. 
Kern River knew of and condoned APC's mobilization 
efforts. APC decided to concentrate its resources at the 
location, at least in part, because it wanted to work for 
Kern River again. Kern River also paid APC about $ 32 
million extra for this change in schedule and work. APC 
faced possibly great financial loss if it did not complete 
the project in the time required. For example, Kern River 
could have fired APC, which could have put APC out of 
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business. APC also wanted to get along with Kern River 
to get repeat business. 
The Erwins's safety expert testified this mobilization 
to the Wasatch area was in total disregard for safety. The 
expert also testified time pressures such as those 
experienced on spread two affect safety. The expert 
further stated the accelerated schedule deprived the 
Wasatch area crews of proper equipment. For example, 
dozers would have been available to do what Logan had 
been trying to do (incorrectly) with a sideboom crane had 
the work schedule not been accelerated. [*18] The 
expert thus concluded Kern River caused the accident, 
although he agreed Logan's negligence was also a cause. 
Kern River had various supervisors and inspectors 
who periodically visited the project. It appears the 
inspectors^ visits were to assure safety and workmanlike 
performance, as provided in the parties's contract. APC 
also had its own safety representative for the project. 
Any work problems were to be reported to APC's on-site 
foreman. APC's former vice president said APC did not 
expect Kern River to check daily on APC's equipment or 
to run its safety program; rather, it was APC's 
responsibility under the contract. APC had experience in 
building pipelines in the mountains. Its employees were 
experienced and trained in laying pipe. APC's former 
vice president said APC brought expertise to the project, 
expertise Kern River did not have. 
The Erwins argue these facts show Kern River 
exercised economic pressure over APC, causing APC to 
rush work and compromise safety. Closely related is 
their argument that Kern River's acceleration of the work 
schedule set the stage for APC's unsafe work practices, 
which led to the accident. We examine these two theories 
of active participation [*19] together. 
An independent contractor undoubtedly always has 
incentive to do that which its principal employer wants 
done, within the time it wants that done. Such economic 
pressure, which appears to exist here, is not tantamount 
to Kern River's directing or controlling the day-to-day 
manner of doing APC's work, or the means and methods 
by which the results were to be accomplished. See and 
compare Dayton, 148 P. at 411-12. Control of the 
overall schedule should not suffice. This is especially 
true where it is uncontested APC agreed to the 
accelerated schedule and the mobilization to the Wasatch 
area, and Kern River paid APC for this change. APC 
could have told Kern River it could or would not carry 
out its work under an accelerated schedule, but APC 
chose not to. While there was expert testimony the 
accelerated work schedule was unsafe, that it caused a 
shortage of equipment, and that this shortage may have 
led to Logan's using inappropriate equipment on the day 
of the accident, the record does not show Kern River 
actively participated in anything other than the ultimate 
schedule. Indeed, under the contract and in practice, APC 
was responsible for providing workers and equipment 
[*20] regardless of the schedule. 
The Erwins do not cite a case in which mere 
economic incentive or coercion, or the acceleration of a 
schedule, sufficed to show a principal's active 
participation. Neither have we found a Utah case so 
holding. In the absence of such a case, we find the 
general rule on active participation of Dayton and its 
progeny controlling. We hold any economic pressure 
Kern River may have exercised over APC, and its mere 
acceleration of the project's schedule, did not constitute 
the sort of active participation contemplated by the 
Dayton line of cases. 
The Erwins also argue Kern River actively 
participated in the project by directing the construction 
of the Wasatch area right-of-way, the negligent design of 
which they say caused the accident. Kern River relies on 
the fact that, although Kern River was to provide the 
rights-of-way, APC agreed to have some restriction in 
the Wasatch area and did not request a broader one at the 
accident site. We find this persuasive. We also find 
persuasive that APC agreed to and was paid more for 
working under the accelerated schedule. Although APC 
advised Kern River of its mobilization in the Wasatch 
area, it was APC's responsibility [*21] to provide 
sufficient equipment and labor. The record further 
discloses Kern River's only involvement in APC's day-
to-day activities (other then Kern River's safety and 
performance inspections) was its one-time involvement 
with the right-of-way. 
Additionally, even if Kern River actively 
participated one time in the right-of-way's specifics, the 
injury did not directly result from this participation. See 
Gleason, 74 P.2d at 1232; Dayton, 148 P. at 411. The 
boom swung free after the pin holding it broke. It was 
undisputedly APC's responsibility to repair and maintain 
these pins and its other equipment. Under the contract 
and in practice, APC, not Kern River, furnished and 
supplied all tools, labor, and equipment for the work. 
Neither does anyone dispute that Logan should not have 
used a sideboom crane to do what he was doing when the 
crane's pin broke. No one from Kern River was present 
or directed the manner or means of APC's work at the 
time of the accident. There is no indication Kern River's 
inspectors knew APC was using sideboom cranes for this 
purpose. No one from Kern River advised Logan to use a 
sideboom crane, to back it down the hill after the pin fell 
out, or to [*22] do so without first ensuring everyone 
was clear. APC, not Kern River, made these daily 
decisions. The equipment's failure, and the negligent 
decision to use the crane and to back it down the hill 
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without clearing all workers, directly caused Shane 
Erwin's accident. 
Accordingly, we overrule point of error one on this 
ground. 
2. Nondelegable Duty: Inherently Dangerous Activity 
Also in point of error one, the Erwins argue Kern 
River is liable because the project was inherently 
dangerous. See Dayton, 148 P. at 412. n7 
We need not decide whether the project was inherently 
dangerous, because we find Shane Erwin was not within 
the class protected by the doctrine under Utah law. 
n7 In addition to the facts set out above, the 
Erwins point to the undisputed testimony that the 
Wasatch area was the steepest, most dangerous, 
and roughest part of spread two. Kern River knew 
of the Wasatch mountains's steep and treacherous 
nature. 
[HN10] Utah law recognizes a principal will be 
liable for injury caused to others [*23] by its contractor 
when the work it hires the contractor to perform is 
inherently dangerous and appropriate precautions are not 
taken. Sullivan v. Utah Gas Serv. Co., 10 Utah 2d 359, 
353 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah 1960) (in dicta, citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965)); 
Gleason, 74 P.2d at 1232; Dayton, 148 P. at 411. 
Whether the principal is liable to its contractor's 
employees under this "inherently dangerous" exception is 
another matter. Jurisdictions split on whether a 
contractor's employees fall within the protected class 
under this doctrine. See Francis M. Dougherty, 
Annotation, Liability of Employer with Regard to 
Inherently Dangerous Work for Injuries to Employees of 
Independent Contractors, 34 A.L.R. 4th 914 (1984). The 
Erwins claim Utah law applies the inherently dangerous 
exception to a contractor's employees; Kern River claims 
it does not. 
Each party cites the Dayton decision and correctly 
notes it is the only Utah decision discussing the issue. In 
Dayton, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether the 
principal employer was liable for its contractor's 
employee's injuries occurring during the blasting of an 
underground tunnel. [*24] Id. at 411-12. The court first 
cited various treatises and secondary sources for the 
general rule that liability attaches only where inherently 
dangerous work caused injury to "another" or "third 
persons." Id. at 412; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 427 (1965). In dicta, the Dayton court 
elaborated as follows: 
But it is said developing an underground tunnel by 
blasting is dangerous. Dangerous to whom? Here, only to 
those engaged in and about the work. So is feeding a 
threshing machine or working at sawmilling dangerous. 
An inexperienced employe, unguarded against attendant 
dangers and attempting such work, may possibly be 
injured. Who, if anyone, owes him duties of warning and 
protection? He who employed or directed or controlled 
him, or directed or controlled the threshing or sawing. 
Certainly not the farmer, who did no more than merely 
contract with the thresher to thresh his grain, or with the 
sawmiller to saw his timber.. . 
Here, the stipulated work itself, constructing and 
developing the tunnel, did not involve injurious or 
mischievous consequences to others. And the injury to 
plaintiff was not caused from the act of performance, but 
from [*25] the manner of performance over which, as 
has been seen, the company neither reserved nor 
exercised direction, control, or supervision. We think, 
therefore, that the case comes within the general rule that 
[HN11] when a person employs a contractor to do work 
lawful in itself and involving no injurious consequences 
to others, and damage arises to another through the 
negligence of a contractor or his servants, the contractor, 
and not the employer, is liable. 
Id. at 412. The Dayton court held that the principal had 
no liability because (1) the work was not inherently 
dangerous and (2) the manner of doing the work, over 
which the principal had no control, caused the accident, 
not the work's intrinsic nature. Id. at 412. However, we 
find the Dayton decision strongly indicates, by using the 
above-quoted language and by consistently speaking of 
danger "to others," the inherently dangerous exception 
would not extend to the contractor's employees. Id. at 
412. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has, in dicta, 
interpreted Dayton similarly. See Page, 350 F.2d at 33-
34. In Page, the district court had found the United 
States liable for injuries to a contractor's [*26] employee 
under the FTCA. Id. at 30. The district court had based 
its decision in part on its conclusion the work was 
inherently dangerous. Id. While noting Utah law did not 
apply, the district court had nonetheless stated it believed 
the government would be liable under Utah law, as 
expressed in Restatement of Torts (Second) section 427. 
n8 
In reversing on other grounds, the Page court noted that 
Dayton, like the law in other jurisdictions, casted serious 
doubt on whether the doctrine applied to the contractor's 
employees. Id. at 33-34. The dicta in Page supports our 
interpretation of Dayton. See also Sew ell, 606 F.2d at 
279 (Doyle, J., dissenting) (quoting language from 
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unpublished opinion on first appeal that inherently 
dangerous exception likely does not apply to contractor's 
employees); Eutsler, 376 F.2d at 636 (finding, under 
federal law, no duty to contractor's employees for 
inherently dangerous work). 
n8 Section 427 provides, "One who employs 
an independent contractor to do work involving 
special danger to others which the employer 
knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or 
normal to the work, or which he contemplates or 
has reason to contemplate when making the 
contract, is subject to liability for physical harm 
to such others by the contractor's failure to take 
reasonable precautions against such danger." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 
(1965) (emphasis added). 
[*27] 
The Erwins rely on Simon, which in turn relied on 
Dayton, to conclude that an independent contractor's 
employee falls under the inherently dangerous doctrine. 
Simon, 699 F. Supp. at 259. The Simon court did not 
discuss the above-quoted language from Dayton, which 
we find actually undermines Simon's conclusion. Id 
Additionally, the Simon decision inadvertently 
misquoted Dayton by stating, "This is not to say that a 
principal can never be liable for injuries sustained by an 
employee of an independent contractor. The three 
recognized exceptions to this rule in Utah are . . . ." Id. 
(emphasis added). The Dayton court, however, had 
defined "this rule" as applying to "third persons" or 
"others." Dayton, 148 P. at 411, 412. The only other 
cases cited by Simon with respect to the inherently 
dangerous rule involved injury to a third person ( Wilson 
v. Good Humor Corp., 244 U.S. App. DC. 298, 757 F.2d 
1293, 1303 (D.C Cir. 1985)), or held the inherently 
dangerous exception inapplicable to a contractor's 
employees ( Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 
1212, 1217-19 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
The Dayton decision indicates [*28] a contractor's 
employee does not fall under the protected class of 
Utah's inherently dangerous doctrine. While the Simon 
decision is to the contrary, we may not follow it when 
the Utah Supreme Court has indicated otherwise. 
Accordingly, we hold Utah would not recognize an 
employer's liability to its independent contractor's 
employee injured during the course of inherently 
dangerous work. Therefore, Kern River cannot be liable 
to Shane Erwin under this theory, and we overrule point 
of error one on this ground. 
3. Assumed Duty of Care 
Also under point of error one, the Erwins claim Kern 
River assumed a duty of care to Shane Erwin, which duty 
Kern River breached. They argue that Kern River 
expressly adopted a duty to APC's employees in an 
operation plan, entitled the Construction, Operation, and 
Maintenance Plan (COM Plan), Kern River devised for 
the project. The trial court excluded the COM Plan and 
testimony explaining it. If this document and testimony 
were properly excluded, the record contains no evidence 
to support Kern River's liability under this theory, and 
we must affirm point of error one. If this evidence was 
improperly excluded, precluding the record from [*29] 
containing evidence to support the Erwins's liability 
theory, a directed verdict would have been improper. 
Therefore, we first examine whether the COM Plan and 
the related testimony were properly excluded. 
Exclusion of Evidence 
In points of error two and three, the Erwins claim 
the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony and 
the COM Plan. 
[HN12] The exclusion of evidence is committed to 
the trial court's sound discretion. City of Brownsville v. 
Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995); Felker v. 
Petrolon, Inc., 929S.W.2d460, 467(Tex. App.-Houston 
[1st Dist] 1996, writ denied). For the exclusion of 
evidence to constitute reversible error, an appellant must 
show (1) the trial court committed error and (2) the error 
was reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did 
cause, rendition of an improper judgment. McCraw v. 
Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1992). This standard 
usually requires the complaining party to show that the 
judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded. 
Alvarado, 897 S. W.2d at 753-54; Stuart v. Bayless, 945 
S.W.2d 131, 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1996, 
no writ) (op. on rehearing). Accordingly, the exclusion 
[*30] of cumulative evidence is not reversible error. 
Reina v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 
611 S.W.2d415, 417 (Tex. 1981); British Am. Ins. Co. v. 
Howerton, 877 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.-Houston 
[1st Dist] 1994, writ dism'd by agr.). We review the 
entire record. Alvarado, 897 S. W.2d at 754. 
COM Plan and Related Testimony 
The resolution of the remainder of the Erwins's first 
point of error depends on whether the COM Plan and 
related testimony were correctly excluded. In point of 
error two, the Erwins argue the trial court improperly 
excluded the COM Plan and testimony relating to it. 
Kern River had to adopt the COM Plan before 
federal governmental agencies would grant Kern River 
rights-of-way on federal land. See 43 U.S.C. § 1764(d) 
(1995); 36 CF.R. § 25154(e)(4) (1997); 43 C.F.R. § 
2882.3(m) (1996). Kern River perceived the COM Plan 
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as a commitment or agreement with the governmental 
agencies granting Kern River permits. By its own terms, 
the COM Plan was drafted for the federal government 
principally to address environmental concerns. 
The Erwins rely on the following COM Plan section 
to support their argument: 
8.0 Safety [*31] Policies and Program 
8.1 Purpose 
The purpose of these policies and program is to provide 
minimum requirements that shall be followed by Kern 
River during construction operations. It is intended to 
provide for the safety and welfare of contractor 
employees, Kern River's personnel, and the general 
public. 
8.2 Plan 
8.2.1 Kern River shall be solely responsible for initiating, 
implementing, maintaining, and supervising all safety 
precautions and programs in connection with 
construction. This shall include employee safety training 
and prompt elimination of all unsafe physical and/or 
mechanical conditions. The contractors shall take any 
precautions necessary to ensure the safety of all proposed 
personnel and property. 
The Erwins argue that Kern River assumed a duty to 
them under Restatement of Torts (Second) section 323 by 
adopting section eight of the COM Plan. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
n9 
As is clear from the text and its own commentary, this 
section applies only to one undertaking a service to 
another. The Erwins claim Kern River assumed the 
following "services" to APC's employees, including 
Shane Erwin: [*32] (1) "to provide for the safety and 
welfare of contractor employees" (P 8.1) and (2) "[to] be 
solely responsible for initiating, implementing, 
maintaining, and supervising all safety precautions and 
programs in connection with construction" (P 8.2.1). 
However, the Erwins overlook paragraph 8.2. l's 
explanation for which "safety precautions and programs" 
Kern River took responsibility: "This shall include 
employee safety training and prompt elimination of all 
unsafe physical and/or mechanical conditions." The 
COM Plan then clearly provides that contractors, not 
Kern River, will be responsible for taking precautions to 
ensure the safety of all personnel, such as Shane Erwin. 
This was also APC's duty under article 17 of the parties's 
contract. 
n9 "One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of the other person or things, is subject 
to liability to the other for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to 
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
323 (1965). Utah has adopted Restatement of 
Torts (Second) section 323. See Weber v. 
Springville, 725 P.2d 1360, 1364 n. 7, n. 8 (Utah 
1986); DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 
433, 436 (Utah 1983). 
[*33] 
Therefore, even if the COM Plan could somehow 
create a duty from Kern River to APC's employees, 
which we need not decide, no such duty was created 
here. The COM Plan was, therefore, irrelevant. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding the 
evidence relating to the COM Plan. We overrule point of 
error two. 
Because the COM Plan and related testimony were 
properly excluded, the record contains no evidence to 
support the Erwins's assumed duty argument. 
Accordingly, we overrule the final ground under point of 
error one. 
Testimony of Pipeline's Cost 
In point of error three, the Erwins contend the trial 
court erred in excluding the deposition testimony of 
Cuba Wadlington, Kern River's vice president, 
concerning the pipeline's cost, because they claim the 
testimony was relevant to show Kern River's motive to 
exercise improper control over the construction methods 
causing the accident. The excluded testimony was as 
follows: 
Q: All right, sir. At the time that your company formed a 
partnership with Tenneco, which became Kern River Gas 
Transmission Company, what was generally the 
projected cost of the project to completion so that the gas 
could flow through [*34] the pipe, the entire project? 
A: It seems to me that the cost of the pipeline was always 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 800 plus million 
dollars, was what we were looking at. 
Q: All right, sir. Did you have . . . projections as to when 
that cost could be recovered, how long that might take? 
A: Well, it was just - it was really a function ~ a 
function of the type of contracts that we entered into. 
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And at the time we were doing the feasibility study, we 
were looking at 20-year contracts with the intent of 
having out all of our capital recovered by the 20th year. 
Q: Without needing to know the actual figures, did the 
project end up, ballpark, of what you expected, around 
800 million, something like that? 
A: Yes. The ultimate cost turned out to be 900 - I think 
about $ 980 million. But that was a very acceptable 
overrun for that size of a project. 
The Erwins argued below this testimony was 
relevant because it showed Kern River's motivation for 
rushing the project: the sooner the project was done, the 
sooner Kern River could start moving gas through the 
pipeline. The Erwins argued that, based on the total 
project cost, one could deduce the monthly profits [*35] 
necessary to recover costs and the amount Kern River 
would lose if the project were delayed by a few months. 
We have already held that Kern River's economic 
motivation for accelerating the project had no bearing on 
whether Kern River actively participated in the day-to-
day details of APC's work. Therefore, the testimony was 
irrelevant. Additionally, while this testimony shows the 
overall project's cost, it does not, as the Erwins claim, 
state that specific, monthly profits from the pipeline's use 
are necessary to meet Kern River's economic needs. 
Further, Wadlington was not qualified as an economic 
expert, and the excluded testimony did not consider 
economic factors other than customers's use of the 
pipeline that might allow Kern River to pay the pipeline's 
costs. Finally, the jury later heard testimony that whether 
the job was completed on schedule had an enormous 
impact on Kern River's economics. Therefore, the 
excluded testimony was cumulative of evidence already 
before the jury. See Reina, 611 S. W.2d at 417. We hold 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, under these 
circumstances, in excluding this testimony. See 
Alvarado, 897 S W.2d at 753. 
We overrule point [*36] of error three. 
Conclusion 
We affirm the trial court's judgment. 
/s/Michael H. Schneider 
Chief Justice 
Justices Taft and Bass nlO also sitting. 
nlO The Honorable Sam H. Bass, retired 
Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas 
at Houston, sitting by assignment. 
Opinion issued and judgment rendered 
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28 
1 Q Thank you. And that's for what part of the 
2 Highland project? 
3 A The rough framing. 
4 Q And how much is that proposal? 
5 A $156,000. 
6 Q Does it include anything other than the rough 
7 framing? 
8 A It talks about them installing framing 
9 anchors, nails, framing hardware, things like that. 
10 Q All connected with framing; is that correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Does it have any provision there about timing? 
13 A This is not a very good copy of that. 
14 Q • I understand, but it's the one that was given 
15 to us. 
16 A I don't think it does say anything about 
17 timing. 
18 MR. MORIARITY: If counsel has a better copy, 
19 and you have an opportunity, we'd appreciate it, but 
20 it's —. 
21 MR. DAVENPORT: Off the record. That's what 
22 I've got. I don't have a better one either. 
23 MR. MORIARITY: I figured as much. It 
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24 appeared that it must have been folded or something and 
25 come that way. Thank you very much. 
29 
1 Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) You heard Maurice Egbert 
2 testify regarding representations of a seven-week 
3 completion time and number of framers on the job when 
4 you were here this morning or earlier today, did you 
5 not? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Do you know where that came from? 
8 A The seven-week process? 
9 Q Yes. 
10 A I believe we would have established a schedule 
11 for the project. It would have come from that schedule. 
12 Q Established by whom, the seven-week 
13 scheduling? 
14 A Probably Joel. 
15 Q Okay. And the number of framers on the job, 
16 who would that have come from? 
17 A Are you talking about the letter, one of those 
18 letters that was — said that he promised 12 or --
19 Q Yes. Let me show you that letter, if it will 
20 help refresh your memory. Ifm not talking about that 
21 letter specifically, sir, but herefs what — Exhibit 16. 
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Q So did you actually know how to frame? 
A No. I'd never framed a building before. 
Q Okay. So your experience in carpentry 
consisted of? 
A I knew how to use the saw. I knew how to use 
the hammer. I didn't know how to frame, though. 
Q And you were hired? 
A Yeah. 
Q How much money did you make? 
A I want to say eight. I believe eight bucks an 
hour. 
Q If you remember. 
A I think it was eight. 
Q And did Mr. Egbert or anyone else train you 
after you got hired, before you started working on the 
church? 
A As we were working. It was kind of an 
on-the-job training. 
Q And what sort of training did you receive? 
A When I was doing something wrong, somebody 
would tell me. Pretty much that was it. 
Q Who would tell you? 
A Just one of the more experienced framers. 
Sometimes ~ Ken Egbert really wasn't there very much, 
s o . . . 
Page 7 
Q Who else did you work with? 
A Just the crew, Ken Egbert's crew. 
Q Ken Egbert's crew, and who else did you say? 
A Maurice Smith, I think was his name, was the 
general contractor. Maurice something. I don't 
remember his last name. 
Q We can call him Maurice. And that was who? 
A He was the general contractor. 
Q And what, if any, instructions did he give 
you? 
A Really nothing. I mean, it was pretty much 
on-the-job training. I remember, you know, they came 
out and they would say, Look, here's an easier way to do 
it. You can do it like uiis. And they would show me. 
Q Who would show you? 
A Any one of the more experienced people that 
worked there. 
Q Did Maurice ever show you how to do anything? 
A No. 
Q Did he ever tell you what to do? 
A Well, actually that's not true, I better take 
that back. There was - 1 think it was my first or 
second day, and we were - there was like three of us 
there standing a wall. I think it was like me and 
25 Maurice and Ken. Oh, and another guy. I don't remember 
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his name. And he told me -- they taught me -- they just 
showed me how to raise the wall. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Are you saying Maurice Egbert, 
the general contractor, or are you saying ~ 
THE WITNESS: Well, Ken Egbert was actually 
telling me to do it, but Maurice was there. I think he 
was in the trailer or something. I don't know where he 
was. I 
MR. DAVENPORT: There's a big difference 
between ~ 
THE WITNESS: Okay, sorry. 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I'm just asking you, what 
did Maurice, if anything, tell you to do? 
MR. DAVENPORT: Keep in mind, distinguish Ken 
Egbert and Maurice. 
THE WITNESS: Really, nothing. Honestly, I 
never talked to Maurice more than one or two words, more 
than, you know, if I needed to ask him a question or 
something. I never really talked to him very much. 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Did he ever tell you you 
were doing something wrong and to stop it? 
A No. That would more be the other framers. 
Q Who showed you how to raise a wall? 
A Ken Egbert. 
Q Okay. 
Page 9 
A He taught me the proper way, you know, how to 
stand when you're holding the wall. You don't want to 
stand right up to it. You've got to put your foot back, 
you know, be ready to brace it, and bail if it goes out 
of the way. 
Q Okay. 
A That's what he told me. 
Q Do you remember Jason Smith? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you know Jason Smith? 
A He had been working there for maybe like two 
or three days. Just a couple of days. 
Q Did he get trained along with you? 
A No. He started after I did. 
Q And what, if anything, did he do, if you know 
what he did? 
A He was the same as I was; he was a laborer. 
Q And he worked for who? 
A He worked for Ken Egbert. 
Q And did you have any supervisors when you 
worked with Ken Egbert? 
A Oh, man. We had -- there was Ken, and I guess 
one ofthe other supervisors, his name was Manny. And I 
then there was this guy named Dale. And they were 
always fighting with each other. 
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1 Q How, if at all, did they supervise you? 
2 A Like I said, if I was doing something wrong, 
3 you know, if I was cutting a board wrong, they'd come 
4 tell me. 
5 Q How did you know what boards to cut or what 
6 walls to build? 
7 A They would tell me. See, usually what I would 
8 do is, I would cut the boards for them, and they would 
9 actually put the boards together, because I was just 
0 learning. That's kind of how it goes when you're in 
1 that business. 
.2 Q And so you would cut the boards. They would 
[ 3 assemble the wall? 
[4 A They'd say, I need 10 boards at 82 and a half 
15 inches or whatever, so I'd go cut 10 boards and bring 
16 them over to them. Sometimes I would assemble the wall. 
L7 Q How did you know how to assemble a wall? 
18 A I was taught how. 
19 Q By? 
20 A By Manny. 
21 Q Do you know if Jason assembled any walls? 
22 A You know, I think from most of what I saw him 
23 doing, he did mostly cutting. 
24 Q Okay. Did you stand up any walls? 
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1 Q Who told you how to stand up a wall? 
2 A Ken Egbert. 
3 Q And how do you stand up a wall? 
4 A Well, you - just depending on the size of the 
5 wall. Sometimes, if the wall was a real big wall, we 
6 would use the forklift, and they'd suspend like tow 
7 straps to the top of the wall and raise the wall with a 
8 forklift. But if it was a smaller wall that we could 
9 lift ourselves, we would stand it. Someone else would 
10 go around and position the wall into the bolts. You 
11 know, sometimes they'd use a board and jack underneath 
12 it to lift the wall up onto the bolts if it wasn't quite 
13 on there. You know, there would always be people 
14 raising the wall. 
15 And then once the wall was up, you put an 
16 A-frame on it. Once you have it down on the bolts, then 
17 you put an A-frame and a brace on it. 
18 Q But not before? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Okay. Do you know who Brent Reynolds is? 
21 A No. I recognize the name from the legal 
22 papers, but that's it. 
23 Q But you don't know how, if at all, he was 
24 involved in the framing process? 
25 A No. 
= - - : : : ' ' • : - - : • • • . : ' . • • : — " ~ — • : . • • . : • • • . , • : : • . • . • . . . / ' ' . " . , " " . . . ' : . • • • • ' 
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1 Q Do you know who Brent Reynolds Construction, 
2 Inc. is? 
3 A I've heard of them. 
4 Q From the court papers? 
5 A Yeah. ft 
6 Q That I've sent you? 
7 A Well, just in the construction business, I've 
8 heard of them. 
9 Q Do you remember August 13 of 1999? 
10 A Was that the day of the accident? 
11 Q Yes. t 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Tell me what happened on that day. 
14 A Well, we had just finished eating lunch, and 
15 there was a wall that had already been built, and 
16 Manny - 1 think it was Manny - told me and Jason and a 1 
17 guy named Jose to go put it up. 
18 Q Okay. And then what happened? 
19 A So we went over there, and we lifted it up, 
20 and it wasn't quite onto the bolts, so Jason and Jose 
21 were holding it, and I went to go get a board, and I was 
22 going to, you know, try to use the leverage and jack it 
23 up onto the bolts. And I put it under there, and as 
24 soon as I put some pressure on there, the wall came 
25 down. Jose bailed out of the way, and it was like 
1 
1 
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1 Jason, he tried to catch it, and he kind of crouched 
2 down. I don't know if he was trying to catch it or 
3 what, it just came down on him. 
4 And they lifted the wall up, and Jason was 
5 just laying there. There was already a puddle of blood 
6 around his head like this. At first, I didn't know it 
7 was going to be serious. I thought he was knocked out 1 
8 or something, but I saw the blood. 
9 And we started yelling for help, and Maurice 
10 came out of the trailer, and the other guys, everyone 
11 else was working on the east - yeah, the east side of 
12 the church, and there was a big wall already built on 
13 that side, so they couldn't really see into the church. 
14 I don't know if you guys have been out there 
15 and seen the site or anything, but it's more on the west 1 
16 side of the church where it happened. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A So they all came running over from there, and 
19 Maurice got his cell phone, called the police, fire 
20 department. 
21 Q And an ambulance came? 
22 A Yeah. And some guy came that - 1 guess he 
23 had a scanner or something. He was just a doctor. He 
24 was driving by, so he stopped. He got there way before 
25 the ambulance did. 
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1 Q The wall you were lifting, how big was it? 
2 A Maybe like - 1 mean, it wasn't that big. 
3 Maybe like six feet long, eight feet long, probably like 
4 eight feet high. 
5 Q Do you know how heavy it was? 
6 A It was heavy. Heavy. I mean the three of us, 
7 it took the three of us really trying to lift it. It 
8 was made out of LVL. 
9 Q LVL? 
0 A It's a synthetic wood. It's much heavier. 
1 Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
2 you needed more men to lift that wall than you had? 
3 A Honestly, I don't think so. I mean, because I 
4 framed for quite - for like two years after that, and I 
5 would say no. 
6 Q Do you know what, if anything, Jason did 
7 wrong? 
.8 A He should have bailed. He should not have 
.9 tried to catch the wall. He should have bailed out to 
10 the side. 
>1 Q And let the wall fall down? 
12 A Yeah. 
>3 Q And did you have an opportunity to bail or not 
14 bail? 
i5 A I was on the other side of the wall. I wasn't 
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1 on the side that fell. 
2 Q And how did you know to bail when the 
3 circumstances called for it? 
4 A That was pretty much the first thing Ken 
5 Egbert told me when we were putting the wall up. He 
6 said, If anything happens, if it starts to go, don't 
7 worry about the wall, we can always rebuild the wall, 
8 just get out of the way, let it fall. 
9 Q And do you know if Jason received those same 
10 instructions? 
LI A I don't. I don't know if he did or I don't 
12 know if he didn't. 
13 Q Well, he wasn't present when you received 
14 them? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Did you receive any safety instruction or 
17 training? 
18 A Not really. I mean, I think I remember a 
19 couple of safety meetings, but that was before Jason was 
20 ever on the crew. He was only on the crew for two or 
21 three days. 
22 Q You remember attending safety meetings before 
23 Jason was on the crew? 
24 A Yeah, I think so. And the safety meetings was 
25 just, Okay, we have to wear hard hats, this is a 
I 
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1 commercial site, make sure you're wearing your hard 
2 hats, just stuff like that. 
3 Q How many days were you on the crew before the 
4 accident happened? 
5 A You know, probably about a month. 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A We'd been working on it for quite a while. 
8 Maybe not quite a month, but for a few weeks, at least. 
9 Q Do you know how many men were on your crew, 
10 men or women? 
11 A At the time of the accident? 
12 Q Prior to the accident. 
13 Well, you said you were working on the crew 
14 for some time prior to August 13; correct? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q August 13,1999--
17 A It was always changing. Guys were coming and 
18 going. Ken would get new guys in. He'd hire - a bunch J 
19 of temp workers would come in for like a week or so and 
20 leave. 
21 Q Were you there from the beginning? 
22 A Yeah, I was there from ~ 
23 Q So approximately your first day at work, how 
24 many men were on the crew? 
25 A My first day at work, it was just me and Manny 
1 
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1 and one other guy, one other kid that Ken had hired to 
2 be a laborer. 
3 Q Do you remember his name? 
4 A I don't remember the kid's name. 
5 Q Do you know whether it was Jose? 
6 A No, it wasn't Jose. 
7 Q And then at some point in time, Jason was 
8 hired on? 
9 A Yeah. I think because like his uncle worked 
10 on there or something. I'm not sure. 
11 Q Do you know how many men were on the crew by 
12 the time Jason was hired on? 
13 A There was probably like 15 or 20. I don't 
14 know an exact number, I couldn't give you that, but an 
15 estimate, 15,20. 
16 Q Okay. Did you wear a hard hat when you were 
17 working for Egbert Construction doing the framing? 
18 A Most of the time. 
i 
19 Q Were you wearing one on August 13? 
20 A No, I wasn't. 
21 Q Do you know if Jason was wearing one? 
22 A No, he wasn't. I 
23 Q Did you own one prior to August 13? 
24 A Yes. Most of the time they really didn't 
25 enforce it. Most of the time they made you wear a hard 
I 
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1 hat if you were working under somebody that was working 
2 above you or something. 
3 Q So it was at your option whether or not you 
4 were going to wear a hard hat? 
5 A Well, we were told to wear them all the time, 
6 but, you know, I mean, they're not there to babysit us, 
7 so . . . 
8 Q Right. Did you wear any other - 1 call it 
9 protective gear, but anything like a hard hat? 
[0 A Just a hard hat. 
[ 1 Q Goggles, gloves, steel-toed boots? 
[ 2 A Yeah, I did wear -- we had to have safety 
[3 glasses. 
[ 4 Q And you wore those? 
[5 A Yes. 
1 6 Q Do you know if you were wearing them on the 
17 13th? 
.8 A Probably. I wore them every day, because they 
9 were my sunglasses. It got way too bright out there 
50 without them. 
\\ Q Now, you were mentioning some documents you 
\2 signed - before we got started. 
3^ A Yeah, I believe so. 
\A Q Well there's an affidavit of Michael Lewis and 
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1 can mark them, and then I'll ask you about them. 
2 (Exhibit No. 40 and 41 were marked for 
3 identification.) 
4 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Take a look at 
5 Exhibits 40 and 41. 
6 A Yeah, I've seen this one. 
7 Q Well, they're pretty similar. 
8 A The only one I was a little concerned about 
9 was No. 9, when it says, "In my opinion, Hales & Warner 
0 Construction, Inc., including Maurice Egbert, were not 
1 in any way at fault in the accident involving Jason 
2 Smith." 
3 I just - I've been feeling uncomfortable 
4 making a judgment on that call, because I'm not a judge. 
5 I don't know the legal proceedings of it. I don't know, 
6 I just don't feel comfortable. 
Q I smile, because that's more or less what the 
8 judge said, at least as I can recall. 
9 What, if anything, would you like to alter or 
0 edit or change about No. 9? 
1 A I was just thinking, if you could take it out, 
2 it would be all right with me. 
3 Q Do you know whether or not Hales & Warner was 
4 at fault in the death of Jason Smith? 
5 A I'm - like I say, I'm not a judge. How am I 
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1 supposed to know? I don't know the legal part of it. 
2 Q Okay. Well, why did you sign the affidavit? 
3 A I don't know. At the time I thought it 
4 sounded like a good idea. 
5 Q All right. 
6 A It just got on my conscience. You know, I 
7 would be reading it over and just thinking about it. It 
8 was just something that was eating away at me. 
9 Q All right. Is there any other portion of that 
10 Exhibit 40 that maybe you have some second thoughts 
11 about? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Okay. And can you take a look at Exhibit 41? 
14 A Is this the same one? 
15 Q It's different. It doesn't have your 
16 signature, but it's identical to the one that does. 
17 MR. DAVENPORT: Is that the second affidavit? 
18 MR. BADARUDDIN: Of Michael Lewis, correct. 
19 MR. DAVENPORT: Actually, there's one that has 
20 your signature. 
21 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I remember you guys coming 
22 out twice, I think. 
23 MR. DAVENPORT: Well, one's related to Hales & 
24 Warner and one is related to the Church of Jesus Christ 
25 of Latter-day Saints, and the second one was prepared by 
P 1 
r 
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1 the Church attorney. 
2 THE WITNESS: Okay. Is it pretty much the 
3 same? 
4 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) It's a little different. 
5 A Where are the differences? 
6 Q Well, let me take a look at it. You're 
7 welcome to read along. It looks like paragraph 8 is a p 
8 little different, and then there's a completely new 9. 
9 Why don't you tell me whether you still stand 
10 by the allegations in paragraphs 8 and 9. 
11 A Okay. 
12 MR. DAVENPORT: Is this of the second 
13 affidavit? 
14 MR. BADARUDDIN: Correct, Exhibit 41. 
15 THE WITNESS: Well, eight, I would have to say 1 
16 that sounds good, because I've never even met Dean 
17 Schick. 
18 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. 
19 A They had no control over any of that. No. 9, 
20 you know, I guess that's the same thing. I'm not a 
21 judge, but on the other hand, logic says to me, It's 
22 just a person, how can they be responsible? You know 
23 what I mean? Yeah, it was their building. But I don't 
24 know. That's just -- like I say, it's not my position, 
25 I guess, to make the call, because I don't know the law. 
| 
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But I don't know. It just doesn't sound ~ it sounds 
like quite a stretch trying to blame the Church for it, 
to be honest with you. 
Q Let me just ask you this. You're not swearing 
to paragraph 9 at this time, are you? 
A No. 
Q You don't really have an opinion with regard 
to whether or not the Church is or is not at fault? 
A Well, my opinion is that they're not, but 
my - is my opinion credible? No. That's what I'm 
saying here. 
Q All right. And then what does paragraph 8 
say? 
Paragraph 8, you don't know who Dean Schick 
is? 
A No. I've never even met him or -
Q Do you know who Paul Evans is? 
A No. 
Q Do you know whether or not he gave you or Ken 
Egbert or Brent Reynolds any instructions? 
A I never even talked to anybody from the 
Church. The only time I talked to anybody from the 
Church was the stake president that was going to be over 
the building. That was at Jason's funeral. 
Q What did y'all talk about then? 
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A Well, he was saying that he was going to put 
up like a monument or something, a little something in 
memory of Jason. 
Q He expressed some remorse about Jason's death? 
A Yes. I don't know if that ever happened or 
not, but that's what he told us. 
Q Okay. Do you know who the architect was on 
this project? 
A No. 
Q Do you know whether or not you had any 
discussions with him? 
A No. I never personally, no. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Some 
of the other gentlemen may have some questions, but I 
don't. I appreciate you coming down. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry I was late. 
MR BADARUDDIN: That's all right. 
MR. DAVENPORT: I've got some. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR DAVENPORT: 
Q Do you want me to call you Mr. Lewis or 
Michael or Mike or what? 
A Mike, whatever. I don't even care. 
Q Mike, I'm going to probably ask you some of 
the same type of questions, but I just want to make sure 
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I'm clear. So if you think, well, I already answered 
that, you have, and ~ 
A It's okay, I understand that. 
Q First, I want to make sure that you understand 
that Ken Egbert and Ken Egbert Construction are separate 
and apart from Maurice Egbert, who was the employee of 
Hales & Warner. 
You understand that? 
A Yeah, I understand that. 
Q And in the deposition of Maurice Egbert, as 
well as others that have been deposed, and the 
affidavits of not only yourself, but the other people 
we've obtained affidavits from, from Ken Egbert, all 
have indicated that Maurice Egbert, himself, the 
employee of Hales & Warner, never gave instructions to 
you or Jason Smith or Jose as to going and lifting that 
wall. And that's consistent with your testimony today; 
correct? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q And also, everybody indicated that Maurice 
Egbert did not teach you or Jason Smith how to lift the 
wall; is that correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
A Well, to be honest with you, no one really 
P 1 
p 
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[1 
taught Jason Smith how to do anything. 
Q Okay. 
A That's the problem I've got. It might be a 
problem. I don't know who's at fault. Like I say, I'm 
not the person to make that call, but the only training 
he had as far as raising a wall was, we were raising a 
wall and he wasn't doing it right, and he was just 
coming over to help, and he was just standing right next 
to it, he wasn't holding onto it that well. He didn't 
have his foot out to brace in case it came back. One of 
the other framers said to him, Hey, you know, you should 
kick your other foot back and brace yourself, hold the 
wall, you know. As far as I know, that's all the 
training he had. 
Q Okay. And Maurice Egbert's testimony was - 1 
think this is consistent with what you already said 
today, is that at the time of the accident, he was in 
the construction trailer. 
A Yes. 
Q That's your understanding, also? 
A Yeah, that's where I think he was. 
Q And you had previously indicated that the 
initial stages of this job, as it relates to the 
starting of the rough carpentry work, you were there 
from the beginning; correct? 
k 
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1 problem as it relates to a particular wall, wherein your 
2 supervisors went and talked to Maurice Egbert, and if 
3 so, did you hear what they had to say? 
4 A Well, I don't know any particular incident, 
5 but I mean, it's — 
6 Q I'm not asking you to say, well, you're sure 
7 it happened. I want to know just what you actually 
8 heard someone do. 
9 A No, I never saw it happen, no. That's not 
10 true, because they were always talking to each other. 
11 That's part of the construction site. You know, the 
12 general tells the subcontractor, the lead framer, Bruce 
13 Lemmon, Maurice would tell him, Okay, we need to get 
14 this done today. And then Bruce would hand the orders 
15 down to us. 
16 Q I guess what I'm saying is, I just wanted to 
17 be clear as to what you actually heard versus what 
18 you're just assuming, because you saw someone talking? 
19 A I couldn't even tell you how many times I saw 
20 them talking, but I don't listen to their conversations, 
21 so I can't tell you what was said. 
22 MR. DAVENPORT: That's what I'm getting at. 
23 Thank you. 
24 MR. BADARUDDIN: Nothing. Thanks for your 
25 time and trouble. 
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1 (Deposition concluded at 5:07 p.m.) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 56 L 
1 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
2 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
3 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
4 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
5 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
6 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
7 . Page Line Correction 
Reason g 
8 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
9 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
10 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
11 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
12 . Page Line Correction 
Reason 
Page 57 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 1 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of 
MICHAEL LEWIS, the witness in the foregoing deposition 
named, was taken before me, V K I E . HATTON, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and j 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That the said witness was by me, before 
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was 
reported by me in Stenotype and thereafter caused by me 
to be transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said testimony so 
taken and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing 
pages numbered from 4 through 55, inclusive, and said 
witness deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed 
deposition. 
I further certify that after the said 
deposition was transcribed, the original of same was 
delivered to Mr. Lewis, the witness, for reading and 
signature, signed before a Notary Public, and to be 
returned to me for filing with the Clerk of the said 
Court. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or | 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the § 
events thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 10th day of March, 2003. 
VKI E. HATTON, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
Utah License No. 93 
My Commission Expires: 
June 9,2006 
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r a g e l OI 1 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965) 
Restatement of the Law — Torts 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Current through June 2003 
Copyright © 1965-2004 by the American Law Institute 
Division 2. Negligence 
Chapter 15. Liability Of An Employer Of An Independent Contractor 
Topic 1. Harm Caused By Fault Of Employers Of Independent Contractors 
§ 414. Negligence In Exercising Control Retained By Employer 
Link to Case Citations 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of 
any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety 
the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to 
exercise his control with reasonable care. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. If the employer of an independent contractor retains control over the operative detail of doing 
any part of the work, he is subject to liability for the negligence of the employees of the contractor 
engaged therein, under the rules of that part of the law of Agency which deals with the relation of 
master and servant. The employer may, however, retain a control less than that which is necessary to 
subject him to liability as master. He may retain only the power to direct the order in which the work 
shall be done, or to forbid its being done in a manner likely to be dangerous to himself or others. Such 
a supervisory control may not subject him to liability under the principles of Agency, but he may be 
liable under the rule stated in this Section unless he exercises his supervisory control with reasonable 
care so as to prevent the work which he has ordered to be done from causing injury to others. 
b. The rule stated in this Section is usually, though not exclusively, applicable when a principal 
contractor entrusts a part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman 
superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the principal contractor is subject to liability if he 
fails to prevent the subcontractors from doing even the details of the work in a way unreasonably 
dangerous to others, if he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care should know that the 
subcontractors' work is being so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it by exercising the power of 
control which he has retained in himself. So too, he is subject to liability if he knows or should know 
that the subcontractors have carelessly done their work in such a way as to create a dangerous 
condition, and fails to exercise reasonable care either to remedy it himself or by the exercise of his 
control cause the subcontractor to do so. 
c. In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least 
some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has 
merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to 
prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does 
not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There 
must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work 
in his own way. 
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